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Abstract
We present the first constructions of single-prover proof systems that achieve perfect zero knowledge (PZK) for
languages beyond NP, under no intractability assumptions:
1. The complexity class #P has PZK proofs in the model of Interactive PCPs (IPCPs) [KR08], where the verifier
first receives from the prover a PCP and then engages with the prover in an Interactive Proof (IP).
2. The complexity class NEXP has PZK proofs in the model of Interactive Oracle Proofs (IOPs) [BCS16, RRR16],
where the verifier, in every round of interaction, receives a PCP from the prover.
Unlike PZK multi-prover proof systems [BGKW88], PZK single-prover proof systems are elusive: PZK IPs are
limited to AM ∩ coAM [For87, AH91], while known PCPs and IPCPs achieve only statistical simulation [KPT97,
GIMS10]. Recent work [BCGV16] has achieved PZK for IOPs but only for languages in NP, while our results go
beyond it.
Our constructions rely on succinct simulators that enable us to “simulate beyond NP”, achieving exponential sav-
ings in efficiency over [BCGV16]. These simulators crucially rely on solving a problem that lies at the intersection of
coding theory, linear algebra, and computational complexity, which we call the succinct constraint detection problem,
and consists of detecting dual constraints with polynomial support size for codes of exponential block length. Our
two results rely on solutions to this problem for fundamental classes of linear codes:
• An algorithm to detect constraints for Reed–Muller codes of exponential length.
• An algorithm to detect constraints for PCPs of Proximity of Reed–Solomon codes [BS08] of exponential degree.
The first algorithm exploits the Raz–Shpilka [RS05] deterministic polynomial identity testing algorithm, and shows, to
our knowledge, a first connection of algebraic complexity theory with zero knowledge. Along the way, we give a per-
fect zero knowledge analogue of the celebrated sumcheck protocol [LFKN92], by leveraging both succinct constraint
detection and low-degree testing. The second algorithm exploits the recursive structure of the PCPs of Proximity to
show that small-support constraints are “locally” spanned by a small number of small-support constraints.
Keywords: probabilistically checkable proofs, interactive proofs, sumcheck, zero knowledge, polynomial identity testing
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2
1 Introduction
We study proof systems that unconditionally achieve soundness and zero knowledge, that is, without relying on in-
tractability assumptions. We present two new constructions in single-prover models that combine aspects of proba-
bilistic checking and interaction: (i) Interactive Probabilistically-Checkable Proofs [KR08], and (ii) Interactive Oracle
Proofs (also called Probabilistically Checkable Interactive Proofs) [BCS16, RRR16].
1.1 Proof systems with unconditional zero knowledge
Zero knowledge is a central notion in cryptography. A fundamental question, first posed in [BGKW88], is the follow-
ing: what types of proof systems achieve zero knowledge unconditionally? We study this question, and focus on the
setting of single-prover proof systems, as we now explain.
IPs and MIPs. An interactive proof (IP) [BM88, GMR89] for a language L is a pair of interactive algorithms (P, V ),
where P is known as the prover and V as the verifier, such that: (i) (completeness) for every instance x ∈ L , P (x)
makes V (x) accept with probability 1; (ii) (soundness) for every instance x 6∈ L , every prover P˜ makes V (x) accept
with at most a small probability ε. A multi-prover interactive proof (MIP) [BGKW88] extends an IP to the case where
the verifier interacts with multiple non-communicating provers.
Zero knowledge. An IP is zero knowledge [GMR89] if malicious verifiers cannot learn any information about an
instance x in L , by interacting with the prover, besides the fact x is in L : for any efficient verifier V˜ there is an
efficient simulator S such that S(x) is “indistinguishable” from V˜ ’s view when interacting with P (x). Depending
on the notion of indistinguishability, one gets different types of zero knowledge: computational, statistical, or perfect
zero knowledge (respectively CZK, SZK, or PZK), which require that the simulator’s output and the verifier’s view
are computationally indistinguishable, statistically close, or equal. Zero knowledge for MIPs is similarly defined
[BGKW88].
IPs vs. MIPs. The complexity classes captured by the above models are (conjecturally) different: all and only
languages in PSPACE have IPs [Sha92]; while all and only languages in NEXP have MIPs [BFL91]. Yet, when
requiring zero knowledge, the difference between the two models is even greater. Namely, the complexity class of SZK
(and PZK) IPs is contained in AM ∩ coAM [For87, AH91] and, thus, does not contain NP unless the polynomial
hierarchy collapses [BHZ87].1 In contrast, the complexity class of PZK MIPs equals NEXP [BGKW88, LS95,
DFK+92].
Single-prover proof systems beyond IPs. The limitations of SZK IPs preclude many information-theoretic and
cryptographic applications; at the same time, while capturing all of NEXP, PZK MIPs are difficult to leverage in
applications because it is hard to exclude all communication between provers. Research has thus focused on obtaining
zero knowledge by considering alternatives to the IP model for which there continues to be a single prover. E.g.,
an extension that does not involve multiple provers is to allow the verifier to probabilistically check the prover’s
messages, instead of reading them in full, as in the following models. (1) In a probabilistically checkable proof (PCP)
[FRS88, BFLS91, FGL+96, AS98, ALM+98], the verifier has oracle access to a single message sent by the prover;
zero knowledge for this case was first studied by [KPT97]. (2) In an interactive probabilistically checkable proof
(IPCP) [KR08], the verifier has oracle access to the first message sent by the prover, but must read in full all subsequent
messages (i.e., it is a PCP followed by an IP); zero knowledge for this case was first studied by [GIMS10]. (3) In an
interactive oracle proof (IOP) [BCS16, RRR16], the verifier has oracle access to all of the messages sent by the prover
(i.e., it is a “multi-round PCP”); zero knowledge for this case was first studied by [BCGV16]. The above models are in
order of increasing generality; their applications include unconditional cryptography [GIMS10], zero knowledge with
black-box cryptography [IMS12, IMSX15], and zero knowledge with random oracles [BCS16].
1A seminal result in cryptography says that if one-way functions exist then every language having an IP also has a CZK IP [GMR89, IY87,
BGG+88]; also, if one-way functions do not exist then CZK IPs capture only “average-case” BPP [Ost91, OW93]. Thus, prior work gives
minimal assumptions that make IPs a powerful tool for zero knowledge. However, we focus on zero knowledge achievable without intractability
assumptions.
3
1.2 What about perfect zero knowledge for single-prover systems?
In the setting of multiple provers, one can achieve the best possible notion of zero knowledge: perfect zero knowledge
for all NEXP languages, even with only two provers and one round of interaction [BGKW88, LS95, DFK+92]. In
contrast, in the setting of a single prover, all prior PCP and IPCP constructions achieve only statistical zero knowledge
(see Appendix A for a summary of prior work). This intriguing state of affairs motivates the following question:
What are the powers and limitations of perfect zero knowledge for single-prover proof systems?
The above question is especially interesting when considering that prior PCP and IPCP constructions all follow the
same paradigm: they achieve zero knowledge by using a “locking scheme” on an intermediate construction that is zero
knowledge against (several independent copies of) the honest verifier. Perfect zero knowledge in this paradigm is not
possible because a malicious verifier can always guess a lock’s key with positive probability. Also, besides precluding
perfect zero knowledge, this paradigm introduces other limitations: (a) the prover incurs polynomial blowups to avoid
collisions due to birthday paradox; and (b) the honest verifier is adaptive (first retrieve keys for the lock, then unlock).
Recent work explores alternative approaches but these constructions suffer from other limitations: (i) [IWY16]
apply PCPs to leakage-resilient circuits, and obtain PCPs for NP with a non-adaptive verifier but they are only witness
(statistically) indistinguishable; (ii) [BCGV16] exploit algebraic properties of PCPs and obtain 2-round IOPs that are
perfect zero knowledge but only for NP.
In sum, prior work is limited to statistical zero knowledge (or weaker) or to languages in NP. Whether perfect
zero knowledge is feasible for more languages has remained open. Beyond the fundamental nature of the question of
understanding perfect zero knowledge for single-prover proof systems, recall that perfect zero knowledge, in the case
of single-prover interactive proofs, is desirable because it implies general concurrent composability while statistical
zero knowledge does not always imply it [KLR10], and one may hope to prove analogous results for IPCPs and IOPs.
1.3 Results
We present the first constructions of single-prover proof systems that achieve perfect zero knowledge for languages
beyond NP; prior work is limited to languages in NP or statistical zero knowledge. We develop and apply linear-
algebraic algorithms that enable us to “simulate beyond NP”, by exploiting new connections to algebraic complexity
theory and local views of linear codes. In all of our constructions, we do not use locking schemes, the honest verifier
is non-adaptive, and the simulator is straightline (i.e., does not rewind the verifier). We now summarize our results.
1.3.1 Perfect zero knowledge beyond NP
(1) PZK IPCPs for #P. We prove that the complexity class #P has IPCPs that are perfect zero knowledge. We do
so by constructing a suitable IPCP system for the counting problem associated to 3SAT, which is #P-complete.
Theorem 1.1 (informal statement of Thm. 6.2). The complexity class #P has Interactive PCPs that are perfect zero
knowledge against unbounded queries (that is, a malicious verifier may ask an arbitrary polynomial number of queries
to the PCP sent by the prover).
The above theorem gives new tradeoffs relative to prior work. First, [KPT97] construct PCPs for NEXP that are
statistical zero knowledge against unbounded queries. Instead, we construct IPCPs (which generalize PCPs) for #P,
but we gain perfect zero knowledge. Second, [GIMS10] construct IPCPs for NP that (i) are statistical zero knowledge
against unbounded queries, and (ii) have a polynomial-time computable oracle. Instead, we construct IPCPs that have
an exponential-time computable oracle, but we gain perfect zero knowledge and all languages in #P.
(2) PZK IOPs for NEXP. We prove that NEXP has 2-round IOPs that are perfect zero knowledge against
unbounded queries. We do so by constructing a suitable IOP system for NTIME(T ) against query bound b, for each
time function T and query bound function b; the result for NEXP follows by setting b to be super-polynomial.
Theorem 1.2 (informal statement of Thm. 8.1). For every time bound T and query bound b, the complexity class
NTIME(T ) has 2-round Interactive Oracle Proofs that are perfect zero knowledge against b queries, and where the
proof length is O˜(T + b) and the (honest verifier’s) query complexity is polylog(T + b).
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The above theorem gives new tradeoffs relative to [KPT97]’s result, which gives PCPs for NEXP that have statistical
zero knowledge, polynomial proof length, and an adaptive verifier. Instead, we construct IOPs (which generalize PCPs)
for NEXP, but we gain perfect zero knowledge, quasilinear proof length, and a non-adaptive verifier. Moreover, our
theorem extends [BCGV16]’s result from NP to NEXP, positively answering an open question raised in that work.
Namely, [BCGV16]’s result requires T, b to be polynomially-bounded because their simulator runs in poly(T + b)
time; in contrast, our result relies on a simulator that runs in time poly(q˜+logT +log b), where q˜ is the actual number
of queries made by the malicious verifier; this is the exponential improvement that enables us to “go up to NEXP”.
Overall, we learn that “2 rounds of PCPs” are enough to obtain perfect zero knowledge (even with quasilinear proof
length) for any language in NEXP.
1.3.2 Succinct constraint detection for Reed–Muller and Reed–Solomon codes
Our theorems in the previous section crucially rely on solving a problem that lies at the intersection of coding theory,
linear algebra, and computational complexity, which we call the constraint detection problem. We outline the role
played by this problem in Section 2.2, while now we informally introduce it and state our results about it.
Detecting constraints in codes. Constraint detection is the problem of determining which linear relations hold across
all codewords of a linear code C ⊆ FD, when considering only a given subdomain I ⊆ D of the code rather than all
of the domain D. This problem can always be solved in time that is polynomial in |D| (via Gaussian elimination);
however, if there is an algorithm that solves this problem in time that is polynomial in the subdomain’s size |I|, rather
than the domain’s size |D|, then we say that the code has succinct constraint detection; in particular, the domain could
have exponential size and the algorithm would still run in polynomial time.
Definition 1.3 (informal). We say that a linear code C ⊆ FD has succinct constraint detection if there exists an
algorithm that, given a subset I ⊆ D, runs in time poly(log |F| + log |D| + |I|) and outputs z ∈ FI such that∑
i∈I z(i)w(i) = 0 for all w ∈ C, or “no” if no such z exists. (In particular, |D| may be exponential.)
We further discuss the problem of constraint detection in Section 2.1, and provide a formal treatment of it in Section 4.1.
Beyond this introduction, we shall use (and achieve) a stronger definition of constraint detection: the algorithm is
required to output a basis for the space of dual codewords in C⊥ whose support lies in the subdomain I , i.e., a basis
for the space {z ∈ DI : ∀w ∈ C , ∑i∈I z(i)w(i) = 0}. Note that in our discussion of succinct constraint detection
we do not leverage the distance property of the code C, but we do leverage it in our eventual applications.
Our zero knowledge simulators’ strategy includes sampling a “random PCP”: a random codeword w in a linear
code C with exponentially large domain size |D| (see Section 2.2 for more on this). Explicitly sampling w requires
time Ω(|D|), and so is inefficient. But a verifier makes only polynomially-many queries to w, so the simulator has to
only simulate w when restricted to polynomial-size sets I ⊆ D, allowing the possibility of doing so in time poly(|I|).
Achieving such a simulation time is an instance of (efficiently and perfectly) “implementing a huge random object”
[GGN10] via a stateful algorithm [BW04]. We observe that if C has succinct constraint detection then this sampling
problem for C has a solution: the simulator maintains the set {(i, ai)}i∈I of past query-answer pairs; then, on a new
verifier query j ∈ D, the simulator uses constraint detection to determine if wj is linearly dependent on wI , and
answers accordingly (such linear dependencies characterize the required probability distribution, see Lemma 4.3).
Overall, our paper thus provides an application (namely, obtaining PZK simulators for classes beyond NP) where
the problem of efficient implementation of huge random objects arises naturally, and also where perfect implementa-
tion (no probability of error in the simulated distribution) is a requirement of the application.
We now state our results about succinct constraint detection.
(1) Reed–Muller codes, and their partial sums. We prove that the family of linear codes comprised of evaluations
of low-degree multivariate polynomials, along with their partial sums, has succinct constraint detection. This family
is closely related to the sumcheck protocol [LFKN92], and indeed we use this result to obtain a PZK analogue of the
sumcheck protocol (see Section 2.2.2 and Section 5), which yields Theorem 1.1 (see Section 2.3.1 and Section 6).
Recall that the family of Reed–Muller codes, denoted RM, is indexed by tuples n = (F,m, d), where F is a finite
field and m, d are positive integers, and the n-th code consists of codewords w : Fm → F that are the evaluation of an
m-variate polynomialQ of individual degree less than d over F. We denote by ΣRM the family that extends RM with
evaluations of all partial sums over certain subcubes of a hypercube:
5
Definition 1.4 (informal). We denote byΣRM the linear code family that is indexed by tuples n = (F,m, d,H), where
H is a subset of F, and where the n-th code consists of codewords (w0, . . . , wm) such that there exists an m-variate
polynomial Q of individual degree less than d over F for which wi : Fm−i → F is the evaluation of the i-th partial
sum of Q over H , i.e, wi(~α) =
∑
~γ∈Hi Q(~α,~γ) for every ~α ∈ Fm−i.
The domain size for codes in ΣRM is Ω(|F|m), but our detector’s running time is exponentially smaller.
Theorem 1.5 (informal statement of Thm. 4.9). The family ΣRM has succinct constraint detection:
there is a detector algorithm for ΣRM that runs in time poly(log |F|+m+ d+ |H |+ |I|).
We provide intuition for the theorem’s proof in Section 2.1.1 and provide the proof’s details in Section 4.2; the proof
leverages tools from algebraic complexity theory. (Our proof also shows that the family RM, which is a restriction
of ΣRM, has succinct constraint detection.) We note that our theorem implies perfect and stateful implementation of
a random low-degree multivariate polynomial and its partial sums over any hypercube; this extends [BW04]’s result,
which handles the special case of parity queries to boolean functions on subcubes of the boolean hypercube.
(2) Reed–Solomon codes, and their PCPPs. Second, we prove that the family of linear codes comprised of evalua-
tions of low-degree univariate polynomials concatenated with corresponding BS proximity proofs [BS08] has succinct
constraint detection. This family is closely related to quasilinear-size PCPs for NEXP [BS08], and indeed we use
this result to obtain PZK proximity proofs for this family (see Section 2.2.3 and Section 7), from which we derive
Theorem 1.2 (see Section 2.3.2 and Section 8).
Definition 1.6 (informal). We denote by BS-RS the linear code family indexed by tuples n = (F, L, d), where F is an
extension field of F2, L is a linear subspace in F, and d is a positive integer; the n-th code consists of evaluations on
L of univariate polynomials Q of degree less than d, concatenated with corresponding [BS08] proximity proofs.
The domain size for codes in BS-RS is Ω(|L|), but our detector’s running time is exponentially smaller.
Theorem 1.7 (informal statement of Thm. 4.12). The family BS-RS has succinct constraint detection:
there is a detector algorithm for BS-RS that runs in time poly(log |F|+ dim(L) + |I|).
We provide intuition for the theorem’s proof in Section 2.1.2 and provide the proof’s details in Section 4.3; the proof
leverages combinatorial properties of the recursive construction of BS proximity proofs.
2 Techniques
We informally discuss intuition behind our algorithms for detecting constraints (Section 2.1), their connection to
perfect zero knowledge (Section 2.2), and how we ultimately derive our results about #P and NEXP (Section 2.3).
Throughout, we provide pointers to the technical sections that contain further details.
2.1 Detecting constraints for exponentially-large codes
As informally introduced in Section 1.3.2, the constraint detection problem corresponding to a linear code family
C = {C
n
}
n
with domain D(·) and alphabet F(·) is the following: given an index n ∈ {0, 1}∗ and subset I ⊆ D(n),
output a basis for the space {z ∈ D(n)I : ∀w ∈ C
n
,
∑
i∈I z(i)w(i) = 0}. In other words, for a given subdomain I ,
we wish to determine all linear relations which hold for codewords in C
n
restricted to the subdomain I .
If a generating matrix for C
n
can be found in polynomial time, this problem can be solved in poly(|n| + |D(n)|)
time via Gaussian elimination (such an approach was implicitly taken by [BCGV16] to construct a perfect zero knowl-
edge simulator for an IOP for NP). However, in our setting |D(n)| is exponential in |n|, so the straightforward
solution is inefficient. With this in mind, we say that C has succinct constraint detection if there exists an algorithm
that solves its constraint detection problem in poly(|n|+ |I|) time, even if |D(n)| is exponential in |n|.
The formal definition of succinct constraint detection is in Section 4.1. In the rest of this section we provide
intuition for two of our theorems: succinct constraint detection for the family ΣRM and for the family BS-RS. As
will become evident, the techniques that we use to prove the two theorems differ significantly. Perhaps this is because
the two codes are quite different: ΣRM has a simple and well-understood algebraic structure, whereas BS-RS is
constructed recursively using proof composition.
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2.1.1 From algebraic complexity to detecting constraints for Reed–Muller codes and their partial sums
The purpose of this section is to provide intuition about the proof of Theorem 1.5, which states that the family ΣRM
has succinct constraint detection. (Formal definitions, statements, and proofs are in Section 4.2.) We thus outline how
to construct an algorithm that detects constraints for the family of linear codes comprised of evaluations of low-degree
multivariate polynomials, along with their partial sums. Our construction generalizes the proof of [BW04], which
solves the special case of parity queries to boolean functions on subcubes of the boolean hypercube by reducing this
problem to a probabilistic identity testing problem that is solvable via an algorithm of [RS05].
Below, we temporarily ignore the partial sums, and focus on constructing an algorithm that detects constraints for
the family of Reed–Muller codes RM, and at the end of the section we indicate how we can also handle partial sums.
Step 1: phrase as linear algebra problem. Consider a codeword w : Fm → F that is the evaluation of an m-variate
polynomial Q of individual degree less than d over F. Note that, for every ~α ∈ Fm, w(~α) equals the inner product of
Q’s coefficients with the vector φ~α that consists of the evaluation of all dm monomials at ~α. One can then argue that
constraint detection for RM is equivalent to finding the nullspace of {φ~α}~α∈I . However, “writing out” this |I| × dm
matrix and performing Gaussian elimination is too expensive, so we must solve this linear algebra problem succinctly.
Step 2: encode vectors as coefficients of polynomials. While each vector φ~α is long, it has a succinct description;
in fact, we can construct an m-variate polynomial Φ~α whose coefficients (after expansion) are the entries of φ~α, but
has an arithmetic circuit of only size O(md): namely, Φ~α( ~X) :=
∏m
i=1(1 + αiXi + α
2
iX
2
i + · · · + αd−1i Xd−1i ).
Computing the nullspace of {Φ~α}~α∈I is thus equivalent to computing the nullspace of {φ~α}~α∈I .
Step 3: computing the nullspace. Computing the nullspace of a set of polynomials is a problem in algebraic
complexity theory, and is essentially equivalent to the Polynomial Identity Testing (PIT) problem, and so we leverage
tools from that area.2 While there are simple randomized algorithms to solve this problem (see for example [Kay10,
Lemma 8]), these algorithms, due to a nonzero probability of error, suffice to achieve statistical zero knowledge but
do not suffice to achieve perfect zero knowledge. To obtain perfect zero knowledge, we need a solution that has no
probability of error. Derandomizing PIT for arbitrary algebraic circuits seems to be beyond current techniques (as
it implies circuit lower bounds [KI04]), but derandomizations are currently known for some restricted circuit classes.
The polynomials that we consider are special: they fall in the well-studied class of “sum of products of univariates”,
and for this case we can invoke the deterministic algorithm of [RS05] (see also [Kay10]). (It is interesting that
derandomization techniques are ultimately used to obtain a qualitative improvement for an inherently probabilistic
task, i.e., perfect sampling of verifier views.)
The above provides an outline for how to detect constraints for RM. The extension to ΣRM, which also includes
partial sums, is achieved by considering a more general form of vectors φ~α as well as corresponding polynomials Φ~α.
These polynomials also have the special form required for our derandomization. See Section 4.2 for details.
2.1.2 From recursive code covers to detecting constraints for Reed–Solomon codes and their PCPPs
The purpose of this section is to provide intuition about the proof of Theorem 1.7, which states that the family BS-RS
has succinct constraint detection. (Formal definitions, statements, and proofs are in Section 4.3.) We thus outline how
to construct an algorithm that detects constraints for the family of linear codes comprised of evaluations of low-degree
univariate polynomials concatenated with corresponding BS proximity proofs [BS08].
Our construction leverages the recursive structure of BS proximity proofs: we identify key combinatorial properties
of the recursion that enable “local” constraint detection. To define and argue these properties, we introduce two notions
that play a central role throughout the proof:
A (local) view of a linear code C ⊆ FD is a pair (D˜, C˜) such that D˜ ⊆ D and C˜ = C|D˜ ⊆ FD˜.
A cover of C is a set of local views S = {(D˜j , C˜j)}j of C such that D = ∪jD˜j .
2PIT is the following problem: given a polynomial f expressed as an algebraic circuit, is f identically zero? This problem has well-known
randomized algorithms [Zip79, Sch80], but deterministic algorithms for all circuits seem to be beyond current techniques [KI04]. PIT is a central
problem in algebraic complexity theory, and suffices for solving a number of other algebraic problems. We refer the reader to [SY10] for a survey.
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Combinatorial properties of the recursive step. Given a finite field F, domain D ⊆ F, and degree d, let C :=
RS[F, D, d] be the Reed–Solomon code consisting of evaluations on D of univariate polynomials of degree less than
d over F; for concreteness, say that the domain size is |D| = 2n and the degree is d = |D|/2 = 2n−1.
The first level of [BS08]’s recursion appends to each codeword f ∈ C an auxiliary function π1(f) : D′ → F with
domain D′ disjoint from D. Moreover, the mapping from f to π1(f) is linear over F, so the set C1 := {f‖π1(f)}f∈C ,
where f‖π1(f) : D ∪D′ → F is the function that agrees with f on D and with π1(f) on D′, is a linear code over F.
The code C1 is the “first-level” code of a BS proximity proof for f .
The code C1 has a naturally defined cover S1 = {(D˜j , C˜j)}j such that each C˜j is a Reed–Solomon code
RS[F, D˜j , dj ] with 2dj ≤ |D˜j | = O(
√
d), that is, with rate 1/2 and block length O(
√
d). We prove several com-
binatorial properties of this cover:
• S1 is 1-intersecting. For all distinct j, j′ in J , |D˜j ∩ D˜j′ | ≤ 1 (namely, the subdomains are almost disjoint).
• S1 is O(√d)-local. Every partial assignment to O(√d) domains D˜j in the cover that is locally consistent with the
cover can be extended to a globally consistent assignment, i.e., to a codeword ofC1. That is, there exists κ = O(
√
d)
such that every partial assignment h : ∪κℓ=1 D˜jℓ → F with h|D˜jℓ ∈ C˜jℓ (for each ℓ) equals the restriction to the
subdomain ∪κℓ=1D˜jℓ of some codeword f‖π1(f) in C1.
• S1 is O(√d)-independent. The ability to extend locally-consistent assignments to “globally-consistent” codewords
of C1 holds in a stronger sense: even when the aforementioned partial assignment h is extended arbitrarily to κ
additional point-value pairs, this new partial assignment still equals the restriction of some codeword f‖π1(f) in
C1.
The locality property alone already suffices to imply that given a subdomain I ⊆ D ∪ D′ of size |I| < √d, we can
solve the constraint detection problem on I by considering only those constraints that appear in views that intersect I
(see Lemma 4.22). But C has exponential block length so a “quadratic speedup” does not yet imply succinct constraint
detection. To obtain it, we also leverage the intersection and independence properties to reduce “locality” as follows.
Further recursive steps. So far we have only considered the first recursive step of a BS proximity proof; we
show how to obtain covers with smaller locality (and thereby detect constraints with more efficiency) by considering
additional recursive steps. Each code C˜j in the cover S1 of C1 is a Reed–Solomon code RS[F, D˜j , dj ] with |D˜j |, dj =
O(
√
d), and the next recursive step appends to each codeword in C˜j a corresponding auxiliary function, yielding a
new codeC2. In turn, C2 has a cover S2, and another recursive step yields a new codeC3, which has its own cover S3,
and so on. The crucial technical observation (Lemma 4.20) is that the intersection and independence properties, which
hold recursively, enable us to deduce that Ci is 1-intersecting, O( 2
i√
d)-local, and O( 2
i√
d)-independent; in particular,
for r = log log d+O(1), Sr is 1-intersecting, O(1)-local, O(1)-independent.
Then, recalling that detecting constraints for local codes requires only the views in the cover that intersect I
(Lemma 4.22), our constraint detector works by choosing i ∈ {1, . . . , r} such that the cover Si is poly(|I|)-local,
finding in this cover a poly(|I|)-size set of poly(|I|)-size views that intersect I , and computing in poly(|I|) time a
basis for the dual of each of these views — thereby proving Theorem 1.7.
Remark 2.1. For the sake of those familiar with BS-RS we remark that the domain D′ is the carefully chosen subset
of F×F designated by that construction, the codeC1 is the code that evaluates bivariate polynomials of degreeO(√d)
on D ∪D′ (along the way mapping D ⊆ F to a subset of F× F), the subdomains D˜j are the axis-parallel “rows” and
“columns” used in that recursive construction, and the codes C˜j are Reed–Solomon codes of block length O(
√
d). The
O(
√
d)-locality and independence follow from basic properties of bivariate Reed–Muller codes; see Example 4.14.
Remark 2.2. It is interesting to compare the above result with linear lower bounds on query complexity for testing
proximity to random low density parity check (LDPC) codes [BHR05, BGK+10]. Those results are proved by ob-
taining a basis for the dual code such that every small-support constraint is spanned by a small subset of that basis.
The same can be observed to hold for BS-RS, even though this latter code is locally testable with polylogarithmic
query complexity [BS08, Thm. 2.13]. The difference between the two cases is due to the fact that, for a random LDPC
code, an assignment that satisfies all but a single basis-constraint is (with high probability) far from the code, whereas
the recursive and 1-intersecting structure of BS-RS implies the existence of words that satisfy all but a single basis
constraint, yet are negligibly close to being a codeword.
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2.2 From constraint detection to perfect zero knowledge via masking
We provide intuition about the connection between constraint detection and perfect zero knowledge (Section 2.2.1),
and how we leverage this connection to achieve two intermediate results: (i) a sumcheck protocol that is perfect zero
knowledge in the Interactive PCP model (Section 2.2.2); and (ii) proximity proofs for Reed–Solomon codes that are
perfect zero knowledge in the Interactive Oracle Proof model (Section 2.2.3).
2.2.1 Local simulation of random codewords
Suppose that the prover and verifier both have oracle access to a codeword w ∈ C, for some linear code C ⊆ FD with
exponential-size domain D, and that they need to engage in some protocol that involves w. During the protocol, the
prover may leak information about w that is hard to compute (e.g., requires exponentially-many queries to w), and so
would violate zero knowledge (as we see below, this is the case for protocols such as sumcheck).
Rather than directly invoking the protocol, the prover first sends to the verifier a random codeword r ∈ C (as an
oracle since r has exponential size) and the verifier replies with a random field element ρ ∈ F; then the prover and
verifier invoke the protocol on the new codewordw′ := ρw+ r ∈ C rather than w. Intuitively, running the protocol on
w′ now does not leak information about w, because w′ is random in C (up to resolvable technicalities). This random
self-reducibility makes sense for only some protocols, e.g., those where completeness is preserved for any choice of ρ
and soundness is broken for only a small fraction of ρ; but this will indeed be the case for the settings described below.
The aforementioned masking technique was used by [BCGV16] for codes with polynomial-size domains, but we
use it for codes with exponential-size domains, which requires exponentially more efficient simulation techniques.
Indeed, to prove perfect zero knowledge, a simulator must be able to reproduce, exactly, the view obtained by any
malicious verifier that queries entries of w′, a uniformly random codeword in C; however, it is too expensive for
the simulator to explicitly sample a random codeword and answer the verifier’s queries according to it. Instead, the
simulator must sample the “local view” that the verifier sees while querying w′ at a small number of locations I ⊆ D.
But simulating local views of the form w′|I is reducible to detecting constraints, i.e., codewords in the dual code
C⊥ whose support is contained in I . Indeed, if no word in C⊥ has support contained in I then w′|I is uniformly
random; otherwise, each additional linearly independent constraint of C⊥ with support contained in I further reduces
the entropy of w′|I in a well-understood manner. (See Lemma 4.3 for a formal statement.) In sum, succinct constraint
detection enables us to “implement” [GGN10, BW04] random codewords of C despite C having exponential size.
We now discuss two concrete protocols for which the aforementioned random self-reducibility applies, and for
which we also have constructed suitably-efficient constraint detectors.
2.2.2 Perfect zero knowledge sumchecks
The celebrated sumcheck protocol [LFKN92] is not zero knowledge. In the sumcheck protocol, the prover and verifier
have oracle access to a low-degreem-variate polynomialF over a field F, and the prover wants to convince the verifier
that
∑
~α∈Hm F (~α) = 0 for a given subset H of F. During the protocol, the prover communicates partial sums of F ,
which are #P-hard to compute and, as such, violate zero knowledge.
We now explain how to use random self-reducibility to make the sumcheck protocol perfect zero knowledge, at the
cost of moving from the Interactive Proof model to the Interactive PCP model.
IPCP sumcheck. Consider the following tweak to the classical sumcheck protocol: rather than invoking sumcheck
on F directly, the prover first sends to the verifier a random low-degree polynomialR that sums to zero on Hm (as an
oracle), the verifier replies with a random field element ρ, and then the two invoke sumcheck on Q := ρF +R instead.
Completeness is clear because if
∑
~α∈Hm F (~α) = 0 and
∑
~α∈Hm R(~α) = 0 then
∑
~α∈Hm(ρF + R)(~α) = 0;
soundness is also clear because if
∑
~α∈Hm F (~α) 6= 0 then
∑
~α∈Hm(ρF + R)(~α) 6= 0 with high probability over ρ,
regardless of the choice of R. (For simplicity, we ignore the fact that the verifier also needs to test that R has low
degree.) We are thus left to show perfect zero knowledge, which turns out to be a much less straightforward argument.
The simulator. Before we explain how to argue perfect zero knowledge, we first clarify what we mean by it: since
the verifier has oracle access to F we cannot hope to ‘hide’ it; nevertheless, we can hope to argue that the verifier, by
participating in the protocol, does not learn anything about F beyond what the verifier can directly learn by querying
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F (and the fact that F sums to zero on Hm). What we shall achieve is the following: an algorithm that simulates the
verifier’s view by making as many queries to F as the total number of verifier queries to either F or R.
On the surface, perfect zero knowledge seems easy to argue, because ρF + R seems random among low-degree
m-variate polynomials that sum to zero on Hm. More precisely, consider the simulator that samples a random low-
degree polynomial Q that sums to zero on Hm and uses it instead of ρF + R and answers the verifier queries as
follows: (a) whenever the verifier queries F (~α), respond by querying F (~α) and returning the true value; (b) whenever
the verifier queries R(~α), respond by querying F (~α) and returning Q(~α) − ρF (~α). Observe that the number of
queries to F made by the simulator equals the number of (mutually) distinct queries to F and R made by the verifier,
as desired.
However, the above reasoning, while compelling, is insufficient. First, ρF +R is not random because a malicious
verifier can choose ρ depending on queries to R. Second, even if ρF +R were random (e.g., the verifier does not query
R before choosing ρ), the simulator must run in polynomial time, both producing correctly-distributed ‘partial sums’
of ρF + R and answering queries to R, but sampling Q alone requires exponential time. In this high level discussion
we ignore the first problem (which nonetheless has to be tackled), and focus on the second.
At this point it should be clear from the discussion in Section 2.2.1 that the simulator does not have to sample Q
explicitly, but only has to perfectly simulate local views of it by leveraging the fact that it can keep state across queries.
And doing so requires solving the succinct constraint detection problem for a suitable code C. In this case, it suffices
to consider the code C = ΣRM, and our Theorem 1.5 guarantees the required constraint detector.
The above discussion omits several details, so we refer the reader to Section 5 for further details.
2.2.3 Perfect zero knowledge proximity proofs for Reed–Solomon
Testing proximity of a codeword w to a given linear code C can be aided by a proximity proof [DR04, BGH+06],
which is an auxiliary oracle π that facilitates testing (e.g., C is not locally testable). For example, testing proximity to
the Reed–Solomon code, a crucial step towards achieving short PCPs, is aided via suitable proximity proofs [BS08].
From the perspective of zero knowledge, however, a proximity proof can be ‘dangerous’: a few locations of π can
in principle leak a lot of information about the codeword w, and a malicious verifier could potentially learn a lot about
w with only a few queries to w and π. The notion of zero knowledge for proximity proofs requires that this cannot
happen: it requires the existence of an algorithm that simulates the verifier’s view by making as many queries to w as
the total number of verifier queries to either w or π [IW14]; intuitively, this means that any bit of the proximity proof
π reveals no more information than one bit of w.
We demonstrate again the use of random self-reducibility and show a general transformation that, under certain
conditions, maps a PCP of proximity (P, V ) for a code C to a corresponding 2-round Interactive Oracle Proof of
Proximity (IOPP) for C that is perfect zero knowledge.
IOP of proximity for C . Consider the following IOP of Proximity: the prover and verifier have oracle access to a
codeword w, and the prover wants to convince the verifier that w is close to C; the prover first sends to the verifier a
random codeword r in C, and the verifier replies with a random field element ρ; the prover then sends the proximity
proof π′ := P (w′) that attests that w′ := ρw + r is close to C. Note that this is a 2-round IOP of Proximity for C,
because completeness follows from the fact that C is linear, while soundness follows because if w is far from C, then
so is ρw + r for every r with high probability over ρ. But is the perfect zero knowledge property satisfied?
The simulator. Without going into details, analogously to Section 2.2.2, a simulator must be able to sample local
views for random codewords from the code L := {w‖P (w) }w∈C , so the simulator’s efficiency reduces to the effi-
ciency of constraint detection for L. We indeed prove that if L has succinct constraint detection then the simulator
works out. See Section 7.1 for further details.
The case of Reed–Solomon. The above machinery allows us to derive a perfect zero knowledge IOP of Proximity
for Reed–Solomon codes, thanks to our Theorem 1.7, which states that the family of linear codes comprised of evalua-
tions of low-degree univariate polynomials concatenated with corresponding BS proximity proofs [BS08] has succinct
constraint detection; see Section 7.2 for details. This is one of the building blocks of our construction of perfect zero
knowledge IOPs for NEXP, as described below in Section 2.3.2.
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2.3 Achieving perfect zero knowledge beyond NP
We outline how to derive our results about perfect zero knowledge for #P and NEXP.
2.3.1 Perfect zero knowledge for counting problems
We provide intuition for the proof of Theorem 1.1, which states that the complexity class #P has Interactive PCPs
that are perfect zero knowledge.
We first recall the classical (non zero knowledge) Interactive Proof for #P [LFKN92]. The language L#3SAT,
which consists of pairs (φ,N) where φ is a 3-CNF boolean formula and N is the number of satisfying assignments of
φ, is #P-complete, and thus it suffices to construct an IP for it. The IP for L#3SAT works as follows: the prover and
verifier both arithmetize φ to obtain a low-degree multivariate polynomial pφ and invoke the (non zero knowledge)
sumcheck protocol on the claim “
∑
~α∈{0,1}n pφ(~α) = N”, where arithmetic is over a large-enough prime field.
Returning to our goal, we obtain a perfect zero knowledge Interactive PCP by simply replacing the (non zero knowl-
edge) IP sumcheck mentioned above with our perfect zero knowledge IPCP sumcheck, described in Section 2.2.2. In
Section 6 we provide further details, including proving that the zero knowledge guarantees of our sumcheck protocol
suffice for this case.
2.3.2 Perfect zero knowledge for nondeterministic time
We provide intuition for the proof of Theorem 1.2, which implies that the complexity class NEXP has Interac-
tive Oracle Proofs that are perfect zero knowledge. Very informally, the proof consists of combining two building
blocks: (i) [BCGV16]’s reduction from NEXP to randomizable linear algebraic constraint satisfaction problems,
and (ii) our construction of perfect zero knowledge IOPs of Proximity for Reed–Solomon codes, described in Sec-
tion 2.2.3. Besides extending [BCGV16]’s result from NP to NEXP, our proof provides a conceptual simplification
over [BCGV16] by clarifying how the above two building blocks work together towards the final result. We now
discuss this.
Starting point: [BS08]. Many PCP constructions consist of two steps: (1) arithmetize the statement at hand (in our
case, membership of an instance in some NEXP-complete language) by reducing it to a “PCP-friendly” problem that
looks like a linear-algebraic constraint satisfaction problem (LACSP); (2) design a tester that probabilistically checks
witnesses for this LACSP. In this paper, as in [BCGV16], we take [BS08]’s PCPs for NEXP as a starting point,
where the first step reduces NEXP to a “univariate” LACSP whose witnesses are codewords in a Reed–Solomon
code of exponential degree that satisfy certain properties, and whose second step relies on suitable proximity proofs
[DR04, BGH+06] for that code. Thus, overall, the PCP consists of two oracles, one being the LACSP witness and
the other being the corresponding BS proximity proof, and it is not hard to see that such a PCP is not zero knowledge,
because both the LACSP witness and its proximity proof reveal hard-to-compute information.
Step 1: sanitize the proximity proof. We first address the problem that the BS proximity proof “leaks”, by simply
replacing it with our own perfect zero knowledge analogue. Namely, we replace it with our perfect zero knowledge
2-round IOP of Proximity for Reed–Solomon codes, described in Section 2.2.3. This modification ensures that there
exists an algorithm that perfectly simulates the verifier’s view by making as many queries to the LACSP witness as the
total number of verifier queries to either the LACSP witness or other oracles used to facilitate proximity testing. At this
point we have obtained a perfect zero knowledge 2-round IOP of Proximity for NEXP (analogous to the notion of a
zero knowledge PCP of Proximity [IW14]); this part is where, previously, [BCGV16] were restricted to NP because
their simulator only handled Reed–Solomon codes with polynomial degree while our simulator is efficient even for
such codes with exponential degree. But we are not done yet: to obtain our goal, we also need to address the problem
that the LACSP witness itself “leaks” when the verifier queries it, which we discuss next.
Step 2: sanitize the witness. Intuitively, we need to inject randomness in the reduction from NEXP to LACSP
because the prover ultimately sends an LACSP witness to the verifier as an oracle, which the verifier can query. This is
precisely what [BCGV16]’s reduction from NEXP to randomizable LACSPs enables, and we thus use their reduction
to complete our proof. Informally, given an a-priori query bound b on the verifier’s queries, the reduction outputs a
witness w with the property that one can efficiently sample another witness w′ whose entries are b-wise independent.
We can then simply use the IOP of Proximity from the previous step on this randomized witness. Moreover, since the
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efficiency of the verifier is polylogarithmic in b, we can set b to be super-polynomial (e.g., exponential) to preserve
zero knowledge against any polynomial number of verifier queries.
The above discussion is only a sketch and we refer the reader to Section 8 for further details. One aspect that we
did not discuss is that an LACSP witness actually consists of two sub-witnesses, where one is a “local” deterministic
function of the other, which makes arguing zero knowledge somewhat more delicate.
2.4 Roadmap
After providing formal definitions in Section 3.1, the rest of the paper is organized as summarized by the table below.
§4.2 Theorem 1.5/4.9 detecting constraints for ΣRM §4.3 Theorem 1.7/4.12 detecting constraints for BS-RS
y y
§5 Theorem 5.3 PZK IPCP for sumcheck §7 Theorem 7.3 PZK IOP of Proximity for RS codes
y y
§6 Theorem 1.1/6.2 PZK IPCP for #P §8 Theorem 1.2/8.1 PZK IOP for NEXP
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3 Definitions
3.1 Basic notations
Functions, distributions, fields. We use f : D → R to denote a function with domain D and rangeR; given a subset
D˜ of D, we use f |D˜ to denote the restriction of f to D˜. Given a distribution D, we write x ← D to denote that x
is sampled according to D. We denote by F a finite field and by Fq the field of size q; we say F is a binary field if
its characteristic is 2. Arithmetic operations over Fq cost polylog q but we shall consider these to have unit cost (and
inspection shows that accounting for their actual polylogarithmic cost does not change any of the stated results).
Distances. A distance measure is a function ∆: Σn × Σn → [0, 1] such that for all x, y, z ∈ Σn: (i) ∆(x, x) = 0,
(ii) ∆(x, y) = ∆(y, x), and (iii) ∆(x, y) ≤ ∆(x, z) + ∆(z, y). We extend ∆ to distances to sets: given x ∈ Σn and
S ⊆ Σn, we define ∆(x, S) := miny∈S ∆(x, y) (or 1 if S is empty). We say that a string x is ǫ-close to another string
y if ∆(x, y) ≤ ǫ, and ǫ-far from y if ∆(x, y) > ǫ; similar terminology applies for a string x and a set S. Unless noted
otherwise, we use the relative Hamming distance over alphabet Σ (typically implicit): ∆(x, y) := |{i : xi 6= yi}|/n.
Languages and relations. We denote by R a (binary ordered) relation consisting of pairs (x,w), where x is the
instance andw is the witness. We denote by Lan(R) the language corresponding to R, and by R|
x
the set of witnesses
in R for x (if x 6∈ Lan(R) then R|
x
:= ∅). As always, we assume that |w| is bounded by some computable function
of n := |x|; in fact, we are mainly interested in relations arising from nondeterministic languages: R ∈ NTIME(T )
if there exists a T (n)-time machineM such thatM(x,w) outputs 1 if and only if (x,w) ∈ R. Throughout, we assume
that T (n) ≥ n. We say that R has relative distance δR : N → [0, 1] if δR(n) is the minimum relative distance among
witnesses in R|
x
for all x of size n. Throughout, we assume that δR is a constant.
Polynomials. We denote by F[X1, . . . , Xm] the ring of polynomials in m variables over F. Given a polynomial P
in F[X1, . . . , Xm], degXi(P ) is the degree of P in the variable Xi. We denote by F
<d[X1, . . . , Xm] the subspace
consisting of P ∈ F[X1, . . . , Xm] with degXi(P ) < d for every i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
Random shifts. We later use a folklore claim about distance preservation for random shifts in linear spaces.
Claim 3.1. Let n be in N, F a finite field, S an F-linear space in Fn, and x, y ∈ Fn. If x is ǫ-far from S, then αx+ y
is ǫ/2-far from S, with probability 1− |F|−1 over a random α ∈ F. (Distances are relative Hamming distances.)
3.2 Single-prover proof systems
We use two types of proof systems that combine aspects of interactive proofs [Bab85, GMR89] and probabilisti-
cally checkable proofs [BFLS91, AS98, ALM+98]: interactive PCPs (IPCPs) [KR08] and interactive oracle proofs
(IOPs) [BCS16, RRR16]. We first describe IPCPs (Section 3.2.1) and then IOPs (Section 3.2.2), which generalize the
former.
3.2.1 Interactive probabilistically checkable proofs
An IPCP [KR08] is a PCP followed by an IP. Namely, the prover P and verifier V interact as follows: P sends to V a
probabilistically checkable proof π; afterwards, P and V π engage in an interactive proof. Thus, V may read a few bits
of π but must read subsequent messages from P in full. An IPCP system for a relation R is thus a pair (P, V ), where
P, V are probabilistic interactive algorithms working as described, that satisfies naturally-defined notions of perfect
completeness and soundness with a given error ε(·); see [KR08] for details.
We say that an IPCP has k rounds if this “PCP round” is followed by a (k − 1)-round interactive proof. (That is,
we count the PCP round towards round complexity, unlike [KR08].) Beyond round complexity, we also measure how
many bits the prover sends and how many the verifier reads: the proof length l is the length of π in bits plus the number
of bits in all subsequent prover messages; the query complexity q is the number of bits of π read by the verifier plus
the number of bits in all subsequent prover messages (since the verifier must read all of those bits).
In this work, we do not count the number of bits in the verifier messages, nor the number of random bits used by
the verifier; both are bounded from above by the verifier’s running time, which we do consider. Overall, we say that
a relation R belongs to the complexity class IPCP[k, l, q, ε, tp, tv] if there is an IOP system for R in which: (1) the
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number of rounds is at most k(n); (2) the proof length is at most l(n); (3) the query complexity is at most q(n); (4) the
soundness error is ε(n); (5) the prover algorithm runs in time tp(n); (6) the verifier algorithm runs in time tv(n).
3.2.2 Interactive oracle proofs
An IOP [BCS16, RRR16] is a “multi-round PCP”. That is, an IOP generalizes an interactive proof as follows: when-
ever the prover sends to the verifier a message, the verifier does not have to read the message in full but may probabilis-
tically query it. In more detail, a k-round IOP comprises k rounds of interaction. In the i-th round of interaction: the
verifier sends a message mi to the prover; then the prover replies with a message πi to the verifier, which the verifier
can query in this and later rounds (via oracle queries). After the k rounds of interaction, the verifier either accepts or
rejects.
An IOP system for a relation R with soundness error ε is thus a pair (P, V ), whereP, V are probabilistic interactive
algorithms working as described, that satisfies the following properties. (See [BCS16] for more details.)
Completeness: For every instance-witness pair (x,w) in the relation R, Pr[〈P (x,w), V (x)〉 = 1] = 1.
Soundness: For every instance x not in R’s language and unbounded malicious prover P˜ , Pr[〈P˜ , V (x)〉 = 1] ≤ ε(n).
Beyond round complexity, we also measure how many bits the prover sends and how many the verifier reads: the
proof length l is the total number of bits in all of the prover’s messages, and the query complexity q is the total number
of bits read by the verifier across all of the prover’s messages. Considering all of these parameters, we say that a
relation R belongs to the complexity class IOP[k, l, q, ε, tp, tv] if there is an IOP system for R in which: (1) the
number of rounds is at most k(n); (2) the proof length is at most l(n); (3) the query complexity is at most q(n); (4) the
soundness error is ε(n); (5) the prover algorithm runs in time tp(n); (6) the verifier algorithm runs in time tv(n).
IOP vs. IPCP. An IPCP (see Section 3.2.1) is a special case of an IOP because an IPCP verifier must read in full all
of the prover’s messages except the first one (while an IOP verifier may query any part of any prover message). The
above complexity measures are consistent with those defined for IPCPs.
3.2.3 Restrictions and extensions
The definitions below are about IOPs, but IPCPs inherit all of these definitions because they are a special case of IOP.
Adaptivity of queries. An IOP system is non-adaptive if the verifier queries are non-adaptive, i.e., the queried
locations depend only on the verifier’s inputs.
Public coins. An IOP system is public coin if each verifier message mi is chosen uniformly and independently at
random, and all of the verifier queries happen after receiving the last prover message.
Proximity. An IOP of proximity extends the definition of an IOP in the same way that a PCP of proximity extends
that of a PCP [DR04, BGH+06]. An IOPP system for a relation R with soundness error ε and proximity parameter δ
is a pair (P, V ) that satisfies the following properties.
Completeness: For every instance-witness pair (x,w) in the relation R, Pr[〈P (x,w), V w(x)〉 = 1] = 1.
Soundness: For every instance-witness pair (x,w) with ∆(w,R|
x
) ≥ δ(n) and unbounded malicious prover P˜ ,
Pr[〈P˜ , V w(x)〉 = 1] ≤ ε(n).
Similarly to above, a relation R belongs to the complexity class IOPP[k, l, q, ε, δ, tp, tv] if there is an IOPP system
for R with the corresponding parameters.
Promise relations. A promise relation is a relation-language pair (RYES,L NO) with Lan(RYES)∩L NO = ∅. An IOP
for a promise relation is the same as an IOP for the (standard) relation RYES, except that soundness need only hold
for x ∈ L NO. An IOPP for a promise relation is the same as an IOPP for the (standard) relation RYES, except that
soundness need only hold for x ∈ Lan(RYES) ∪L NO.
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3.2.4 Prior constructions
In this paper we give new IPCP and IOP constructions that achieve perfect zero knowledge for various settings. Below
we summarize known constructions in these two models.
IPCPs. Prior work obtains IPCPs with proof length that depends on the witness size rather than computation size
[KR08, GKR08], and IPCPs with statistical zero knowledge [GIMS10] (see Section 3.3 for more details).
IOPs. Prior work obtains IOPs with perfect zero knowledge for NP [BCGV16], IOPs with small proof length and
query complexity [BCG+16], and an amortization theorem for “unambiguous” IOPs [RRR16]. Also, [BCS16] show
how to compile public-coin IOPs into non-interactive proofs in the random oracle model.
3.3 Zero knowledge
We define the notion of zero knowledge for IOPs and IPCPs achieved by our constructions: perfect zero knowledge via
straightline simulators. This notion is quite strong not only because it unconditionally guarantees perfect simulation
of the verifier’s view but also because straightline simulation implies desirable properties such as composability. We
now provide some context and then give formal definitions.
At a high level, zero knowledge requires that the verifier’s view can be efficiently simulated without the prover.
Converting the informal statement into a mathematical one involves many choices, including choosing which verifier
class to consider (e.g., the honest verifier? all polynomial-time verifiers?), the quality of the simulation (e.g., is it
identically distributed to the view? statistically close to it? computationally close to it?), the simulator’s dependence
on the verifier (e.g., is it non-uniform? or is the simulator universal?), and others. The definitions below consider two
variants: perfect simulation via universal simulators against either unbounded-query or bounded-query verifiers.
Moreover, in the case of universal simulators, one distinguishes between a non-blackbox use of the verifier, which
means that the simulator takes the verifier’s code as input, and a blackbox use of it, which means that the simulator
only accesses the verifier via a restricted interface; we consider this latter case. Different models of proof systems call
for different interfaces, which grant carefully-chosen “extra powers” to the simulator (in comparison to the prover) so
to ensure that efficiency of the simulation does not imply the ability to efficiently decide the language. For example: in
ZK IPs, the simulator may rewind the verifier; in ZK PCPs, the simulator may adaptively answer oracle queries. In ZK
IPCPs and ZK IOPs (our setting), the natural definition would allow a blackbox simulator to rewind the verifier and
also to adaptively answer oracle queries. The definitions below, however, consider only simulators that are straightline
[FS89, DS98], that is they do not rewind the verifier, because our constructions achieve this stronger notion.
Recall that protocols that are perfectly secure with a straightline simulator (in the standalone model) remain secure
under concurrent general composition [KLR10]. In particular, the above notion of zero knowledge is preserved under
such composition and, for example, one can use parallel repetition to reduce soundness error without impacting zero
knowledge. Indeed, straightline simulation facilitates many applications, e.g., verifiable secret sharing in [IW14], and
unconditional general universally-composable secure computation in [GIMS10].
We are now ready to define the notion of perfect zero knowledge via straightline simulators. We first discuss the
notion for IOPs, then for IOPs of proximity, and finally for IPCPs.
3.3.1 ZK for IOPs
Below is the definition of perfect zero knowledge (via straightline simulators) for IOPs.
Definition 3.2. Let A,B be algorithms and x, y strings. We denote by View 〈B(y), A(x)〉 the view of A(x) in
an interactive oracle protocol with B(y), i.e., the random variable (x, r, a1, . . . , an) where x is A’s input, r is A’s
randomness, and a1, . . . , an are the answers to A’s queries into B’s messages.
Straightline simulators in the context of IPs were used in [FS89], and later defined in [DS98]. The definition below
considers this notion in the context of IOPs, where the simulator also has to answer oracle queries by the verifier. Note
that since we consider the notion of perfect zero knowledge, the definition of straightline simulation needs to allow the
efficient simulator to work even with inefficient verifiers [GIMS10].
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Definition 3.3. We say that an algorithm B has straightline access to another algorithm A if B interacts with A,
without rewinding, by exchanging messages with A and also answering any oracle queries along the way. We denote
by BA the concatenation of A’s random tape and B’s output. (Since A’s random tape could be super-polynomially
large, B cannot sample it for A and then output it; instead, we restrict B to not see it, and we prepend it to B’s output.)
Definition 3.4. An IOP system (P, V ) for a relation R is perfect zero knowledge (via straightline simulators) against unbounded queries
(resp., against query bound b) if there exists a simulator algorithm S such that for every algorithm (resp., b-query al-
gorithm) V˜ and instance-witness pair (x,w) ∈ R, SV˜ (x) and View 〈P (x,w), V˜ (x)〉 are identically distributed.
Moreover, S must run in time poly(|x|+ qV˜ (|x|)), where qV˜ (·) is V˜ ’s query complexity.
We say that a relation R belongs to the complexity class PZK-IOP[k, l, q, ε, tp, tv, b] if there is an IOP system
for R, with the corresponding parameters, that is perfect zero knowledge with query bound b; also, it belongs to the
complexity class PZK-IOP[k, l, q, ε, tp, tv, ∗] if the same is true with unbounded queries.
3.3.2 ZK for IOPs of proximity
Below is the definition of perfect zero knowledge (via straightline simulators) for IOPs of proximity. It is a straight-
forward extension of the corresponding notion for PCPs of proximity, introduced in [IW14].
Definition 3.5. An IOPP system (P, V ) for a relation R is perfect zero knowledge (via straightline simulators)
against unbounded queries (resp., against query bound b) if there exists a simulator algorithm S such that for every
algorithm (resp., b-query algorithm) V˜ and instance-witness pair (x,w) ∈ R, the following two random variables
are identically distributed: (
SV˜ ,w(x) , qS
)
and
(
View 〈P (x,w), V˜ w(x)〉 , qV˜
)
,
where qS is the number of queries to w made by S, and qV˜ is the number of queries to w or to prover messages made
by V˜ . Moreover, S must run in time poly(|x|+ qV˜ (|x|)), where qV˜ (·) is V˜ ’s query complexity.
We say that a relation R belongs to the complexity class PZK-IOPP[k, l, q, ε, δ, tp, tv, b] if there is an IOPP
system for R, with the corresponding parameters, that is perfect zero knowledge with query bound b; also, it belongs
to the complexity class PZK-IOPP[k, l, q, ε, δ, tp, tv, ∗] if the same is true with unbounded queries.
Remark 3.6. Analogously to [IW14], our definition of zero knowledge for IOPs of proximity requires that the number
of queries tow by S equals the total number of queries (tow or prover messages) by V˜ . Stronger notions are possible:
“the number of queries to w by S equals the number of queries to w by V˜ ”; or, even more, “S and V˜ read the same
locations of w”. The definition above is sufficient for the applications of IOPs of proximity that we consider.
3.3.3 ZK for IPCPs
The definition of perfect zero knowledge (via straightline simulators) for IPCPs follows directly from Definition 3.4 in
Section 3.3.1 because IPCPs are a special case of IOPs. Ditto for IPCPs of proximity, whose perfect zero knowledge
definition follows directly from Definition 3.5 in Section 3.3.2. (For comparison, [GIMS10] define statistical zero
knowledge IPCPs, also with straightline simulators.)
3.4 Codes
An error correcting code C is a set of functions w : D → Σ, where D,Σ are finite sets known as the domain and
alphabet; we write C ⊆ ΣD. The message length of C is k := log|Σ| |C|, its block length is ℓ := |D|, its rate is
ρ := k/ℓ, its (minimum) distance is d := min{∆(w, z) : w, z ∈ C , w 6= z} when ∆ is the (absolute) Hamming
distance, and its (minimum) relative distance is τ := d/ℓ. At times we write k(C), ℓ(C), ρ(C), d(C), τ(C) to make
the code under consideration explicit. All the codes we consider are linear codes, discussed next.
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Linearity. A code C is linear if Σ is a finite field and C is a Σ-linear space in ΣD. The dual code of C is the set
C⊥ of functions z : D → Σ such that, for all w : D → Σ, 〈z, w〉 :=∑i∈D z(i)w(i) = 0. We denote by dim(C) the
dimension of C; it holds that dim(C) + dim(C⊥) = ℓ and dim(C) = k (dimension equals message length).
Code families. A code family C = {C
n
}
n∈{0,1}∗ has domain D(·) and alphabet F(·) if each code Cn has domain
D(n) and alphabet F(n). Similarly, C has message length k(·), block length ℓ(·), rate ρ(·), distance d(·), and relative
distance τ(·) if each code C
n
has message length k(n), block length ℓ(n), rate ρ(n), distance d(n), and relative
distance τ(n). We also define ρ(C ) := inf
n∈N ρ(n) and τ(C ) := infn∈N τ(n).
Reed–Solomon codes. The Reed–Solomon (RS) code is the code consisting of evaluations of univariate low-degree
polynomials: given a field F, subset S of F, and positive integer d with d ≤ |S|, we denote by RS[F, S, d] the linear
code consisting of evaluations w : S → F over S of polynomials in F<d[X ]. The code’s message length is k = d,
block length is ℓ = |S|, rate is ρ = d|S| , and relative distance is τ = 1− d−1|S| .
Reed–Muller codes. The Reed–Muller (RM) code is the code consisting of evaluations of multivariate low-degree
polynomials: given a field F, subset S of F, and positive integers m, d with d ≤ |S|, we denote by RM[F, S,m, d]
the linear code consisting of evaluations w : Sm → F over Sm of polynomials in F<d[X1, . . . , Xm] (i.e., we bound
individual degrees rather than their sum). The code’s message length is k = dm, block length is ℓ = |S|m, rate is
ρ = ( d|S|)
m
, and relative distance is τ = (1 − d−1|S| )m.
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4 Succinct constraint detection
We introduce the notion of succinct constraint detection for linear codes. This notion plays a crucial role in construct-
ing perfect zero knowledge simulators for super-polynomial complexity classes (such as #P and NEXP), but we
believe that this naturally-defined notion is also of independent interest. Given a linear code C ⊆ FD we refer to its
dual code C⊥ ⊆ FD as the constraint space of C. The constraint detection problem corresponding to a family of
linear codes C = {C
n
}
n
with domain D(·) and alphabet F(·) is the following:
Given an index n and subset I ⊆ D(n), output a basis for {z ∈ D(n)I : ∀w ∈ C
n
,
∑
i∈I z(i)w(i) = 0}.3
If |D(n)| is polynomial in |n| and a generating matrix for C
n
can be found in polynomial time, this problem can
be solved in poly(|n| + |I|) time via Gaussian elimination; such an approach was implicitly taken by [BCGV16] to
construct a perfect zero knowledge simulator for an IOP for NP. However, in our setting, |D(n)| is exponential in |n|
and |I|, and the aforementioned generic solution requires exponential time. With this in mind, we say C has succinct
constraint detection if there exists an algorithm that solves the constraint detection problem in poly(|n| + |I|) time
when |D(n)| is exponential in |n|. After defining succinct constraint detection in Section 4.1, we proceed as follows.
• In Section 4.2, we construct a succinct constraint detector for the family of linear codes comprised of evaluations of
partial sums of low-degree polynomials. The construction of the detector exploits derandomization techniques from
algebraic complexity theory. Later on (in Section 5), we leverage this result to construct a perfect zero knowledge
simulator for an IPCP for #P.
• In Section 4.3, we construct a succinct constraint detector for the family of evaluations of univariate polynomials
concatenated with corresponding BS proximity proofs [BS08]. The construction of the detector exploits the re-
cursive structure of these proximity proofs. Later on (in Section 8), we leverage this result to construct a perfect
zero knowledge simulator for an IOP for NEXP; this simulator can be interpreted as an analogue of [BCGV16]’s
simulator that runs exponentially faster and thus enables us to “scale up” from NP to NEXP.
Throughout this section we assume familiarity with terminology and notation about codes, introduced in Section 3.4.
We assume for simplicity that |n|, the number of bits used to represent n, is at least logD(n) + logF(n); if this does
not hold, then one can replace |n| with |n|+ logD(n) + logF(n) throughout the section.
Remark 4.1 (sparse representation). In this section we make statements about vectors v in FD where the cardinality
of the domainD may be super-polynomial. When such statements are computational in nature, we assume that v is not
represented as a list of |D| field elements (which requiresΩ(|D| log |F|) bits) but, instead, assume that v is represented
as a list of the elements in supp(v) (and each element comes with its index in D); this sparse representation only
requires Ω(|supp(v)| · (log |D|+ log |F|)) bits.
4.1 Definition of succinct constraint detection
Formally define the notion of a constraint detector, and the notion of succinct constraint detection.
Definition 4.2. Let C = {C
n
}
n
be a linear code family with domain D(·) and alphabet F(·). A constraint detector
for C is an algorithm that, on input an index n and subset I ⊆ D(n), outputs a basis for the space{
z ∈ D(n)I : ∀w ∈ C
n
,
∑
i∈I
z(i)w(i)
}
.
We say that C has a T (·, ·)-time constraint detection if there exists a detector for C running in time T (n, ℓ); we also
say that C has succinct constraint detection if it has poly(|n|+ ℓ)-time constraint detection.
3In fact, the following weaker definition suffices for the applications in our paper: given an index n and subset I ⊆ D(n), output z ∈ F(n)I
such that
∑
i∈I z(i)w(i) = 0 for all w ∈ Cn , or ‘independent’ if no such z exists. We achieve the stronger definition, which is also easier to work
with.
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A constraint detector induces a corresponding probabilistic algorithm for ‘simulating’ answers to queries to a
random codeword; this is captured by the following lemma, the proof of which is in Appendix B. We shall use such
probabilistic algorithms in the construction of perfect zero knowledge simulators (see Section 5 and Section 8).
Lemma 4.3. Let C = {C
n
}
n
be a linear code family with domain D(·) and alphabet F(·) that has T (·, ·)-time
constraint detection. Then there exists a probabilistic algorithm A such that, for every index n, set of pairs S =
{(α1, β1), . . . , (αℓ, βℓ)} ⊆ D(n)× F(n), and pair (α, β) ∈ D(n) × F(n),
Pr
[
A(n, S, α) = β
]
= Pr
w←C
n

w(α) = β
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
w(α1) = β1
.
.
.
w(αℓ) = βℓ

 .
Moreover A runs in time T (n, ℓ) + poly(log |F(n)| + ℓ).
For the purposes of constructing a constraint detector, the sufficient condition given in Lemma 4.6 below is some-
times easier to work with. To state it we need to introduce two ways of restricting a code, and explain how these
restrictions interact with taking duals; the interplay between these is delicate (see Remark 4.7).
Definition 4.4. Given a linear code C ⊆ FD and a subset I ⊆ D, we denote by (i) C⊆I the set consisting of the
codewords w ∈ C for which supp(w) ⊆ I , and (ii) C|I the restriction to I of codewords w ∈ C.
Note that C⊆I and C|I are different notions. Consider for example the 1-dimensional linear code C = {00, 11}
in F{1,2}2 and the subset I = {1}: it holds that C⊆I = {00} and C|I = {0, 1}. In particular, codewords in C⊆I
are defined over D, while codewords in C|I are defined over I . Nevertheless, throughout this section, we sometimes
compare vectors defined over different domains, with the implicit understanding that the comparison is conducted over
the union of the relevant domains, by filling in zeros in the vectors’ undefined coordinates. For example, we may write
C⊆I ⊆ C|I to mean that {00} ⊆ {00, 10} (the set obtained from {0, 1} after filling in the relevant zeros).
Claim 4.5. Let C be a linear code with domain D and alphabet F. For every I ⊆ D,
(C|I)⊥ = (C⊥)⊆I ,
that is, {
z ∈ D(n)I : ∀w ∈ C
n
,
∑
i∈I
z(i)w(i)
}
=
{
z ∈ C⊥
n
: supp(z) ⊆ I
}
.
Proof. For the containment (C⊥)⊆I ⊆ (C|I)⊥: if z ∈ C⊥ and supp(z) ⊆ I then z lies in the dual of C|I because
it suffices to consider the subdomain I for determining duality. For the reverse containment (C⊥)⊆I ⊇ (C|I)⊥: if
z ∈ (C|I)⊥ then supp(z) ⊆ I (by definition) so that 〈z, w〉 = 〈z, w|I〉 for every w ∈ C, and the latter inner product
equals 0 because z is in the dual of C|I ; in sum z is dual to (all codewords in) C and its support is contained in I , so
z belongs to (C⊥)⊆I , as claimed.
Observe that Claim 4.5 tells us the constraint detection is equivalent to determining a basis of (C
n
|I)⊥ = (C⊥
n
)⊆I .
The following lemma asserts that if, given a subset I ⊆ D, we can find a set of constraints W in C⊥ that spans
(C⊥)⊆I then we can solve the constraint detection problem for C; we defer the proof of the lemma to Appendix C.
Lemma 4.6. Let C = {C
n
}
n
be a linear code family with domainD(·) and alphabetF(·). If there exists an algorithm
that, on input an index n and subset I ⊆ D(n), outputs in poly(|n| + |I|) time a subset W ⊆ F(n)D(n) (in sparse
representation) with (C⊥
n
)⊆I ⊆ span(W ) ⊆ C⊥
n
, then C has succinct constraint detection.
Remark 4.7. The following operations do not commute: (i) expanding the domain via zero padding (for the purpose
of comparing vectors over different domains), and (ii) taking the dual of the code. Consider for example the code C =
{0} ⊆ F{1}2 : its dual code is C⊥ = {0, 1} and, when expanded to F{1,2}2 , the dual code is expanded to {(0, 0), (1, 0)};
yet, when C is expanded to F{1,2}2 it produces the code {(0, 0)} and its dual code is {(0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 1), (1, 1)}. To
resolve ambiguities (when asserting an equality as in Claim 4.5), we adopt the convention that expansion is done
always last (namely, as late as possible without having to compare vectors over different domains).
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4.2 Partial sums of low-degree polynomials
We show that evaluations of partial sums of low-degree polynomials have succinct constraint detection (see Defini-
tion 4.2). In the following, F is a finite field, m, d are positive integers, and H is a subset of F; also, F<d[X1, . . . , Xm]
denotes the subspace of F[X1, . . . , Xm] consisting of those polynomials with individual degrees less than d. More-
over, given Q ∈ F<d[X1, . . . , Xm] and ~α ∈ F≤m (vectors over F of length at most m), we define Q(~α) :=∑
~γ∈Hm−|~α| Q(~α,~γ), i.e., the answer to a query that specifies only a suffix of the variables is the sum of the val-
ues obtained by letting the remaining variables range over H . We begin by defining the code that we study, which
extends the Reed–Muller code (see Section 3.4) with partial sums.
Definition 4.8. We denote by ΣRM[F,m, d,H ] the linear code that comprises evaluations of partial sums of polyno-
mials in F<d[X1, . . . , Xm]; more precisely, ΣRM[F,m, d,H ] := {wQ}Q∈F<d[X1,...,Xm] where wQ : F≤m → F is the
function defined by wQ(~α) :=
∑
~γ∈Hm−|~α| Q(~α,~γ) for each ~α ∈ F≤m.4 We denote by ΣRM the linear code family
indexed by tuples n = (F,m, d,H) and where the n-th code equals ΣRM[F,m, d,H ]. (We represent indices n so to
ensure that |n| = Θ(log |F|+m+ d+ |H |).)
We prove that the linear code family ΣRM has succinct constraint detection:
Theorem 4.9 (formal statement of 1.5). ΣRM has poly(log |F|+m+ d+ |H |+ ℓ)-time constraint detection.
Combined with Lemma 4.3, the theorem above implies that there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm
for answering queries to a codeword sampled at random from ΣRM, as captured by the following corollary.
Corollary 4.10. There exists a probabilistic algorithm A such that, for every finite field F, positive integers m, d,
subset H of F, subset S = {(α1, β1), . . . , (αℓ, βℓ)} ⊆ F≤m × F, and (α, β) ∈ F≤m × F,
Pr
[
A(F,m, d,H, S, α) = β
]
= Pr
R←F<d[X1,...,Xm]

R(α) = β
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
R(α1) = β1
.
.
.
R(αℓ) = βℓ

 .
Moreover A runs in time poly(log |F|+m+ d+ |H |+ ℓ).
We sketch the proof of Theorem 4.9, for the simpler case where the code is RM[F,m, d,H ] (i.e., without partial
sums). We can view a polynomial Q ∈ F<d[X1, . . . , Xm] as a vector over the monomial basis, with an entry for each
possible monomial X i11 . . . X imm (with 0 ≤ i1, . . . , im < d) containing the corresponding coefficient. The evaluation
of Q at a point ~α ∈ Fm then equals the inner product of this vector with the vector φ~α, in the same basis, whose
entry for X i11 . . . X imm is equal to α
i1
1 . . . α
im
m . Given ~α1, . . . , ~αℓ, we could use Gaussian elimination on φ~α1 , . . . , φ~αℓ
to check for linear dependencies, which would be equivalent to constraint detection for RM[F,m, d,H ].
However, we cannot afford to explicitly write down φ~α, because it has dm entries. Nevertheless, we can still
implicitly check for linear dependencies, and we do so by reducing the problem, by building on and extending ideas of
[BW04], to computing the nullspace of a certain set of polynomials, which can be solved via an algorithm of [RS05]
(see also [Kay10]). The idea is to encode the entries of these vectors via a succinct description: a polynomial Φ~α
whose coefficients (after expansion) are the entries of φ~α. In our setting this polynomial has the particularly natural
form:
Φ~α( ~X) :=
m∏
i=1
(1 + αiXi + α
2
iX
2
i + · · ·+ αd−1i Xd−1i ) ;
note that the coefficient of each monomial equals its corresponding entry in φ~α. Given this representation we can
use standard polynomial identity testing techniques to find linear dependencies between these polynomials, which
corresponds to linear dependencies between the original vectors. Crucially, we cannot afford any mistake, even with
exponentially small probability, when looking for linear dependencies for otherwise we would not achieve perfect
simulation; this is why the techniques we leverage rely on derandomization. We now proceed with the full proof.
4Note that ΣRM[F,m, d,H] is indeed linear: for every wQ1 , wQ2 ∈ ΣRM[F,m, d,H], a1, a2 ∈ F, and ~α ∈ F≤m, it holds
that a1wQ1(~α) + a2wQ2 (~α) = a1
∑
~γ∈Hm−|~α| Q1(~α,~γ) + a2
∑
~γ∈Hm−|~α| Q2(~α,~γ) =
∑
~γ∈Hm−|~α|(a1Q1 + a2Q2)(~α,~γ) =
wa1Q1+a2Q2 (~α). But wa1Q1+a2Q2 ∈ ΣRM[F,m, d,H], since F<d[X1, . . . , Xm] is a linear space.
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Proof of Theorem 4.9. We first introduce some notation. Define [< d] := {0, . . . , d − 1}. For vectors ~α ∈ Fm and
~a ∈ [< d]m, we define ~α~a :=∏mi=1 αaii ; similarly, for variables ~X = (X1, . . . , Xm), we define ~X~a :=∏mi=1Xaii .
We identify ΣRM[F,m, d,H ] with F[<d]m ; a codeword wQ then corresponds to a vector ~Q whose ~a-th entry is
the coefficient of the monomial ~X~a in Q. For ~α ∈ F≤m, let
φ~α :=

~α~a ∑
~γ∈Hm−|~α|
~γ
~b


~a∈[<d]|~α| ,~b∈[<d]m−|~α|
.
We can also view φ~α as a vector in F[<d]
m by merging the indices, so that, for all ~α ∈ F≤m andwQ ∈ ΣRM[F,m, d,H ],
wQ(~α) =
∑
~γ∈Hm−|~α|
Q(~α,~γ) =
∑
~γ∈Hm−|~α|
∑
~a∈[<d]|~α|
∑
~b∈[<d]m−|~α|
~Q~a,~b · ~α~a~γ
~b
=
∑
~a∈[<d]|~α|
∑
~b∈[<d]m−|~α|
~Q~a,~b · ~α~a
∑
~γ∈Hm−|~α|
~γ
~b = 〈 ~Q, φ~α〉 .
Hence for every ~α1, . . . , ~αℓ, ~α ∈ F≤m and a1, . . . , aℓ ∈ F, the following statements are equivalent (i) w(~α) =∑ℓ
i=1 aiw(~αi) for all w ∈ ΣRM[F,m, d,H ]; (ii) 〈~f, φ~α〉 =
∑ℓ
i=1 ai〈~f, φ~αi〉 for all ~f ∈ F[<d]
m (iii) φ~α =∑ℓ
i=1 aiφ~αi . We deduce that constraint detection for ΣRM[F,m, d,H ] is equivalent to the problem of finding
a1, . . . , aℓ ∈ F such that φ~α =
∑ℓ
i=1 aiφ~αi , or returning ‘independent’ if no such a1, . . . , aℓ exist.
However, the dimension of the latter vectors is dm, which may be much larger than poly(log |F|+m+d+ |H |+ℓ),
and so we cannot afford to “explicitly” solve the ℓ × dm linear system. Instead, we “succinctly” solve it, by taking
advantage of the special structure of the vectors, as we now describe. For ~α ∈ Fm, define the polynomial
Φ~α( ~X) :=
m∏
i=1
(1 + αiXi + α
2
iX
2
i + · · ·+ αd−1i Xd−1i ) .
Note that, while the above polynomial is computable via a small arithmetic circuit, its coefficients (once expanded
over the monomial basis) correspond to the entries of the vector φ~α. More generally, for ~α ∈ F≤m, we define the
polynomial
Φ~α( ~X) :=

 |~α|∏
i=1
(1 + αiXi + · · ·+ αd−1i Xd−1i )



m−|~α|∏
i=1
∑
γ∈H
(1 + γXi+|~α| + · · ·+ γd−1Xd−1i+|~α|)

 .
Note that Φ~α is a product of univariate polynomials. To see that the above does indeed represent φ~α, we rearrange the
expression as follows:
Φ~α( ~X) =

 |~α|∏
i=1
(1 + αiXi + · · ·+ αd−1i Xd−1i )



 ∑
~γ∈Hm−|~α|
m−|~α|∏
i=1
(1 + γiXi+|~α| + · · ·+ γd−1i Xd−1i+|~α|)


= Φ~α(X1, . . . , X|~α|)

 ∑
~γ∈Hm−|~α|
Φ~γ(X|~α|+1, . . . , Xm)

 ;
indeed, the coefficient of ~X~a,~b for ~a ∈ [< d]|~α| and~b ∈ [< d]m−|~α| is ~α~a∑~γ∈Hm−|~α| ~γ~b, as required.
Thus, to determine whether φα ∈ span(φα1 , . . . , φαℓ), it suffices to determine whetherΦα ∈ span(Φα1 , . . . ,Φαℓ).
In fact, the linear dependencies are in correspondence: for a1, . . . , aℓ ∈ F, φα =
∑ℓ
i=1 aiφαi if and only if Φα =∑ℓ
i=1 aiΦαi . Crucially, each Φαi is not only in F<d[X1, . . . , Xm] but is a product of m univariate polynomials each
represented via an F-arithmetic circuit of size poly(|H | + d). We leverage this special structure and solve the above
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problem by relying on an algorithm of [RS05] that computes the nullspace for such polynomials (see also [Kay10]),
as captured by the lemma below;5 for completeness, we provide an elementary proof of the lemma in Appendix D.
Lemma 4.11. There exists a deterministic algorithm D such that, on input a vector of m-variate polynomials ~Q =
(Q1, . . . , Qℓ) over F where each polynomial has the form Qk( ~X) =
∏m
i=1Qk,i(Xi) and each Qk,i is univariate of
degree less than d with d ≤ |F| and represented via an F-arithmetic circuit of size s, outputs a basis for the linear
space ~Q⊥ := {(a1, . . . , aℓ) ∈ Fℓ :
∑ℓ
k=1 akQk ≡ 0}. Moreover, D runs in poly(log |F|+m+ d+ s+ ℓ) time.
The above lemma immediately provides a way to construct a constraint detector for ΣRM: given as input an index
n = (F,m, d,H) and a subset I ⊆ D(n), we construct the arithmetic circuit Φα for each α ∈ I , and then run the
algorithm D on vector of circuits (Φα)α∈I , and directly output D’s result. The lemma follows.
4.3 Univariate polynomials with BS proximity proofs
We show that evaluations of univariate polynomials concatenated with corresponding BS proximity proofs [BS08]
have succinct constraint detection (see Definition 4.2). Recall that the Reed–Solomon code (see Section 3.4) is not
locally testable, but one can test proximity to it with the aid of the quasilinear-size proximity proofs of Ben-Sasson
and Sudan [BS08]. These latter apply when low-degree univariate polynomials are evaluated over linear spaces, so
from now on we restrict our attention to Reed–Solomon codes of this form. More precisely, we consider Reed–
Solomon codes RS[F, L, d] where F is an extension field of a base field K, L is a K-linear subspace in F, and d =
|L| · |K|−µ for some µ ∈ N+. We then denote by BS-RS[K,F, L, µ, k] the code obtained by concatenating codewords
in RS[F, L, |L| · |K|−µ] with corresponding BS proximity proofs whose recursion terminates at “base dimension”
k ∈ {1, . . . , dim(L)} (for completeness we include a formal definition of these in Appendix F); typically K, µ, k are
fixed to certain constants (e.g., [BS08] fixes them to F2, 3, 1, respectively) but below we state the cost of constraint
detection in full generality. The linear code family BS-RS is indexed by tuples n = (K,F, L, µ, k) and the n-th code
is BS-RS[K,F, L, µ, k], and our result about BS-RS is the following:
Theorem 4.12 (formal statement of 1.7). BS-RS has poly(log |F|+ dim(L) + |K|µ + ℓ)-time constraint detection.
The proof of the above theorem is technically involved, and we present it via several steps, as follows. (1) In
Section 4.3.1 we introduce the notion of a code cover and two key combinatorial properties of these: κ-locality and
κ-independence. (2) In Section 4.3.2 we introduce the notion of a recursive code cover and relate its combinatorial
properties to those of (standard) code covers. (3) In Section 4.3.3 we show how to construct succinct constraint
detectors starting from algorithms that detect constraints only ‘locally’ for code covers and recursive code covers.
(4) In Section 4.3.4 we show that BS-RS has a recursive code cover with the requisite properties and thus implies, via
the results of prior steps, a succinct constraint detector, as claimed. Several sub-proofs are deferred to the appendices,
and we provide pointers to these along the way.
The role of code covers. We are interested in succinct constraint detection: solving the constraint detection problem
for certain code families with exponentially-large domains (such as BS-RS). We now build some intuition about how
code covers can, in some cases, facilitate this.
Consider the simple case where the code C ⊆ FD is a direct sum of many small codes: there exists S =
{(D˜j , C˜j)}j such that D = ∪jD˜j and C = ⊕jC˜j where, for each j, C˜j is a linear code in FD˜j and the subdo-
main D˜j is small and disjoint from other subdomains. The detection problem for this case can be solved efficiently:
use the generic approach of Gaussian elimination independently on each subdomain D˜j .
Next consider a more general case where the subdomains are not necessarily disjoint: there exists S = {(D˜j , C˜j)}j
as above but we do not require that the D˜j form a partition ofD; we say that each (D˜j , C˜j) is a local view ofC because
D˜j ⊆ D and C˜j = C|D˜j , and we say that S is a code cover of C. Now suppose that for each j there exists an efficient
constraint detector for C˜j (which is defined on D˜j); in this case, the detection problem can be solved efficiently at
least for those subsets I that are contained in D˜j for some j. Generalizing further, we see that we can efficiently solve
5One could use polynomial identity testing to solve the above problem in probabilistic polynomial time; see [Kay10, Lemma 8]. However, due
to a nonzero probability of error, this suffices only to achieve statistical zero knowledge, but does not suffice to achieve perfect zero knowledge.
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constraint detection for a codeC if there is a cover S = {(D˜j, C˜j)}j such that, given a subset I ⊆ D, (i) I is contained
in some subdomain D˜j , and (ii) constraint detection for C˜j can be solved efficiently.
We build on the above ideas to derive analogous statements for recursive code covers, which arise naturally in the
case of BS-RS. But note that recursive constructions are common in the PCP literature, and we believe that our cover-
based techniques are of independent interest as, e.g., they are applicable to other PCPs, including [BFLS91, AS98].
4.3.1 Covering codes with local views
The purpose of this section is to formally define the notion of cover and certain combinatorial properties of these.
Definition 4.13. Let C be a linear code with domain D and alphabet F. A (local) view of C is a pair (D˜, C˜) such
that D˜ ⊆ D and C|D˜ = C˜ . A cover of C is a set of local views S = {(D˜j, C˜j)}j of C such that D = ∪jD˜j . Also, we
define a cover’s domain intersection as di(S) := ∪i6=j(D˜i ∩ D˜j) and, given a set J , we define D˜J := ∪j∈J D˜j .
Example 4.14 (line cover of RM). Suppose for instance that C is the Reed–Muller code RM[F,F,m, d]: C consists
of evaluations overD = Fm of polynomials in F<d[X1, . . . , Xm] (see Definition 3.4). A cover of C that is extensively
studied in the PCP and property-testing literature is the one given by (axis-parallel) lines. A line (in the i-th direction)
is a set of |F| points that agree on all but one coordinate (the i-th one); and the line cover of C is thus S = {(D˜ℓ, C˜ℓ)}
where ℓ ranges over all (axis-parallel) lines and C˜ℓ is the Reed–Solomon code RS[F,F, d] (see Definition 3.4).
Observe that the domain intersection of the line cover equals Fm, which is also the domain D of the base code C.
However, for BS-RS, we consider a cover whose domain intersection is a strict subset of D (see Appendix G).
Next, we specify a notion of locality for covers. A partial assignment w′ ∈ FD′ is locally consistent with a cover
S = {(D˜j , C˜j)}j if for every local view (D˜j , C˜j) with D˜j ⊆ D′ the restriction w′|D˜j is a codeword of C˜j . Then we
say that a cover is κ-local if any locally consistent assignment w′ ∈ FD′ , where D′ is a union of at most κ domains in
the cover, can be extended to a “globally consistent” codeword w of C.
Definition 4.15. Let C be a linear code with domain D and alphabet F. Given κ ∈ N, a κ-local cover of C is a cover
S = {(D˜j, C˜j)}j of C such that: for every subset of view-indices J of size at most κ and every word w′ ∈ FD˜J with
w′|D˜j ∈ C˜j (for every j ∈ J), the word w′ can be extended to some word w in C, i.e., w satisfies w|D˜J = w′). (The
trivial cover S = {(D,C)} of C is κ-local for every κ.)
The following definition significantly strengthens the previous one. Informally, a cover is κ-independent if every
partial assignment over a subdomain D′ that is the union of κ subdomains from the cover and κ auxiliary locations
can be extended to a “globally consistent” codeword. We use this stronger notion in our main Lemma 4.20.
Definition 4.16. Let C be a linear code with domain D and alphabet F. Given κ ∈ N, a κ-independent cover of C is
a κ-local cover S = {(D˜j , C˜j)}j such that for every set J of size at most κ, subdomain D′ ⊆ di(S) of size at most κ,
and w′ ∈ FD′∪D˜J with w′|D˜j ∈ C˜j for every j ∈ J , there exists w ∈ C such that w|D′∪D˜J = w′. (The trivial cover
S = {(D,C)} of C is κ-independent for every κ ∈ N because it is κ-local and has di(S) = ∅.)
Example 4.17. The line cover from Example 4.14 is d-local because any evaluation on at most d (axis-parallel)
lines ℓ1, . . . , ℓd that is a polynomial of degree (d − 1) along each of ℓ1, . . . , ℓd can be extended to a codeword of
RM[F,F,m, d]. Furthermore, it is d/2-independent because any locally consistent assignment to d/2 such lines and
d/2 points p1, . . . , pd/2 can be extended to a valid Reed–Muller codeword. To see this, observe that there exists an
interpolating set H1 × · · · ×Hm (with |Hi| = d) that contains p1, . . . , pd/2 and intersects each line in d points; we
shall later use this observation for the bivariate case (m = 2), a proof for that case is provided at Claim H.1.
4.3.2 Recursive covers and locality
Proximity proofs for codes such as the Reed–Solomon code and the Reed–Muller code are typically obtained via
techniques of proof composition [AS98]. Informally, a problem is reduced to a set of smaller sub-problems of the
same kind (which are usually interconnected), and a sub-proof is constructed for each sub-problem. This process
leads to a proof for the original problem that is “covered” by the sub-proofs for the sub-problems, and naturally imply
23
a cover of the proof by these sub-proofs. This process is then repeated recursively until the sub-problems are small
enough for the verifier to check directly — and in our case leads to the notion of recursive covers, which we define
below.
To support the definition of a recursive cover, we first introduce notation for rooted trees. Edges in a rooted tree
T = (V,E) are directed from the root r towards the leaves; the edge directed from v to u is denoted (v, u); v is the
predecessor of u and u the successor of v; if there is a path from v to v′ we say that v is an ancestor of v′; if there is no
directed path between v and v′ (in either direction) we say that the two vertices are disconnected. The set of successors
of v is denoted successors(T, v). The depth of a vertex v in T is denoted depth(T, v) and equals the number of edges
on the path from r to v. The depth of T is denoted depth(T ) and equals the maximum of depth(T, v) as v ranges
in V . The i-th layer of T is denoted layer(T, i) and equals the set of v ∈ V such that depth(T, v) = i. (Note that
depth(T, r) = 0 and layer(T, 0) = {r}.) An equidepth tree is a tree in which all leaves have equal depth.
Definition 4.18. Let C be a linear code with domain D and alphabet F. A recursive cover of C is a directed rooted
equidepth tree T of non-zero depth where each vertex v is labeled by a view (C˜v , D˜v) such that: (i) C˜v is a linear
code with domain D˜v and alphabet F; (ii) if v is the root, then (C˜v, D˜v) = (C,D); and (iii) for every non-leaf v the
set Tv := {(C˜u, D˜u)}u∈successors(T,v) is a cover of C˜v . Furthermore we define the following notions:
• Given d ∈ {0, . . . , depth(T )}, the d-depth restriction of T is T |d :=
⋃
v∈layer(T,d){(C˜v, D˜v)}. (Note that T |0 =
{(C,D)}.)
• Given c ∈ N, we say that T is c-intersecting if |D˜u ∩ D˜u′ | ≤ c for every two disconnected vertices u, v.
• Given κ ∈ N, we say that T is κ-independent if Tv is a κ-independent cover of C˜v for every non-leaf vertex v in T .
Remark 4.19. The above definition is restricted to equidepth trees, but can be extended to general trees as follows.
Iteratively append to each leaf v of non-maximal depth a single successor u labeled by (C˜u, D˜u) := (C˜v, D˜v); this
leads to a cover of Tv that is 0-intersecting and κ-doubly independent for κ that equals C˜v’s dual distance.
Below we state the main lemma of this section. This lemma says that (given certain restrictions) if a recursive
cover has the local property of independence (of some degree) at each internal vertex, then each of its layers has the
global property of locality (of some degree) as a cover of the root. Later on (in Section 4.3.3) we show how cover
locality is used to construct constraint detectors.
Lemma 4.20 (main). Let C be a linear code with domain D and alphabet F, and let T be a recursive cover of C such
that (i) T is c-intersecting for c > 0, and (ii) for every non-leaf vertex v in T it holds that Tv is a κ-independent cover
of C˜v . Then, for every d ∈ {0, . . . , depth(T )}, T |d is a κc -local cover of C.
Proof. We prove the statement by induction on the non-negative integer d. The base case is when d = 0, and holds
because T |0 = {(D,C)} is the trivial cover, thus it is a κ′-local cover of C for any κ′ ≥ 0 and, in particular, a κc -local
cover. We now assume the statement for d < depth(T ) and prove it for depth d+ 1.
Let T |d = {(D˜j , C˜j)}j be the d-depth cover of C, and let T |d+1 = {(D˜i,j , C˜i,j)}i,j be the (d + 1)-depth cover
of C, where, for every i, T |(i)d+1 = {(D˜i,j , C˜i,j)}j is the cover of C˜i (this can be ensured via suitable indexing). Let J
be a set of pairs (i, j) of size at most κc , and let w
′ ∈ FD˜J be such that w′|D˜i,j ∈ C˜i,j for every (i, j) ∈ J . We show
that there exists w ∈ C such that w|D˜J = w′. Define I := {i : ∃ j s.t. (i, j) ∈ J} and note that |I| ≤ |J | ≤ κc . By the
inductive assumption, it suffices to show that there exists w ∈ FD˜I such that (a) w|D˜i,j = w′|D˜i,j for every (i, j) ∈ J ,
and (b) w|D˜i ∈ C˜i for every i ∈ I .
For simplicity assume I = {1, . . . , |I|}. We construct w incrementally and view w as belonging to (F ∪ {∅})D˜I ,
i.e., it is a partial mapping from D˜I to F. Let def(w) := {α ∈ D˜I : w(α) 6= ∅} denote the set of locations where
w is defined. Initialize def(w) = D˜J and w|D˜J = w′; then, for increasing i = 1, . . . , |I|, iteratively extend w to be
defined (also) over D˜i, eventually obtaining w ∈ FD˜I . In the i-th iteration (that handles D˜i), it is sufficient to prove
the existence of a codeword wi ∈ C˜i such that wi|D˜i∩def(w) = w|D˜i∩def(w). If such a codeword exists then we shall
define w on D˜i by w|D˜i = wi, thus eventually reaching w that satisfies the stated requirements.
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To show that during the i-th iteration the desired wi exists, partition the elements of D˜i ∩ def(w) into two sets:
V := ∪j s.t. (i,j)∈JD˜i,j and W := (D˜i∩def(w))\V . Note that W ⊆ ∪i′ 6=i(D˜i∩ D˜i′), because defining w(α) for any
α ∈ W can be done only: (i) in the initialization phase, so that α ∈ D˜i′,j′ ⊆ D˜i′ for some (i′, j′) ∈ J with i′ 6= i (as
otherwise α ∈ V ); or (ii) in a previous iteration, so that α ∈ D˜i′ for some i′ < i (as D˜i′ was already handled and w
is already defined on all of D˜i′). The above implies that W ⊆ di(T |(i)d+1) and the assumption that T is c-intersecting
implies
|W | ≤
∑
i′ 6=i
|D˜i ∩ D˜i′ | ≤ c · |I| ≤ c · |J | ≤ κ .
Similarly, note that for every fixed i ∈ I the number of pairs (i, j) ∈ J is at most |J | ≤ κ. By assumption C˜i has a
κ-independent cover and thus we conclude (via Definition 4.16) that the desired wi exists, as required.
4.3.3 From recursive covers to succinct constraint detection
The purpose of this section is to establish sufficient conditions for succinct constraint detection by leveraging covers
with small-enough views and large-enough locality. First, in Definition 4.21 and Lemma 4.22, we define cover-based
constraint detection and prove that it implies succinct constraint detection; informally, we consider the case when
a code has a sequence of covers where view size and locality reduce together, and prove that we can locally detect
constraints in a number of views that is proportional to the constraint’s weight and each view’s size is proportional to
the constraint’s weight, by choosing the right cover from the sequence. Then, in Definition 4.24 and Lemma 4.25, we
extend our discussion to recursive code covers by defining recursive-cover-based constraint detection and establishing
that it implies the previous notion. We conclude (in Corollary 4.26) that recursive-cover-based constraint detection
implies succinct constraint detection.
Definition 4.21. Let C = {C
n
}
n
be a linear code family with domain D(·) and alphabet F(·). We say that C has
cover-based constraint detection if there exists an algorithm that, given an index n and subset I ⊆ D(n), outputs in
poly(|n| + |I|) time a subset W ⊆ F(n)D(n) for which there exists a subset S′ of some |I|-local cover S of C
n
, and
the following holds: (i) |S′| ≤ |I|; (ii) I ⊆ (∪(D˜,C˜)∈S′ D˜); (iii) span(W ) = span(∪(D˜,C˜)∈S′ C˜⊥).
Lemma 4.22. Let C = {C
n
}
n
be a linear code family with domain D(·) and alphabet F(·). If C has cover-based
constraint detection then C has succinct constraint detection.
To prove this lemma we require a technical claim, the proof of which is deferred to Appendix E.
Claim 4.23. Let C be a linear code with domain D and alphabet F, let S = {(D˜j , C˜j)}j be a κ-local cover of C. For
any set J of size at most κ it holds span(∪j∈J C˜⊥j ) = (C⊥)⊆(∪j∈J D˜j).
Proof of Lemma 4.22. By Lemma 4.6, it suffices to show an algorithm that, on input an index n and subset I ⊆ D(n),
outputs a subset W ⊆ F(n)D(n) with (C⊥
n
)⊆I ⊆ span(W ) ⊆ C⊥
n
in poly(|n| + |I|) time. We take this algorithm to
be the one guaranteed by Definition 4.21. To see correctness, let D˜S′ := ∪(D˜,C˜)∈S′ D˜, and note that Definition 4.21
and Claim 4.23 imply that span(W ) = (C⊥
n
)⊆D˜S′ and (C
⊥
n
)⊆I ⊆ (C⊥
n
)⊆D˜S′ ⊆ C⊥n , as required.
Next we show that, under certain conditions, code families with recursive covers imply a sequence of covers that we
can use to construct cover-based constraint detectors. Combined with Lemma 4.22, this result is key for establishing
a connection from certain proximity proof constructions to succinct constraint detectors.
Definition 4.24. Let C = {C
n
}
n
be a linear code family with domain D(·) and alphabet F(·). We say that C has
recursive-cover-based constraint detection if:
• there exists c ∈ N such that, for every index n, C
n
has a c-intersecting recursive cover T
n
;
• there exists an algorithm that, given an index n and subset I ⊆ D(n), outputs in poly(|n| + |I|) time a subset
W ⊆ F(n)D(n) for which there exist d ∈ {0, . . . , depth(T
n
)} and U ⊆ layer(T
n
, d) such that: (i) for every
vertex v in T
n
with depth(T
n
, v) < d, the cover T
n,v is c|I|-independent; (ii) |U | ≤ |I|; (iii) I ⊆ (∪u∈U D˜u);
(iv) span(W ) = span(∪u∈U C˜⊥u ).
Lemma 4.25. Let C = {C
n
}
n
be a linear code family with domain D(·) and alphabet F(·). If C has recursive-cover-
based constraint detection, then C has cover-based constraint detection.
Proof. The definition of recursive-cover-based detection says that there exist (a) c ∈ N such that, for every index n, C
n
has a c-intersecting recursive cover T
n
, and (b) an algorithm satisfying certain properties. We show that this algorithm
meets the requirements for being a cover-based constraint detector (see Definition 4.21). Consider any index n and
subset I ⊆ D(n), and let W be the output of the algorithm. Let d ∈ {0, . . . , depth(T
n
)} and U ⊆ layer(T
n
, d) be the
objects associated to W (guaranteed by the definition of recursive-cover-based constraint detection). Let S := T
n
|d
(i.e., S is the d-depth restriction of T
n
) and S′ := {(D˜u, C˜u)}u∈U ; it suffices to show that S is |I|-local. The claim
follows directly by the assumption on d and Lemma 4.20, because T
n,v is c|I|-independent for every vertex v in Tn
with depth(T
n
, v) < d, and thus S = T
n
|d is indeed a |I|-local cover of C.
Corollary 4.26. Let C = {C
n
}
n
be a linear code family with domain D(·) and alphabet F(·). If C has recursive-
cover-based constraint detection, then C has succinct constraint detection.
Proof. Follows directly from Lemma 4.25 (recursive-cover-based constraint detection implies cover-based constraint
detection) and Lemma 4.22 (cover-based constraint detection implies succinct constraint detection).
4.3.4 Proof of Theorem 4.12
The purpose of this section is to prove Theorem 4.12. By Corollary 4.26, it suffices to argue that the linear code family
BS-RS has recursive-cover-based constraint detection (see Definition 4.24).
Recall that we consider Reed–Solomon codes RS[F, L, d] where F is an extension field of a base field K, L is
a K-linear subspace in F, and d = |L| · |K|−µ for some µ ∈ N; and we denote by BS-RS[K,F, L, µ, k] the code
obtained by concatenating codewords in RS[F, L, |L| · |K|−µ] with corresponding [BS08] proximity proofs with “base
dimension” k ∈ {1, . . . , dim(L)} (see Appendix F for details). The linear code family BS-RS is indexed by tuples
n = (K,F, L, µ, k) and the n-th code is BS-RS[K,F, L, µ, k].
We represent indices n so that log |F|+dim(L)+ |K|µ ≤ poly(|n|). The base field K and extension field F require
O(log |K|) and O(log |F|) bits to represent; the subspace L requires O(dim(L)) elements in F to represent; and the
two integers µ and k requireO(log µ) andO(log k) bits to represent. In addition, we add |K|µ arbitrary bits of padding.
Overall, we obtain that |n| = Θ(log |K|+log |F|+log |F|·dim(L)+logµ+log k+|K|µ) = Θ(log |F|·dim(L)+|K|µ).
The main claim in this section is the following (and does not rely on fixing K, µ).
Lemma 4.27. Define the depth function d(K, L, µ, a) := log2 dim(L)− log2(log|K| a+ µ+ 2)− 1. The linear code
family BS-RS satisfies the following properties.
• For every index n = (K,F, L, µ, k), BS-RS[K,F, L, µ, k] has a 1-intersecting recursive cover T
n
. Also, for every
positive integerm and non-leaf vertex v in T
n
with depth(T
n
, v) < d(K, L, µ,m), the cover T
n,v is m-independent.
• There exists an algorithm that, given an index n = (K,F, L, µ, k) and subset I ⊆ D(n), outputs in time poly(log |F|+
dim(L) + |K|µ + |I|) a subset W ⊆ FD(n) for which there exist U ⊆ layer(T
n
, d(K, L, µ, |I|)) such that:
(i) |U | ≤ |I|; (ii) I ⊆ (∪u∈U D˜u); (iii) span(W ) = span(∪u∈U C˜⊥u ).
Given the above lemma, we can complete the proof of Theorem 4.12, as explained below. We defer the (long and
technical) proof of the lemma to Appendix G, and instead end this section with an overview of that proof.
Proof of Theorem 4.12. The proof follows from Lemma 4.27 above and from Corollary 4.26, as we now explain.
Corollary 4.26 states that if a linear code family C has recursive-cover-based constraint detection (see Defini-
tion 4.24), then C has succinct constraint detection (see Definition 4.2). Also recall that the definition of recursive-
cover-based detection requires having a c-intersecting recursive cover for each code in the class, and an algorithm
satisfying certain properties.
Observe that Lemma 4.27 guarantees that every code in BS-RS has a 1-intersecting recursive code and, moreover,
guarantees the existence of an algorithm whose output satisfies the required properties. We are left to argue that the
algorithm runs in time poly(|n|+ |I|). But this immediately follows from the running time stated in Lemma 4.27 and
the fact that log |F|+ dim(L) + |K|µ ≤ poly(|n|).
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Overview of Lemma 4.27’s proof. We assume familiarity with the linear code family BS-RS from [BS08]; for
completeness, we provide formal definitions and notations in Appendix F. Recall that the Reed–Solomon code is not
locally testable, but one can test proximity to it with the aid of BS proximity proofs [BS08]; the linear code family
BS-RS consists of the concatenation of Reed–Solomon codes with BS corresponding proximity proofs.
The construction of the aforementioned proximity proofs is recursive, with each step in the recursion reducing both
the evaluation domain size |L| and the degree d to (approximately) their square roots. Namely, testing proximity of a
codeword w to RS[F, L, d] is reduced to testing proximity of Θ(
√|L|) codewords {wi}i to {RS[F, Li, di]}i, where
|Li|, di = Θ(
√|L|) for each i. This step is then recursively applied (by way of proof composition [AS98]) to each
codeword wi, until the domain size is “small enough”.
The first part of the proof of Lemma 4.27 consists of various combinatorial claims (see Appendix G.1). First, we
observe that the union of the domains of the codewords wi covers (and, actually, slightly expands) the domain of the
original codeword w; this holds recursively, and induces a recursive cover T (see Definition G.3). We prove that T is
1-intersecting (see Claim G.4) and that, for every vertex v in T of depth at most d, the cover Tv is (|L|2−d−1 · |K|−µ−2)-
independent, which implies the stated independence property about Tv (see Claim G.5). The core of the argument
for this second claim is to show that the code C˜v equals BS-RS[K,F, Lv, µ, k] for some subspace Lv such that
dim(L) · 2−d ≤ dim(L˜) ≤ dim(L) · 2−d + 2µ (see Claim G.6).
The second part of the proof of Lemma 4.27 consists of establishing the computational efficiency of certain tasks
related to the recursive cover (see Appendix G.2). Specifically, we bound the time required to compute a spanning set
for covers in T (see Claim G.8). After a few more observations, we are able to conclude the proof.
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5 Sumcheck with perfect zero knowledge
We show how to obtain an IPCP for sumcheck that is perfect zero knowledge against unbounded queries.
Sumcheck. The sumcheck protocol [LFKN92, Sha92] is an IP for the claim “∑~α∈Hm F (~α) = 0”, where F is a
polynomial in F<d[X1, . . . , Xm] and H is a subset of F. The prover and verifier have input (F,m, d,H) and oracle
access to (the evaluation table on Fm of) F . The sumcheck protocol has soundness error 1 − (1 − d|F|)m; the prover
runs in space poly(log |F|+m+ d+ |H |) and the verifier in time poly(log |F|+m+ d+ |H |); the number of rounds
is m; finally, the protocol is public coin and the verifier queries F only at one random point.
Leakage. The sumcheck protocol is not zero knowledge: a verifier, by interacting with the honest prover, learns partial
sums of F , in addition to the fact that “
∑
~α∈Hm F (~α) = 0” is true. Assuming one way functions, one can make any
interactive proof, including the sumcheck protocol, to be (computational) zero knowledge [GMR89, IY87, BGG+88];
moreover, one-way functions are necessary for obtaining zero knowledge IPs for non-trivial languages [OW93]. As
we do not wish to make intractability assumptions, we now turn to a different proof system model.
Perfect zero knowledge via IPCPs. We obtain an IPCP for sumcheck that is perfect zero knowledge against un-
bounded queries. Namely, a malicious verifier has oracle access to a proof string π and also interacts with the prover,
but learns no information about F beyond the fact that the statement about F is true, in the following sense. There
exists an algorithm that perfectly simulates the verifier’s view by making as many queries to F as the total number
of verifier queries to either F or the oracle π. (Analogously to zero knowledge for proximity testers, a verifier may
query F at any time, so any such information comes “for free” and, also, any query to π ‘counts’ as a query to F ; see
Section 3.3.)
Our construction proceeds in two steps:
• Step 1. We modify the sumcheck protocol to make it perfect zero knowledge, but in a hybrid model where the
prover and verifier have access to a random polynomial R ∈ F<d[X1, . . . , Xm] such that
∑
~α∈Hm R(~α) = 0.
Crucially, soundness relies only on the fact that R is low-degree, but not the fact that it is random or sums to 0.
Also, the modified protocol does not depend on a bound on the malicious verifier’s queries, and thus maintains zero
knowledge even against unbounded queries.
• Step 2. We observe that in the IPCP model the prover can send an oracle proof string π that represents the evaluation
table of R, and the verifier can test that π is close to low-degree, and then use self correction to query it. This
extension preserves the zero knowledge properties of the previous step.
The more interesting of the two steps is the first one, so we briefly discuss the intuition behind it. Our idea is that,
rather than executing the sumcheck protocol on F directly, the prover and verifier execute it on ρF + R, where ρ
is chosen at random by the verifier (after R is sampled). Completeness is clear because if ∑~α∈Hm F (~α) = 0 and∑
~α∈Hm R(~α) = 0 then
∑
~α∈Hm(ρF + R)(~α) = 0; soundness is also clear because if
∑
~α∈Hm F (~α) 6= 0 then∑
~α∈Hm(ρF + R)(~α) 6= 0 with high probability over ρ (regardless of
∑
~α∈Hm R(~α)). We are thus left to show
perfect zero knowledge, which turns out to be a much less straightforward argument.
On the surface, perfect zero knowledge appears easy to argue: simply note that ρF + R is random among all
polynomials in F<d[X1, . . . , Xm] that sum to zero on Hm. However, this argument, while compelling, is not enough.
First, ρF + R is not random because a malicious verifier can choose ρ depending on queries to R; we discuss this
issue further down below. Second, even if ρF + R were random (e.g., the verifier does not query R before choosing
ρ), the simulator must run in polynomial time but it is not clear how that is possible, as we now explain.
Consider the following simulator: (1) sample a random polynomialQsim ∈ F<d[X1, . . . , Xm] subject to∑~α∈Hm Qsim(~α) =
0 and use it to simulate ρF + R; (2) whenever the verifier queries F (~α), respond by querying F (~α) and returning
the true value; (3) whenever the verifier queries R(~α), respond by querying F (~α) and returning Qsim(~α) − ρF (~α).
One can argue that the simulator produces the correct distribution; moreover, the number of queries to F made by the
simulator equals the number of (mutually) distinct queries to F and R made by the verifier, as desired.
But how does the simulator sample a random polynomial in F<d[X1, . . . , Xm] in polynomial time? The size of
the representation of such a polynomial is Ω(dm), which is exponential. We get around this problem by exploiting the
fact that the number of queries the verifier can make is polynomially bounded, and the simulator can keep state about
the answers to past queries and ‘make up’ on the fly the answer to a new query by resolving dependencies between
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queries. More precisely, we leverage our construction of a succinct constraint detector for evaluations of low-degree
polynomials (see Section 4.2), which itself relies on tools borrowed from algebraic complexity theory. The same
detector also allows to simulate partial sums, which the prover sends in the course of the sumcheck protocol itself.
Finally, we explain how we address the issue that the verifier may choose to query R before sending ρ. We handle
this by first (implicitly) sampling a random polynomial Rsim, and responding to each verifier query to R(~α) with
Rsim(~α). Then, when the verifier sends ρ, we draw Qsim conditioned on the already-queried values for R being
‘correct’; i.e., for each point ~α queried before ρ is sent, we add the condition that Qsim(~α) = ρF (~α) + Rsim(~α). We
then continue as described above, and it is not too difficult to argue that this strategy yields the correct distribution.
We are now ready to turn the above discussions into formal definitions and proofs. First, we give the definition of the
sumcheck relation and of a PZK IPCP system for sumcheck; then we state and prove the PZK Sumcheck Theorem.
Definition 5.1. The sumcheck relation and its promise variant are defined as follows.
• The sumcheck relation is the relation RSC of instance-witness pairs
(
(F,m, d,H, v), F
)
such that (i) F is a fi-
nite field, H is a subset of F, v is an element of F, and m, d are positive integers with md|F| < 12 ; (ii) F is in
F
<d[X1, . . . , Xm] and sums to v on Hm.
• The sumcheck promise relation is the pair of relations (RYESSC,RNOSC) where RYESSC := RSC and RNOSC are the pairs(
(F,m, d,H, v), F
)
such that (F,m, d,H, v) is as above andF is in F<d[X1, . . . , Xm] but does not sum to v on Hm.
Definition 5.2. A PZK IPCP system for sumcheck with soundness error ε is a pair of interactive algorithms (P, V )
that satisfies the following properties.
• COMPLETENESS. For every ((F,m, d,H, v), F ) ∈ RYESSC, Pr [〈PF (F,m, d,H, v), V F (F,m, d,H, v)〉 = 1] = 1.
• SOUNDNESS. For every ((F,m, d,H, v), F ) ∈ RNOSC and malicious prover P˜ , Pr [〈P˜ , V F (F,m, d,H, v)〉 = 1] ≤ ε.
• PERFECT ZERO KNOWLEDGE. There exists a straightline simulatorS such that, for every ((F,m, d,H, v), F ) ∈ RYESSC
and malicious verifier V˜ , the following two random variables are identically distributed(
SV˜ ,F (F,m, d,H, v) , qS
)
and
(
View 〈PF (F,m, d,H, v), V˜ F 〉 , qV˜
)
,
where qS is the number of queries to F made by S and qV˜ is the number of queries to F or PCP oracle made by V˜ .
Moreover, S runs in time poly(log |F|+ |H |+m+ qV˜ ), where qV˜ is V˜ ’s query complexity.
Theorem 5.3 (PZK Sumcheck). There exists a PZK public-coin IPCP system (P, V ) for sumcheck with soundness
error ε = O(md|F| ) and the following efficiency parameters.
• Oracle round: P sends an oracle proof string π : Fm → F.
• Interactive proof: after the oracle round, P and V engage in an m-round interactive proof; across the interaction,
the verifier sends to the prover O(m) field elements, while the prover sends to the verifier O(md) field elements.
• Queries: after the interactive proof, V non-adaptively queries π at poly(log |F|+m+ d) locations.
• Space and time: P runs in space poly(log |F| + m + d + |H |), while V in time poly(log |F| + m + d + |H |).
(The prover’s space complexity assumes that the randomness tape is two-way rather than one-way; see Remark 5.7
below.)
5.1 Step 1
We construct a public-coin IP for sumcheck that is perfect zero knowledge, in the “R-hybrid” model, where the prover
and verifier have access to a uniformly random R ∈ F<d[X1, . . . , Xm] conditioned on
∑
~α∈Hm R(~α) = 0.
Construction 5.4. The IP system (PIP, VIP) is defined as follows. Both PIP and VIP receive a tuple (F,m, d,H, v)
as common input, and two polynomials F,R ∈ F<d[X1, . . . , Xm] as oracles. The interaction proceeds as follows:
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1. VIP draws a random element ρ in F, and sends ρ to PIP; then
2. PIP and VIP run the sumcheck IP [LFKN92, Sha92] on the statement “
∑
~α∈Hm Q(~α) = ρv” where Q := ρF +R
(with PIP playing the role of the prover and VIP that of the verifier).
Note that (PIP, VIP) is public-coin, and satisfies the following efficiency properties.
– Communication: The number of rounds is m, because the first message is from VIP to PIP; then the standard
sumcheck protocol starts with a message from the prover to the verifier, and is followed by m − 1 full rounds.
Across the interaction, PIP sends O(m) field elements to VIP, while PIP sends O(md) field elements to VIP.
– Queries: VIP queries F and R each at a single random point because, at the end of the sumcheck protocol, the
verifier queries Q at a random point ~γ, and such a query can be “simulated” by querying F and R at ~γ and then
using these answers, along with ρ, to compute the necessary value for Q.
– Space and time: PIP runs in space poly(log |F| +m + d + |H |), while VIP in time poly(log |F| +m + d + |H |).
(The prover’s space complexity assumes that the randomness tape is two-way; see Remark 5.7 below.)
We now state and prove the completeness, soundness, and perfect zero knowledge properties.
Lemma 5.5. The IP system (PIP, VIP) satisfies the following properties.
• COMPLETENESS. For every ((F,m, d,H, v), F ) ∈ RYESSC and R ∈ F<d[X1, . . . , Xm] with ∑~α∈Hm R(~α) = 0,
Pr
[
〈PF,RIP (F,m, d,H, v), V F,RIP (F,m, d,H, v)〉 = 1
]
= 1 .
• SOUNDNESS. For every ((F,m, d,H, v), F ) ∈ RNOSC, R ∈ F<d[X1, . . . , Xm], and malicious prover P˜ ,
Pr
[
〈P˜ , V F,RIP (F,m, d,H, v)〉 = 1
]
≤ md+ 1|F| .
• PERFECT ZERO KNOWLEDGE. There exists a straightline simulator SIP such that, for every
(
(F,m, d,H, v), F
) ∈
R
YES
SC and malicious verifier V˜ , the following two random variables are identically distributed(
SV˜ ,FIP (F,m, d,H, v) , qSIP
)
and
(
View 〈PF,RIP (F,m, d,H, v), V˜ F,R〉 , qV˜
)
,
where R is uniformly random in F<d[X1, . . . , Xm] conditioned on
∑
~α∈Hm R(~α) = 0, qSIP is the number of
queries to F made by SIP, and qV˜ is the number of queries to F or R made by V˜ . Moreover, SIP runs in time
poly(log |F|+m+ d+ |H |+ qV˜ ) where qV˜ is V˜ ’s query complexity.
Proof. We argue first completeness, then soundness, and, finally, perfect zero knowledge.
Completeness. If both F sums to v on Hm and R sums to 0 on Hm, then Q := ρF +R sums to ρv on Hm for every
choice of ρ. Then completeness follows from the completeness of standard sumcheck.
Soundness. For everyF,R ∈ F<d[X1, . . . , Xm] with
∑
~α∈Hm F (~α) 6= 0. Then
∑
~α∈Hm Q(~α) equals ρv for at most
one choice of ρ, namely, (
∑
~α∈Hm R(~α))/(v −
∑
~α∈Hm F (~α)). Thus, except with probability 1/|F|, the sumcheck
protocol is invoked on an incorrect claim, which incurs a soundness error of at most md|F| . The claimed soundness error
follows by a union bound.
Perfect zero knowledge. We begin by proving perfect zero knowledge via a straightline simulator Sslow whose
number of queries to F equals qV˜ , but runs in time poly(|F|m + qV˜ ). After that, we explain how to modify Sslow into
another simulator SIP, with an identical output distribution, that runs in the faster time claimed in the lemma.
The simulator Sslow , given straightline access to V˜ and oracle access to F , works as follows:
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1. Draw a uniformly random Rsim ∈ F<d[X1, . . . , Xm] conditioned on
∑
~α∈Hm Rsim(~α) = 0.
2. Whenever V˜ queries F at ~γ ∈ Fm, return F (~γ); whenever V˜ queries R at ~γ ∈ Fm, return Rsim(~γ).
3. Receive ρ˜ from V˜ , and draw a uniformly random Qsim ∈ F<d[X1, . . . , Xm] conditioned on
∑
~α∈Hm Qsim(~α) = ρ˜v and
Qsim(~γ) = ρ˜F (~γ) +Rsim(~γ) for every coordinate ~γ ∈ Fm queried in Step 2. (This latter condition requires querying F
at ~γ for every coordinate ~γ ∈ Fm queried to Rsim in Step 2.)
4. Hereafter: whenever V˜ queries F at ~γ ∈ Fm, return F (~γ); whenever V˜ queries R at ~γ ∈ Fm, return Qsim(~γ) − ρ˜F (~γ).
(In either case, a query to F is required.)
5. Run the sumcheck protocol with V˜ on Qsim. (Note that V˜ may query F or R before, during, or after this protocol.)
6. Output the view of the simulated V˜ .
Note that Sslow runs in time poly(|F|m + qV˜ ). Also, Sslow makes one query to F for every query to F or R by V˜ (at
least provided that V˜ ’s queries have no duplicates, which we can assume without loss of generality). Thus, overall, the
number of queries to F by Sslow is qV˜ . We now argue that Sslow’s output is identically distributed to V˜ ’s view when
interacting with the honest prover PIP, for R random in F<d[X1, . . . , Xm].
Claim. SV˜ ,Fslow ≡ View 〈PF,RIP , V˜ F,R〉.
Proof. Define the random variable Q := ρ˜F + R, where ρ˜ is chosen by V˜ . Observe that there exists a
(deterministic) function v(·) such that
View 〈PF,RIP , V˜ F,R〉 = v(Q,F, r) and SV˜ ,Fslow = v(Qsim, F, r) ,
where the random variable r is V˜ ’s private randomness. Indeed, (i) the messages sent and received by
V˜ are identical to those when interacting with PIP on Q and Qsim, respectively; (ii) V˜ ’s queries to F
are answered honestly; (iii) V˜ ’s queries to R are answered by R = Q − ρ˜F and Rsim = Qsim − ρ˜F
respectively. We are only left to argue that, for any choice of r, Q and Qsim are identically distributed:
– Q = ρ˜F + R is uniformly random in F<d[X1, . . . , Xm] conditioned on
∑
~α∈Hm Q(~α) = ρ˜v, be-
cause R is uniformly random in F<d[X1, . . . , Xm] conditioned on
∑
~α∈Hm R(~α) = 0 (and F is in
F
<d[X1, . . . , Xm] and satisfies
∑
~α∈Hm F (~α) = v); and
– Qsim is uniformly random in F<d[X1, . . . , Xm] conditioned on
∑
~α∈Hm Qsim(~α) = ρ˜v, because
Qsim is sampled at random in F<d[X1, . . . , Xm] conditioned on
∑
~α∈Hm Qsim(~α) = ρ˜v andQsim(~γi) =
Rsim(~γi) + ρ˜F (~γi) for some (adversarial) choice of ~γ1, . . . , ~γk. But Rsim is uniformly random in
F
<d[X1, . . . , Xm] such that
∑
~α∈Hm Rsim(~α) = 0, so the latter condition says that Qsim matches a
random polynomial on the set of points {~γ1, . . . , ~γk}, giving the claimed distribution for Qsim.
We explain how to modify Sslow so as to reduce the running time to poly(log |F|+m+ d+ |H |+ qV˜ ).
Note that Sslow’s inefficiency arises from sampling two random polynomials in F<d[X1, . . . , Xm], namely Rsim
andQsim, subject to certain constraints, and using them to answer V˜ ’s messages and queries. We observe (and carefully
justify below) that all information about Rsim and Qsim received by V˜ is answers to queries of the form “given
~γ ∈ F≤m, return the value A(~γ) :=∑~α∈Hm−|~γ| A(~γ, ~α)” for a random A ∈ F<d[X1, . . . , Xm], possibly conditioned
on previous such queries; when ~γ has length zero we use the symbol⊥, so that A(⊥) denotes∑~α∈Hm A(~α). The new
simulator can use the algorithm A from our Corollary 4.10 to adaptively answer such queries, without ever explicitly
sampling the two polynomials.
We now argue that all information about Rsim and Qsim received by V˜ from Sslow can be viewed as queries of the
above form, by discussing each step of Sslow.
• In Step 1, Sslow draws a uniformly random Rsim ∈ F<d[X1, . . . , Xm] conditioned on Rsim(⊥) = 0.
• In Step 2, Sslow answers any query ~γ ∈ Fm to R with Rsim(~γ).
• In Step 3, Sslow draws a uniformly random Qsim ∈ F<d[X1, . . . , Xm] conditioned on Qsim(⊥) = ρ˜v and also on
Qsim(~γ) = Rsim(~γ) + ρ˜F (~γ) for at most qV˜ points ~γ ∈ Fm (namely, the points corresponding to queries in Step 2).
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• In Step 4, Sslow replies any query ~γ ∈ Fm to R with Qsim(~γ)− ρ˜F (~γ).
• In Step 5, Sslow runs the sumcheck protocol with V˜ on Qsim, which requires computing univariate polynomials of
the form
∑
~α∈Hm−|θ|−1 Qsim(
~θ,X, ~α) ∈ F[X ] for various choices of ~θ ∈ F<m. Each of these polynomials has
degree less than d, and so can be obtained by interpolation from its evaluation at any d distinct points; each of these
is the answer of a query to Qsim of the required form, with ~γ = (~θ, δ) for some δ ∈ F. Overall, during the protocol,
Sslow only needs to query Qsim at md points ~γ ∈ F≤m.
In sum, we can modify Sslow so that instead of explicitly sampling Rsim and Qsim, it uses A to sample the answer
for each query to Qsim or Rsim, conditioning the uniform distribution on the answers to previous queries. Putting all
of this together, we obtain the simulator SIP described below, whose output is identically distributed to the output of
Sslow.
The simulator SIP, given straightline access to V˜ and oracle access to F , works as follows:
1. Let ansRsim be a subset of F≤m × F that records query-value pairs for Rsim; initially, ansRsim equals {(⊥, 0)}.
2. Whenever V˜ queries F at~γ ∈ Fm, returnF (~γ); whenever V˜ queriesR at~γ ∈ Fm, return β := A(F,m, d,H, ansRsim , ~γ).
In the latter case, add (~γ, β) to ansRsim .
3. Receive ρ˜ from V˜ , and compute ansQsim := {(~γ, β+ ρ˜F (~γ))}(~γ,β)∈ansRsim ; this subset of F
≤m×F records query-value
pairs for Qsim. Note that ansQsim includes the pair (⊥, ρ˜v) because F (⊥) = v by assumption.
4. Hereafter: whenever V˜ queries F at ~γ ∈ Fm, return F (~γ); whenever V˜ queries R at ~γ ∈ Fm, return β′ := β − ρ˜F (~γ)
where β := A(F,m, d,H, ansQsim , ~γ). In the latter case, add (~γ, β) to ansQsim .
5. Run the sumcheck protocol with V˜ on Qsim, by using the algorithm A and updating ansQsim appropriately. (Note that V˜
may query F or R before, during, or after this protocol.)
6. Output the view of the simulated V˜ .
Note that SIP makes the same number of queries to F as Sslow does. Also, the number of pairs in ansRsim is at most
qV˜ +md + 1; ditto for ansQsim . Since the algorithm A is called at most qV˜ +md times, the running time of SIP is
poly(log |F|+m+ d+ |H |+ qV˜ ), as required.
5.2 Step 2
The IP described and analyzed in Section 5.1 is in the “R-hybrid” model. We now compile that IP into an IPCP, by
using proximity testing and self-correction, thereby concluding the proof of the PZK Sumcheck Theorem.
Proof of Theorem 5.3. Construct an IPCP system (P, V ) for sumcheck as follows:
• The prover P , given input (F,m, d,H, v) and oracle access to F , samples a uniformly random polynomial R ∈
F
<d[X1, . . . , Xm] conditioned on
∑
~α∈Hm R(~α) = 0 and sends its evaluation π : Fm → F to the verifier V . Then
P simulates PF,RIP (F,m, d,H, v).
• The verifier V , after receiving a proof string π : Fm → F, simulates V F,πIP (F,m, d,H, v) up to VIP’s single query
~α ∈ Fm to π (which occurs after the interaction), which V does not answer directly but instead answers as follows.
First, V checks that π is ̺-close to the evaluation of a polynomial in F<d[X1, . . . , Xm] by performing an individual-
degree test with proximity parameter ̺ := 18 and soundness error ǫ :=
md
|F| [GS06, GR15]; then, V computes
π(~α) via self-correction with soundness error ǫ [RS96, AS03], and replies with that value. Both procedures require
poly(log |F|+m+ d) queries and time. Finally, V rejects if VIP rejects or the individual degree test rejects.
Completeness and perfect zero knowledge of (P, V ) are inherited, in a straightforward way, from those of (PIP, VIP).
We now argue soundness. So consider an instance-witness pair
(
(F,m, d,H, v), F
) ∈ RNOSC and a malicious prover P˜ ,
and denote by π˜ : Fm → F the proof string sent by P˜ . We distinguish between the following two cases.
• Case 1: π˜ is ̺-far from evaluations of polynomials in F<d[X1, . . . , Xm].
In this case, the low-degree test accepts with probability at most ǫ.
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• Case 2: π˜ is ̺-close to evaluations of polynomials in F<d[X1, . . . , Xm].
In this case, let R˜ be the unique polynomial in F<d[X1, . . . , Xm] whose evaluation is ̺-close to π˜; this polynomial
exists because ̺ is less than the unique decoding radius (of the corresponding Reed–Muller code), which equals
1
2 (1 − d−1|F| )m, and is at most 14 by the assumption that md|F| < 12 . By the soundness of (PIP, VIP), the probability
that V F,R˜IP accepts is at most
md+1
|F| (see Lemma 5.5). However V only has access to π˜, and uses self-correction on
it to compute R˜ at the single location ~α ∈ Fm required by VIP; the probability that the returned value is not correct
is at most ǫ. Hence, by a union bound, V accepts with probability at most md+1|F| + ǫ.
Overall, we deduce that V accepts with probability at most max{ǫ , md+1|F| + ǫ} ≤ 3md|F| .
Remark 5.6 (necessity of IPCP). One may be tempted to “flatten” the IPCP used to prove Theorem 5.3, by sending a
single PCP that already contains all possible transcripts, relative to all possible ρ’s. Such a modification does indeed
preserve completeness and soundness. (In fact, even a small subset of ρ’s is enough for constant soundness error,
because only one ρ in F is “bad”.) However, this modification does not preserve zero knowledge: if a verifier learns,
say, the partial sums α1 := ρ1F (~γ) + R(~γ) and α2 := ρ2F (~γ) + R(~γ) for ρ1 6= ρ2 and some ~γ ∈ F≤m then he
also learns F (~γ) = α1−α2ρ1−ρ2 , violating zero knowledge. (That said, the modification does preserve honest-verifier zero
knowledge.)
Remark 5.7 (space complexity of the prover). The prover in a zero knowledge protocol is a probabilistic function,
and hence reads bits from its randomness tape. In the case of the above protocol, the prover P must sample the
evaluation of a random polynomial R in F<d[X1, . . . , Xm]; the entropy of R is exponential and thus requires reading
an exponential number of random bits from the randomness tape. (Beyond this, P requires no other randomness.)
It is easy to see that P can run in exponential time and space. However, if the prover has two-way access to its
random tape, P can run in exponential time and polynomial space: the prover treats the random tape as the coeffi-
cients of R, computing an evaluation at a given point by reading the tape coefficient-by-coefficient and summing the
contributions of each monomial.
Two-way access to the randomness tape is a relaxation of the standard definition, which permits only one-way
access to it [Nis93]; that is, random bits must be stored on the work tape in order to be accessed again. It is not
known whether the relaxation makes polynomial-space machines more powerful for decision problems (the class is
equivalent to “almost”-PSPACE [BVW98]), nor do we know how to obtain a polynomial-space prover with only
one-way access. Nevertheless, we believe that polynomial space with two-way access to the random tape is still quite
meaningful, e.g., it yields standard polynomial space relative to a random oracle.
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6 Perfect zero knowledge for counting problems
We prove that#P has an IPCP that is perfect zero knowledge against unbounded queries. (Recall that#P corresponds
to all counting problems associated to decision problems in NP.) We do so by constructing a suitable protocol for the
counting problem associated to 3SAT, which is #P-complete.
Definition 6.1. Let L#3SAT be the language of pairs (φ,N) where φ is a 3-CNF boolean formula and N is the
number of satisfying assignments of φ. We denote by n the number of variables and by c the number of clauses in φ.
We construct a public-coin IPCP system for L#3SAT that is perfect zero knowledge against unbounded queries,
and has exponential proof length and polynomial query complexity. As in the non-ZK IP counterpart, the number of
rounds is O(n), the prover runs in space poly(c) (with a caveat, see Remark 5.7), and the verifier in time poly(c).
Theorem 6.2 (formal statement of 1.1). There exists a IPCP system (P, V ) that puts L#3SAT in the complexity class
PZK-IPCP


rounds k = O(n)
proof length l = exp(n)
query complexity q = poly(c)
soundness error ε = 1/2
prover space sp = poly(c)
verifier time tv = poly(c)
query bound b = ∗


.
Moreover, the verifier V is public-coin and non-adaptive.
Proof. Let (PSC, VSC) be the PZK IPCP system for sumcheck from Theorem 5.3, and let SSC be any simulator attests
to its perfect zero knowledge. We construct an IPCP system (P, V ) for L#3SAT as follows.
• The proverP , given an instance (φ,N), finds a prime q ∈ (2n, 22n], computes the arithmetization pφ ∈ F<3cq [X1, . . . , Xn]
of φ and simulatesPFSC(F,m, d,H, v)with F := Fq, m := n, d := 3c,H := {0, 1}, v := N , andF (X1, . . . , Xn) :=
pφ(X1, . . . , Xn). (The prover P also communicates the prime q to the V verifier.)
• The verifier V , given an instance (φ,N), also computes F,m, d,H, v, F , and then simulates V FSC(F,m, d,H, v),
and accepts if and only if the simulation accepts.
Note that the arithmetization of a 3-CNF formula φ can be computed in time poly(c), and the claimed given effi-
ciency parameters follow from Theorem 5.3. We now argue completeness, then soundness, and finally perfect zero
knowledge.
Completeness. Completeness follows from the completeness of (PSC, VSC) and the fact that if (φ,N) ∈ L#3SAT
then
(
(F,m, d,H, v), F
)
= ((Fq, n, 3c, {0, 1}n, N), pφ) ∈ RYESSC.
Soundness. Soundness follows from the soundness of (PSC, VSC) and the fact that if (φ,N) /∈ L#3SAT then(
(F,m, d,H, v), F
)
= ((Fq, n, 3c, {0, 1}n, N), pφ) ∈ RNOSC.
Perfect zero knowledge. We construct a simulator S that provides perfect zero knowledge. Given an instance
(φ,N) and straightline access to a verifier V˜ , the simulator S computes F,m, d,H, v, F as above and simulates
SV˜ ,FSC (F,m, d,H, v). By the perfect zero knowledge property of (PSC, VSC), the simulator’s output is identically
distributed to View 〈PFSC(F,m, d,H, v), V˜ F 〉; but note that V˜ does not query any oracles outside of its interaction
with PSC so that V˜ F = V˜ . By the construction of P above, this view equals to View 〈P (φ,N), V˜ 〉, as desired.
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7 Perfect zero knowledge from succinct constraint detection
We show how to obtain perfect zero knowledge 2-round IOPs of Proximity for any linear code that has proximity
proofs with succinct constraint detection (Section 7.1). Afterwards, we instantiate this general transformation for the
case of Reed–Solomon codes (Section 7.2), whose proximity proofs we discussed in Section 4.3.
7.1 A general transformation
PCPs of proximity for codes. A PCP of Proximity [DR04, BGH+06] for a code family C = {C
n
}
n
is a pair
(PC , VC ) where for every index n and w ∈ FD(n): if w ∈ Cn then V w,πC (n) accepts with probability 1 with π :=
P (n, w); if w is ‘far’ from C
n
then w ∈ C
n
rejects with high probability regardless of π. We do not formally define
this notion because it is a special case of a 1-round IOP of Proximity (see Section 3.2.3) where the verifier message is
empty; we use PCPP[l, q, ε, δ, tp, tv] to denote the corresponding complexity class. Note that, since both π and w
are provided as oracles to V , the query complexity of V is the total number of queries across both oracles.
Leakage from proximity proofs. While proximity proofs facilitate local testing, they are a liability for zero knowl-
edge: in principle even a single query to π may ‘summarize’ information that needs many queries to w to simulate.
(This holds for BS proximity proofs [BS08], for instance.) Our construction facilitates local testing while avoiding
this leakage.
Perfect zero knowledge IOPs of Proximity. The notion of zero knowledge for IOPs of Proximity that we target
is defined in Section 3.3.2 and is analogous to [IW14]’s notion for PCPs of Proximity (a special case of our setting).
Informally, it requiress an algorithm that simulates the verifier’s view by making as many queries to w as the total
number of verifier queries to either w or any oracles sent by the prover; intuitively, this means that any bit of any
message oracle reveals no more information than one bit of w.
A generic ‘masking’ construction. Suppose that the linear code family C = {C
n
}
n
has a PCP of Proximity.
Consider the 2-round IOP of Proximity that uses masking via random self-reducibility (similarly to [BCGV16]) as
follows. The prover and verifier have input n and oracle access to a codeword w, and the prover wants to convince the
verifier that w is close to C
n
. Rather than sending a proximity proof for w, the prover samples a random codeword
z ∈ C
n
and sends it to the verifier; the verifier replies with a random field element ρ; the prover sends a proximity
proof for the new codeword ρw+ z. Completeness follows from linearity of C
n
; soundness follows from the fact that
if w is far from C
n
then so is the word ρw + z for every z with high probability over ρ.
Perfect zero knowledge intuitively follows from the observation that ρw + z is essentially a random codeword
(up to malicious choice of ρ). We formally prove this for the case where the linear code family consisting of the
concatenation of codewords in C with corresponding proximity proofs has succinct constraint detection.
We are now ready to turn the above discussions into formal definitions and proofs. Throughout, given a code family
C , we denote by Rel(C ) the relation consisting of all pairs (n, w) such that w ∈ C
n
.
Definition 7.1. Let C = {C
n
}
n
be a linear code family with domain D(·) and alphabet F(·), and let (P, V ) be a
PCPP system for Rel(C ). We say that (P, V ) is linear if P is deterministic and is linear in its input codeword: for
every index n there exists a matrix A
n
with entries in F(n) such that P (n, w) = A
n
· w for all w ∈ C
n
(equivalently,
the set {w‖P (n, w) }w∈C
n
is a linear code).
Definition 7.2. Let C = {C
n
}
n
be a linear code family with domain D(·) and alphabet F(·), and let (P, V ) be a
PCPP system for Rel(C ). We say that (P, V ) has T (·, ·)-time constraint detection if (P, V ) is linear and, moreover,
the linear code family L = {L
n
} has T (·, ·)-time constraint detection, where L
n
:= {w‖P (n, w) }w∈C
n
; we also
say that (P, V ) has succinct constraint detection if the same holds with T (n, ℓ) = poly(n+ ℓ).
Theorem 7.3. Let C = {C
n
}
n
be a linear code family with domain D(·), alphabet F(·), block length ℓ(·), and a
S(·)-time sampler. Suppose that there exists a PCPP system (PC , VC ) for Rel(C ) that (is linear and) has succinct
35
constraint detection and puts Rel(C ) in the complexity class
PCPP


answer alphabet F(n)
proof length lC (n)
query complexity qC (n)
soundness error εC (n)
proximity parameter δC (n)
prover time tp
C
(n)
verifier time tvC (n)
verifier randomness rvC (n)


.
Then there exists an IOPP system (P, V ) that puts Rel(C ) in the complexity class
PZK-IOPP


answer alphabet F(n)
rounds k(n) = 2
proof length l(n) = lC (n) + ℓ(n)
query complexity q(n) = 2qC (n)
soundness error ε(n) = εC (n) +
1
|F(n)|
proximity parameter δ(n) = 2δC (n)
prover time tp(n) = tp
C
(n) + S(n) +O(ℓ(n))
verifier time tv(n) = tvC (n) +O(qC (n))
verifier randomness rv(n) = rvC (n) + log |F(n)|
query bound b(n) = ∗


.
Remark 7.4 (the case of LTCs). It is tempting to apply Theorem 7.3 to the notable special case where the proximity
proof is empty (e.g., when C is locally testable so no proximity proofs are needed). However, in this case, the
zero knowledge guarantee of our construction does not buy anything compared to when the verifier queries only the
codeword (indeed, the verifier already learns precisely the value of codeword at those positions which it queries and
nothing else).
Construction 7.5. The IOPP system (P, V ) is defined as follows. The prover receives a pair (n, w) as input, while
the verifier receives the index n as input and w as an oracle. The interaction proceeds as follows:
1. P samples a random codeword z in C
n
and sends z to V ;
2. V samples a random element ρ in F(n) and sends ρ to P ;
3. P computes the proof π := PC (n, ρw + z) and sends π to V ;
4. V checks that V w
′,π
C
(n) accepts, where w′ := ρw + z (any query α to w′ is computed as ρw(α) + z(α)).
The round complexity, proof length, query complexity, and prover and verifier complexities claimed in Theo-
rem 7.3 follow in a straightforward way from Construction 7.5. We now argue completeness and soundness (Claim 7.6)
and perfect zero knowledge (Claim 7.7).
Claim 7.6. The IOPP system (P, V ) has completeness 1 and soundness error ε(n) = εC (n) + 1|F(n)| .
Proof. First we argue completeness. Suppose that the instance-witness pair (n, w) is in the relation Rel(C ), i.e., that
the word w is in the code C
n
. Then, the linearity of C
n
implies that, for every word z in C
n
and element ρ in F(n),
the word ρw + z is also in C
n
. Thus completeness of (P, V ) follows from the completeness of (PC , VC ).
Next we argue soundness. Suppose that w is 2δC (n)-far from Cn. For every word z in F(n)ℓ(n) (not necessarily
in C
n
), there exists at most one ρ in F(n) such that ρw + z is δC (n)-close to Cn (see Claim 3.1). The soundness of
(PC , VC ) implies that VC accepts with probability at most εC (n) if VC is invoked on a word that is δC (n)-far from
C
n
. Thus, since V invokes VC on the word ρw + z, the probability that V accepts is at most εC (n) + 1|F(n)| .
Claim 7.7. There exists a straightline simulator S such that, for every (n, w) ∈ Rel(C ) and malicious verifier V˜ , the
following two random variables are identically distributed(
SV˜ ,w(n) , qS
)
and
(
View 〈Pw(n), V˜ w〉 , qV˜
)
,
where qS is the number of queries to w made by S and qV˜ is the number of queries to w or to prover messages made
by V˜ . Moreover, S runs in time poly(n+ qV˜ ), where qV˜ is V˜ ’s query complexity.
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Proof. We begin by proving perfect zero knowledge via a straightline simulator Sslow whose number of queries to w
equals qV˜ , but runs in time poly(tp(n) + qV˜ ). After that, we explain how to modify Sslow into another simulator S,
with an identical output distribution, that runs in the faster time claimed in the lemma.
The simulator Sslow , given straightline access to V˜ and oracle access to w, works as follows:
1. Draw a uniformly random zsim ∈ Cn.
2. Whenever V˜ queries w at α ∈ D(n), return w(α); whenever V˜ queries z at α ∈ D(n), return zsim(α).
3. Receive ρ˜ from V˜ , and draw a uniformly random w′sim‖πsim ∈ Ln conditioned on w′sim(α) = ρ˜w(α)+zsim(α) for every
coordinate α ∈ D(n) queried in Step 2. (This latter condition requires querying w at α for every coordinate α ∈ D(n)
queried to zsim in Step 2.)
4. Hereafter: whenever V˜ queriesw at α ∈ D(n), return w(α); whenever V˜ queries z at α ∈ D(n), returnw′sim(α)−ρ˜w(α).
(In either case, a query to w is required.)
5. Tell V˜ that the oracle π has been ‘sent’; whenever V˜ queries the i-th entry of π, return the i-th entry of πsim. (Note that
V˜ may query w or z before or after learning about π.)
6. Output the view of the simulated V˜ .
Note that Sslow runs in time poly(tp(n) + qV˜ ). Also, Sslow makes one query to w for every query to w or z by V˜ (at
least provided that V˜ ’s queries have no duplicates, which we can assume without loss of generality), and zero queries
to w for every query to π by V˜ . Thus, overall, the number of queries to w by Sslow is at most qV˜ ; clearly, this number
of queries can be padded to be equal to qV˜ . We now argue that Sslow’s output is identically distributed to V˜ ’s view
when interacting with the honest prover P , for z random in C
n
.
Claim. SV˜ ,wslow ≡ View 〈Pw(n), V˜ w〉.
Proof. Define the random variable w′ := ρ˜w + z, where ρ˜ is chosen by V˜ . Observe that there exists a
(deterministic) function v(·) such that
View 〈Pw,z, V˜ w,z〉 = v(w′, w, r) and SV˜ ,wslow = v(w′sim, w, r) ,
where the random variable r is V˜ ’s private randomness. Indeed, (i) the messages sent and received by
V˜ are identical to those when interacting with P on w′ and w′sim, respectively; (ii) V˜ ’s queries to w
are answered honestly; (iii) V˜ ’s queries to z are answered by z = w′ − ρ˜w and zsim = w′sim − ρ˜w
respectively; (iv) V˜ ’s queries to π are answered by PC (n, w′) and PC (n, w′sim) respectively. We are
only left to argue that, for any choice of r, w′ and w′sim are identically distributed:
– w′ = ρ˜w + z is uniformly random in C
n
, because z is uniformly random in C
n
, w is in C
n
, and C
n
is linear; and
– w′sim is uniformly random inCn, becausew′sim is sampled at random inCn conditioned onw′sim(αi) =
zsim(αi) + ρ˜w(αi) for some (adversarial) choice of α1, . . . , αk. But zsim is uniformly random in Cn,
so the latter condition says that w′sim matches a random codeword on the set of points {α1, . . . , αk},
giving the claimed distribution for w′sim.
We explain how to modify Sslow so as to reduce the running time to poly(n+qV˜ ). The inefficiency of Sslow comes
from sampling zsim ∈ Cn and w′sim‖πsim ∈ Ln, which takes time poly(S(n) + ℓ(n)) and poly(tpC (n)) respectively,
which need not be polynomial in n. In the following, we show how to not explicitly sample these codewords but,
instead, adaptively sample them by relying on constraint detection.
First, note that if L has constraint detection with a certain efficiency then so does C with the same efficiency.
The theorem’s hypothesis says that L has succinct constraint detection; so both C and L have succinct constraint
detection. We then invoke Lemma 4.3 to obtain probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms AC ,AL for the code
families C ,L respectively. Using these algorithms, we write the more efficient simulator S, as follows.
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LetD∗(n) be the domain ofL
n
: this is the disjoint union of D(n) (the domain ofC
n
) and [lC (n)] (the domain of PC (n, Cn)).
The simulator S, given straightline access to V˜ and oracle access to w, works as follows:
1. Let anszsim be a subset of D(n)× F(n) that records query-value pairs for zsim; initially, anszsim equals ∅.
2. Whenever V˜ queries w at α ∈ D(n), return w(α); whenever V˜ queries z at α ∈ D(n), return β := AC (n, anszsim , α).
In the latter case, add (α, β) to anszsim .
3. Receive ρ˜ from V˜ , and compute ans := {(α, β+ ρ˜w(α))}(α,β)∈anszsim ; this subset of D
∗(n)×F(n) records query-value
pairs for w′sim‖πsim.
4. Hereafter: whenever V˜ queries w at α ∈ D(n), return w(α); whenever V˜ queries z at α ∈ D(n), return β′ := β− ρ˜w(α)
where β := AL (n, ans, α) and add (α, β) to ans.
5. Tell V˜ that the oracle π has been ‘sent’; note that we do not yet commit to any entries in the proof, save for those which
are implied by the verifier’s previous queries to w. Whenever V˜ queries the i-th location in π, return πi := AL (n, ans, i)
and add (i, πi) to ans. (Note that V˜ may query w or z before or after learning about π.)
6. Output the view of the simulated V˜ .
Note that S makes the same number of queries to w as Sslow does. Also, the number of pairs in anszsim is at most qV˜ ;
ditto for ans. Since the algorithmA is called at most qV˜ times, the running time of S is poly(n+qV˜ ), as required.
We conclude with a lemma that says that succinct constraint detection is in some sense inherent to the “masking”
approach used in Construction 7.5.
Lemma 7.8. If (PC , VC ) is a linear PCPP such that Construction 7.5 yields (P, V ) with perfect zero knowledge, then
(PC , VC ) has a constraint detector that runs in probabilistic polynomial time. (In fact, the same statement holds even
if the construction yields (P, V ) with only statistical zero knowledge.)
Proof. The linear code L
n
:= {w‖P (n, w) }w∈C
n
has domain D∗(n) := D(n) ⊔ [lC (n)], which is the disjoint union
of D(n) (the domain of C
n
) and [lC (n)] (the domain of P (n, Cn)); see Definition 7.2. Let I ⊆ D∗(n). We need, in
probabilistic polynomial time, to output a basis for (L
n
|I)⊥. Construct a malicious verifier V˜ that works as follows:
1. Receive z ∈ C
n
from P .
2. Send ρ = 0 to P .
3. Receive π from P .
4. For each i ∈ I: if i ∈ D(n) then query z at i, and if i ∈ [lC (n)] then query π at i; call the answer βi.
By PZK, there is a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm S such that the output of SV˜ ,w(n) is identically distributed
toView 〈Pw(n), V˜ w〉, for everyw ∈ C
n
. Setw to be the zero codeword, and suppose we run SV˜ ,w(n); this invocation
makes S sample answers (βi)i∈I = (z′(i))i∈I for z′ = z‖PC (n, z) uniformly random in Ln.
Thus, to perform constraint detection in probabilistic polynomial time, we proceed as follows. We run SV˜ ,w(n)
k > |I| times, recording a vector ~βj = (βi)i∈I at the j-th iteration. Let B be the k × |I| matrix with rows ~β1, . . . , ~βk.
Output a basis for the nullspace of B, which we can find in poly(log |F|+ k + |I|) time.
We now argue correctness of the above approach. First, for every u ∈ FI such that∑i∈I u(i)w′(i) = 0 for every
w′ ∈ L
n
, it holds that u is in the nullspace of B, because codewords used to generate B satisfy the same relation.
Next, the probability that there exists u ∈ FI in the nullspace of B such that∑i∈I u(i)w′(i) 6= 0 for some w′ ∈ Ln is
at most 1/|F|k−|I|. Indeed, for every such u, Prz′←L
n
[
∑
i∈I u(i)z
′(i) = 0] ≤ 1/|F| (since L
n
is a linear code), so the
probability that u is in the nullspace of B is at most 1/|F|k; we then obtain the claimed probability by a union bound.
Overall, the probability that the algorithm answers incorrectly is at most 1/|F|k−|I|.
7.2 Perfect zero knowledge IOPs of proximity for Reed–Solomon codes
We have already proved that the linear code family BS-RS, which consists of low-degree univariate polynomials
concatenated with corresponding BS proximity proofs [BS08], has succinct constraint detection. When combined
with the results in Section 7.1, we obtain IOPs of Proximity for Reed–Solomon codes, as stated in the corollary below.
Definition 7.9. We denote by RS+ the linear code family indexed by tuples n = (F, L, d), where F is an extension
field of F2 and L is an F2-linear subspace of F with d ≤ |L|/8, and the n-th code consists of the codewords from the
Reed–Solomon code RS[F, L, d].
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Theorem 7.10 ([BS08]). For every function δ : {0, 1}∗ → (0, 1), the linear code family RS+ has PCPs of Proximity
with soundness error 1/2, proximity parameter δ, prover running time (and thus proof length) that is quasilinear in
the block length ℓ(n), and verifier running time (and thus query complexity) that is polylogarithmic in ℓ(n)/δ(n).
Corollary 7.11. For every function δ : {0, 1}∗ → (0, 1), there exists an IOPP system that puts Rel(RS+) in the
complexity class
PZK-IOPP


answer alphabet F(n)
rounds k(n) = 2
proof length l(n) = O˜(ℓ(n))
query complexity q(n) = polylog(ℓ(n)/δ(n))
soundness error ε(n) = 1/2
proximity parameter δ(n)
prover time tp(n) = O˜(ℓ(n))
verifier time tv(n) = polylog(ℓ(n)/δ(n))
query bound b(n) = ∗


.
Proof. Invoke Theorem 7.3 on the linear code family RS+ with corresponding BS proximity proofs (Theorem 7.10).
Indeed, the concatenation of codewords in RS+ and proximity proofs yields the family BS-RS, which has succinct
constraint detection by Theorem 4.12. (This last step omits a technical, but uninteresting, step: the proximity proofs
from Theorem 4.12 consider the case where the degree d equals the special value |L|/8, rather than being bounded by
it; but proximity proofs for smaller degree d are easily obtained from these, as explained in [BS08].)
When constructing perfect zero knowledge IOPs for NEXP (Section 8) we shall need perfect zero knowledge
IOPs of Proximity not quite for the family RS+ but for an extension of it that we denote by ERS+, and for which
[BS08] also gives PCPs of proximity. The analogous perfect zero knowledge result follows in a similar way, as
explained below.
Definition 7.12. Given a field F of characteristic 2, F2-linear subspaces H,L ⊆ F with |H | ≤ |L|/8, and d0, d1 ∈ N
with d0, d1 ≤ |L|/8, we denote by ERS+[F, L,H, d0, d1] the linear code consisting of all pairs (w0, w1) where
w0 ∈ RS[F, L, d0], w1 ∈ RS[F, L, d1], and w1(x) = 0 for all x ∈ H . We denote by ERS+ the linear code family
indexed by tuples n = (F, L, d0, d1) for which the n-th code is ERS+[F, L,H, d0, d1].
Theorem 7.13 ([BS08]). For every function δ : {0, 1}∗ → (0, 1), the linear code family ERS+ has PCPs of Proximity
with soundness error 1/2, proximity parameter δ, prover running time (and thus proof length) that is quasilinear in
the block length ℓ(n), and verifier running time (and thus query complexity) that is polylogarithmic in ℓ(n)/δ(n).
Proof sketch. A PCP of proximity for a codeword (w0, w1) to ERS+[F, L,H, d0, d1] consists of (π0, w′1, π1), where
• π0 is a PCP of proximity for w0 to RS[F, L, d0];
• w′1 is the evaluation of the polynomial obtained by dividing (the polynomial of) w1 by the zero polynomial of H ;
• π1 is a PCP of proximity for w′1 to RS[F, L, d1 − |H |].
The verifier, which has oracle access to (w0, w1) and (π0, w′1, π1), checks both PCPs or proximity and then performs
a consistency check between w1 and w′1. See [BS08] for details.
Corollary 7.14. For every function δ : {0, 1}∗ → (0, 1), there exists an IOPP system that puts Rel(ERS+) in the
complexity class
PZK-IOPP


answer alphabet F(n)
rounds k(n) = 2
proof length l(n) = O˜(ℓ(n))
query complexity q(n) = polylog(ℓ(n)/δ(n))
soundness error ε(n) = 1/2
proximity parameter δ(n)
prover time tp(n) = O˜(ℓ(n))
verifier time tv(n) = polylog(ℓ(n)/δ(n))
query bound b(n) = ∗


.
Proof. Invoke Theorem 7.3 on the linear code family ERS+ with corresponding BS proximity proofs (Theorem 7.13),
which has succinct constraint detection as we now clarify. A codeword (w0, w1) has proximity proof (π0, w′1, π1), and
Theorem 4.12 implies that (w0, π0) and (w′1, π1) have succinct constraint detection. But every coordinate of w′1 is easy
to compute from the same coordinate in w1, and concatenating codewords preserves succinct constraint detection.
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8 Perfect zero knowledge for nondeterministic time
We prove that NEXP has 2-round IOPs that are perfect zero knowledge against unbounded queries. We do so by
constructing a suitable IOP system for NTIME(T ) against query bound b, for each time function T and query bound
function b, where the verifier runs in time polylogarithmic in both T and b. Crucially, the simulator runs in time
poly(q˜ + logT + log b), where q˜ is the actual number of queries made by the malicious verifier; this exponential
improvement over [BCGV16], where the simulator runs in time poly(T + b), enables us to “go up to NEXP”.
Theorem 8.1 (formal statement of Theorem 1.2). For every constant d > 0, time bound function T : N → N with
n ≤ T (n) ≤ 2nd , and query bound function b : N → N with b(n) ≤ 2nd , there exists an IOP system (P, V ) that
makes NTIME(T ) a subset of the complexity class
PZK-IOP


answer alphabet F(n) = F2
rounds k(n) = 2
proof length l(n) = O˜(T (n) + b(n))
query complexity q(n) = polylog(T (n) + b(n))
soundness error ε(n) = 1/2
prover time tp(n) = poly(n) · O˜(T (n) + b(n))
verifier time tv(n) = poly(n+ log(T (n) + b(n)))
query bound b(n)


.
Moreover, the verifier V is public-coin and non-adaptive.
Our proof is similar to that of [BCGV16], and the only major difference is that [BCGV16]’s simulator explicitly
samples random codewords, while we rely on succinct constraint detection to do so implicitly. Indeed, the reduction
from NTIME(T ) generates codewords of size O˜(T ), which means that sampling random codewords of that size is
infeasible when T is super-polynomial. We structure our argument in three steps, highlighting the essential compo-
nents that implicitly underlie [BCGV16]’s ‘monolithic’ argument; we view this as a conceptual contribution of our
work.
Step 1 (Section 8.1). We construct perfect zero knowledge IOPs of Proximity for linear algebraic constraint satisfac-
tion problems (LACSPs) [BCGV16], a family of constraint satisfaction problems whose domain and range are linear
codes. An instance x of LACSP is specified by a function g and a pair of codes C0, C1; a witness w for x is a pair
(w0, w1) such that w0 ∈ C0, w1 ∈ C1, and g(w0) = w1. A natural approach to construct a perfect zero knowledge
IOPP for this relation is the following: if we are given a perfect zero knowledge IOP of Proximity for the relation
Rel(C0×C1), then the verifier can test proximity ofw = (w0, w1) to C0×C1 and then sample a random index j and
check that g(w0)[j] = w1[j]. In order for the verifier’s strategy to make sense, we require g to (i) satisfy a distance
condition with respect to C0, C1, namely, that C1 ∪ g(C0) has large relative distance; (ii) be ‘local’, which means that
computing g(w0)[j] requires examining only a few indices of w0; and (iii) be ‘evasive’, which means that if w˜0 is
close to some w0 ∈ C0, then g(w˜0) is close to g(w0). All of this implies that if (w˜0, w˜1) is far from any valid witness
but close to C0 × C1, we know that g(w˜0) is far from w˜1, so that examining a random index j gives good soundness.
Step 2 (Section 8.2). We build on the above result to derive perfect zero knowledge IOPs for a subfamily of LAC-
SPs called randomizable LACSPs (RLACSPs) [BCGV16]. The key difference between this protocol and the IOP of
Proximity described above is that in the “proximity setting”, the verifier, and thus also the simulator, has oracle access
to the witness, while in the “non-proximity setting” the witness is sent to the verifier but the simulator must make do
without it; in particular, merely sending the witness (w0, w1) is not zero knowledge. We thus rely on the randomizabil-
ity property of RLACSPs to generate witnesses from a t-wise independent distribution, where t is larger than the query
bound b. In particular, while the simulator runs in time polynomial in the actual number of queries made by a verifier,
it runs in time polylogarithmic in t, and thus we can set b to be super-polynomial in order to obtain unbounded-query
zero knowledge against polynomial-time verifiers.
Step 3 (Section 8.3). We derive Theorem 8.1 (perfect zero knowledge IOPs for NTIME(T )) by combining: (1) the
aforementioned result for RLACSPs; (2) [BCGV16]’s reduction from NTIME to RLACSPs; (3) a perfect zero
knowledge IOP of Proximity for a suitable choice of C0 × C1, which we derived in Section 7.2. This last component
is the one that makes use of succinct constraint detection, and relies on the technical innovations of our work.
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8.1 Perfect zero knowledge IOPs of proximity for LACSPs
A constraint satisfaction problem asks whether, for a given “local” function g, there exists an input w such that g(w)
is an accepting output. For example, in the case of 3SAT with n variables and m clauses, the function g maps {0, 1}n
to {0, 1}m, and g(w) indicates which clauses are satisfied by w ∈ {0, 1}n; hence w yields an accepting output if (and
only if) g(w) = 1m. Below we introduce a family of constraint satisfaction problems whose domain and range are
linear-algebraic objects, namely, linear codes.
We begin by providing the notion of locality that we use for g, along with a measure of g’s “pseudorandomness”.
Definition 8.2. Let g : Σn → Σm be a function. We say that g is q-local if for every j ∈ [m] there exists Ij ⊆ [n] with
|Ij | = q such that g(w)[j] (the j-th coordinate of g(w)) depends only on w|Ij (the restriction of w to Ij ). Moreover,
we say that g is s-evasive if for every I ⊆ [n] the probability that Ij intersects I for a uniform j ∈ [m] is at most
s · |I|n .
For example, if g is a 3SAT formula then g is 3-local because Ij equals the variables appearing in clause j;
moreover, g is s-evasive if and only if every variable xi appears in at most a fraction s/n of the clauses (i.e., the
evasiveness property corresponds to the fraction of clauses in which a variable appears). Also, a natural case where g
is q-evasive is when the elements of Ij are individually uniform in [n] when j is uniform in [m].
Definition 8.3. Let g : Σn → Σm be a function. We say that g is c-efficient if there is a c-time algorithm that, given j
and w|Ij , computes the set Ij and value g(w)[j].
The above definition targets succinctly-described languages. For example, a succinct 3SAT instance is given by a
circuit of size S that, on input j, outputs a description of the j-th clause; the definition is then satisfied with c = O(S).
Definition 8.4 (LACSP). Let C0(n), C1(n) be (descriptions of) linear codes over F(n) with block length ℓ(n) and
relative distance τ(n). The promise relation of linear algebraic CSPs (LACSPs)
(RYES
LACSP
,L NO
LACSP
)[F(n), C0(n), C1(n), ℓ(n), τ(n), q(n), c(n)]
considers instance-witness pairs (x,w) of the following form.
• An instance x is a tuple (1n, g) where:
– g : F(n)ℓ(n) → F(n)ℓ(n) is q(n)-local, q(n)-evasive, and c(n)-efficient;
– C1(n) ∪ g(C0(n)) has relative distance at least τ(n) (though may not be a linear space).
• A witness w is a tuple (w0, w1) where w0, w1 ∈ F(n)ℓ(n).
The yes-relation RYES
LACSP
consists of all pairs (x,w) as above where the instance x and witness w jointly satisfy the
following: w0 ∈ C0(n), w1 ∈ C1(n), and g(w0) = w1. (In particular, a witness w = (w0, g(w0)) with w0 ∈ C0(n)
satisfies x if and only if g(w0) ∈ C1(n).) The no-language consists of all instances x as above where x /∈ Lan(RYESLACSP).
Remark 8.5. In [BCGV16] the codes C0 and C1 are allowed to have distinct block lengths while, for simplicity, we
assume that they have the same block length; this restriction does not change any of their, or our, results.
We are now ready to give perfect zero knowledge IOPs of proximity for LACSPs.
Theorem 8.6. Suppose that there exists an IOPP system (Pˆ , Vˆ ) that puts Rel(C0 × C1) in the complexity class
PZK-IOPP[F, kˆ, lˆ, qˆ, δˆ, εˆ, tˆp, tˆv, ∗] .
Then there exists an IOPP system (PLACSP, VLACSP) that puts (RYESLACSP,L NOLACSP)[F, C0, C1, ℓ, τ, q, c] in the complexity class
PZK-IOPP


answer alphabet F(n)
rounds k(n) = kˆ(n)
proof length l(n) = lˆ(n)
query complexity q(n) = qˆ(n) + q(n) + 1
soundness error ε(n) = max
{
εˆ(n) , 1− τ (n) + 2δˆ(n) · (q(n) + 1)
}
proximity parameter δ(n) = δˆ(n)
prover time tp(n) = tˆp(n)
verifier time tv(n) = tˆv(n) + c(n)
query bound b(n) = ∗


.
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Moreover, if (Pˆ , Vˆ ) is non-adaptive (respectively, public-coin) then so is (PLACSP, VLACSP).
Proof. We construct the IOPP system (PLACSP, VLACSP) for R, where the prover receives (x,w) =
(
(1n, g), (w0, w1)
)
as input while the verifier receives x as input and w as an oracle, as follows:
1. PLACSP and VLACSP invoke the IOPP system (Pˆ , Vˆ ) to prove that (w0, w1) ∈ C0 × C1;
2. VLACSP chooses a random j ∈ [ℓ] and checks that g(w0)[j] = w1[j];
3. VLACSP rejects if and only if Vˆ rejects or the above check fails.
Completeness. If (x,w) ∈ RYES
LACSP
, then (i) w0 ∈ C0, w1 ∈ C1, so Vˆ always accepts, and (ii) g(w0) = w1 so the
consistency check succeeds for every j ∈ [ℓ]. We deduce that VLACSP always accepts.
Soundness. Suppose that x ∈ Lan(RYES
LACSP
)∪L NO
LACSP
and w˜ are such that ∆(w˜,RYES
LACSP
|
x
) ≥ δˆ. Writing w˜ = (w˜0, w˜1),
we argue as follows.
• Case 1: ∆(w˜, C0 × C1) ≥ δˆ. In this case Vˆ rejects with probability at least 1− εˆ.
• Case 2: ∆(w˜, C0 × C1) < δˆ. There exist codewords w0 ∈ C0 and w1 ∈ C1 such that (w0, w1) is δ-close to
(w˜0, w˜1) for δ < δˆ. By assumption, ∆(w˜,RYESLACSP|x) ≥ δˆ, so in particular (w0, w1) cannot be in RYESLACSP|x, and
g(w0) 6= w1. Since C1 ∪ g(C0) has relative distance at least τ , ∆(g(w0), w1) ≥ τ . Observe that since C0 and
C1 have the same block length, ∆(w˜0, w0) ≤ 2δˆ and ∆(w˜1, w1) ≤ 2δˆ. Thus since g is q-evasive, the probability
that the set of coordinates I := {i ∈ [ℓ] : w0[i] 6= w˜0[i]} intersects with Ij for random j ∈ [ℓ] is at most 2δˆq, so
∆(g(w0), g(w˜0)) ≤ 2δˆq. Using the triangle inequality, we deduce that
∆(g(w˜0), w˜1) ≥ τ − 2δˆ(q + 1),
which means the consistency check rejects with probability at least τ − 2δˆ(q + 1).
It follows that VLACSP accepts with probability at most max{εˆ, 1− τ + 2δˆ(q + 1)}.
Perfect zero knowledge. We can choose the simulator SLACSP for (PLACSP, VLACSP) to equal any simulator Sˆ that fulfills
the perfect zero knowledge guarantee of (Pˆ , Vˆ ). Indeed, the behavior of PLACSP is the same as Pˆ , and so the view of
any malicious verifier V˜ when interacting with PLACSP is identical to its view when interacting with Pˆ .
8.2 Perfect zero knowledge IOPs for RLACSPs
The above discussion achieves perfect zero knowledge for LACSPs, “up to queries to the witness”. We now explain
how to simulate these queries as well, without any knowledge of the witness, for a special class of LACSPs called
randomizable LACSPs. For these, the prover can randomize a given witness (w0, g(w0)) by sampling a random u′ in
a t-wise independent subcodeC′ of C0, and use the new ‘shifted’ witness (w0+u′, g(w0+u′)) instead of the original
one. We now define the notion of randomizable LACSPs, and then show how to construct perfect zero knowledge
IOPs for these, against bounded-query verifiers and where the the query bound depends on t.
Definition 8.7 (randomizability). An instance x = (1n, g) is t(n)-randomizable in time r(n) (with respect to code
families C0(n), C1(n)) if: (i) there exists a t(n)-wise independent subcode C′ ⊆ C0(n) such that if (w0, g(w0))
satisfies x, then, for every w′0 in C′ + w0 := {w′ + w0 | w′ ∈ C′}, the witness (w′0, g(w′0)) also satisfies x; and
(ii) one can sample, in time r(n), three uniformly random elements in C′, C0(n), C1(n) respectively.
Definition 8.8 (RLACSP). The promise relation of randomizable linear algebraic CSPs (RLACSPs) is
(RYES
RLACSP
,L NO
RLACSP
)[F(n), C0(n), C1(n), ℓ(n), τ(n), q(n), c(n), t(n), r(n)]
where RYES
RLACSP
is obtained by restricting RLACSP to instances that are t-randomizable in time r, and L NORLACSP := L NOLACSP.
Theorem 8.9. Suppose that there exists an IOPP system (Pˆ , Vˆ ) that puts Rel(C0 × C1) in the complexity class
PZK-IOPP[F, kˆ, lˆ, qˆ, δˆ, εˆ, tˆp, tˆv, ∗] .
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Then there exists an IOP system (PRLACSP, VRLACSP) that puts (RYESRLACSP,L NORLACSP)[F, C0, C1, ℓ, τ, q, c, t, r] (with c polynomi-
ally bounded) in the complexity class
PZK-IOP


answer alphabet F(n)
rounds k(n) = kˆ(n)
proof length l(n) = lˆ(n) + ℓ(n)
query complexity q(n) = qˆ(n) + q(n) + 1
soundness error ε(n) = max
{
εˆ(n) , 1− τ (n) + 2 · δˆ(n) · (q(n) + 1)
}
prover time tp(n) = tˆp(n) + c(n) · ℓ(n) + r(n)
verifier time tv(n) = tˆv(n) + c(n)
query bound b(n) = t(n)/q(n)


.
Moreover, if (Pˆ , Vˆ ) is non-adaptive (respectively, public-coin) then so is (PRLACSP, VRLACSP).
Proof. Let (PLACSP, VLACSP) be the IOPP system for RLACSP guaranteed by Theorem 8.6. We construct the IOP system
(PRLACSP, VRLACSP) for (RYESRLACSP,L NORLACSP), where the prover receives (x,w) =
(
(1n, g), (w0, w1)
)
as input while the
verifier receives x as input, as follows:
1. The prover PRLACSP parses the witness w as (w0, w1) ∈ C0 ×C1, samples a random u′ ∈ C′ (the subcode of C0 for
which t-randomizability holds), sets w′0 := u′ + w0 and w′1 := g(w′0), and sends w′ := (w′0, w′1) to VRLACSP.
2. In parallel to the above interaction, the prover PRLACSP and verifier VRLACSP invoke the IOPP system (PLACSP, VLACSP) on
the input x and new “prover-randomized” witness w′. The verifier VRLACSP accepts if and only if VLACSP does.
The claimed efficiency parameters immediately follow by construction. We now show that (PRLACSP, VRLACSP) satisfies
completeness, soundness, and perfect zero-knowledge.
Completeness. Suppose that (x,w) =
(
(1n, g), (w0, w1)
)
is in the relation RYES
RLACSP
, so that w0 ∈ C0, w1 ∈ C1, and
g(w0) = w1. By randomizability (Definition 8.8), since w′0 ∈ C′ +w0, we deduce that w′ = (w′0, w′1) = (w′0, g(w′0))
satisfies x, and so (x,w′) ∈ RYES
LACSP
. Completeness then follows by the completeness of (PLACSP, VLACSP).
Soundness. Suppose that x = (1n, g) is in the language L NO
RLACSP
= L NO
LACSP
, so that RYES
LACSP
|
x
= ∅. Regardless of
what ‘witness’ w′ is sent by PRLACSP, it holds that ∆(w′,RYESLACSP|x) = ∆(w′, ∅) = 1 ≥ δˆ, so that the soundness of
(PLACSP, VLACSP) implies that VLACSP, and thus VRLACSP, accepts with probability at most max{εˆ, 1− τ + 2δˆ · (q + 1)}.
Perfect zero knowledge. Let V˜ be any verifier that makes at most b := t/q queries, and let SLACSP be the perfect zero
knowledge simulator for (PLACSP, VLACSP). We construct a simulator SRLACSP for (PRLACSP, VRLACSP) as follows:
SV˜
RLACSP
(x):
1. SRLACSP initializes two empty strings wˆ0 and wˆ1 which will be partially filled during the simulation.
2. SRLACSP invokes SV˜ ,(wˆ0,wˆ1)LACSP , and during the execution answers oracle queries to (wˆ0, wˆ1) in the following
way.
(a) If SLACSP queries wˆ0 at a location j ∈ [ℓ]: if wˆ0[j] is already defined then return that value; otherwise
sample a random a ∈ F(n), set wˆ0[j] := a, and reply with wˆ0[j].
(b) If SLACSP queries wˆ1 at a location j ∈ [ℓ]: if wˆ1[j] is already defined then return that value; otherwise
compute the set of indices Ij ⊆ [ℓ] that g(·)j depends on; then ‘query’ the values of wˆ0[i] for all i ∈ Ij
as in the previous step; then update wˆ1[j] := g(wˆ0)[j] and reply with wˆ1[j].
Observe that SRLACSP runs in time poly(|x|+ qV˜ + c), where qV˜ denotes the actual number of queries made by V˜ and c
is g’s efficiency (see Definition 8.3). Since c is polynomially bounded, SRLACSP runs in time poly(|x|+qV˜ ), as required.
We must show that View 〈PRLACSP(x,w), V˜ (x)〉 and SV˜RLACSP(x) are identically distributed. Recall that PRLACSP(x,w)
samplesw′ and then invokesPLACSP(x,w′); viewingw′ as a random variable, we get thatView 〈PRLACSP(x,w), V˜ (x)〉 ≡
View 〈PLACSP(x,w′), V˜ (x)〉. By (PLACSP, VLACSP)’s perfect zero knowledge guarantee, we also know that(
View 〈PLACSP(x,w′), V˜ (x)〉, qV˜
) ≡ (SV˜ ,w′
LACSP
(x), qSLACSP
)
.
We are left to show that SV˜ ,w
′
LACSP (x) ≡ SV˜RLACSP(x).
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By the query bound, we know that SLACSP makes at most t/q queries to w′. By construction of SRLACSP, this causes
at most t entries in wˆ0 to be ‘defined’, since |Ij | ≤ q for all j ∈ [ℓ] (by g’s locality); let E ⊆ [ℓ] be these entries. Since
w1 = g(w0), all of the responses to SLACSP’s queries are determined by w′0|E . While E is itself dependent onw′0 (as V˜ ’s
queries may be adaptive), this does not affect the distribution of the string w′0|E because |E| ≤ t and w′0 is drawn from
a t-wise independent distribution. We deduce that there exists a deterministic function v(·) such that SLACSP’s queries
to w′ are answered by v(w′0|E) in the ‘real’ execution, and SRLACSP answers the same queries with v(U) where U is
uniformly random in FE . But w′0 is |E|-wise independent, so that w′0|E ≡ U , and thus SV˜ ,w
′
LACSP (x) ≡ SV˜RLACSP(x).
8.3 Putting things together
We are almost ready to prove Theorem 8.1, the main theorem of this section. The last missing piece is a suitable
reduction fromNTIME(T ) to RRLACSP, the promise relation of RLACSPs. Below, we state a special case of [BCGV16,
Thm. 7.9], which provides the reduction that we need.
Theorem 8.10 (NTIME → RRLACSP). For every T, t : N → N, constant τ ∈ (0, 1), and R ∈ NTIME(T ) there
exist algorithms inst,wit1,wit2 satisfying the following conditions:
• EFFICIENT REDUCTION. For every instance x, letting x′ := inst(x):
– if x ∈ Lan(R) then x′ ∈ Lan(RYES
RLACSP
);
– if x 6∈ Lan(R) then x′ ∈ L NO
RLACSP
;
– for every witness w, if (x,w) ∈ R then (x′,wit1(x,w)) ∈ RYESRLACSP;
– for every witness w′, if (x′,w′) ∈ RYES
RLACSP
then (x,wit2(x,w′)) ∈ R.
Moreover, inst runs in time poly(n+ log(T (n) + t(n))) and wit1,wit2 run in time poly(n) · O˜(T (n) + t(n)).
• RANDOMIZABLE LINEAR ALGEBRAIC CSP. The promise relation (RYES
RLACSP
,L NO
RLACSP
) has the parameters:
(RYES
RLACSP
,L NO
RLACSP
)


field F = F2log(T+t)+O(log log(T+t))
first code C0
second code C1
block length ℓ = O˜(T + t)
relative distance τ
map locality q = polylogT
map efficiency c = poly(n+ logT )
randomizability t
randomize time r = O˜(T + t)


.
(The hidden constants depend on the choice of τ ; see [BCGV16, Thm. 7.9] for the dependence on τ .)
• ADDITIVE REED–SOLOMON CODES. Rel(C0 × C1) is a subfamily of ERS+.
Proof of Theorem 8.1. The theorem directly follows by having the prover and verifier reduce the given relation in
NTIME(T ) to (RYES
RLACSP
,L NO
RLACSP
), following Theorem 8.10, and then invoking Theorem 8.9 with the perfect zero
knowledge IOP of Proximity for ERS+ from Corollary 7.14.
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A Prior work on single-prover unconditional zero knowledge
We summarize prior work on single-prover proof systems that achieve zero knowledge unconditionally. First, the
complexity classes of PZK IPs and SZK IPs are contained in AM ∩ coAM [For87, AH91], so they do not contain
NP unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses [BHZ87]; thus, IPs have strong limitations. Next, we discuss other
single-prover proof systems: PCPs and IPCPs; all prior work for these is about statistical zero knowledge (SZK), via
simulators that are straightline (which is needed in many of the cryptographic applications explored in these works).
SZK PCP for NEXP. [KPT97] obtain PCPs for NEXP that are SZK against unbounded queries; the PCP has
exponential length, the honest verifier makes a polynomial number of queries, and malicious verifiers can make any
polynomial number of queries. Their construction has two steps: (1) transform a given PCP into a new one that
is PZK against (several independent copies of) the honest verifier; (2) transform the latter PCP into a new one that
is SZK against malicious verifiers. The first step uses secret sharing and builds on techniques of [DFK+92]; the
second uses locking schemes, which are information-theoretic PCP-analogues of commitment schemes. Subsequent
work simplifies the steps: [IW14] use MPC techniques to simplify the first step; and [IMS12, IMSX15] give a simple
construction of locking schemes, by obtaining a non-interactive PCP-analogue of [Nao91]’s commitment scheme.
SZK PCP for NP against unbounded queries. A PCP must have super-polynomial length if it ensures SZK against
any polynomial number of malicious queries: if not, a malicious verifier could read the entire PCP, in which case zero
knowledge is impossible for non-trivial languages [GO94]. If one allows the prover to be inefficient, then invoking
[KPT97]’s result for any language in NEXP, including NP languages, suffices. Yet, in the case of NP, one can
still aim for oracle efficiency: the prover outputs a succinct representation of the oracle, i.e., a polynomial-size circuit
that, given an index, outputs the value at that index. However, [IMS12, MX13, IMSX15] show that languages with
oracle-efficient PCPs that are SZK against unbounded queries are contained in the complexity class of SZP IPs, which
is unlikely to contain NP.
SZK PCP for NP against bounded queries. [KPT97] obtain PCPs for NP that are SZK against b malicious
queries, for a given polynomially-bounded function b. The construction is analogous to the one for NEXP, but with
different parameter choices. (The simplifications in [IMS12, IMSX15, IW14] also apply to this case.)
Subsequently, [IW14] consider the case of zero knowledge PCPs of proximity; they obtain PCPPs for NP that
are SZK against b malicious queries. Like [KPT97], their construction has two steps: (1) use MPC techniques to
transform a given PCPP into a new one that is PZK against (several independent copies of) the honest verifier; (2) use
locking schemes to transform the latter PCPP into a new one that is SZK against malicious verifiers.
SZK IPCP for NP against unbounded queries. For an IPCP to ensure SZK against any polynomial number of
queries, the prover must send a PCP with super-polynomial length: if not, a malicious verifier could read the entire
PCP, forcing the IPCP model to “collapse” to IP (recall that the complexity class of SZK IPs is unlikely to contain
NP). As in the PCP model, one may still aim for oracle efficiency, and this time no limitations apply because a
positive result is known: [GIMS10] obtain oracle-efficient IPCPs for NP that are SZK against unbounded queries.
Their construction is analogous to [KPT97]’s, but relies on interactive locking schemes in the IPCP model, rather than
non-interactive ones in the PCP model; this circumvents the impossibility result for oracle-efficient PCPs.
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B Proof of Lemma 4.3
The algorithm A, given (n, S, α), where S = {(α1, β1), . . . , (αℓ, βℓ)} ⊆ D(n) × F(n) and α ∈ D(n), works as
follows: (1) run C ’s constraint detector on input (n, {α1, . . . , αℓ, α}); (2) if the detector outputs an empty basis or
a basis z1, . . . , zd where zi(α) = 0 for all i, then output a random element in F(n); (3) if the detector outputs some
basis element zj where zj(α) 6= 0, then output −
∑ℓ
i=1
zj(αi)
zj(α)
βi. The stated time complexity of A is clear from its
construction. We now argue correctness. Define the probability
p := Pr
w←C
n

w(α) = β
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
w(α1) = β1
.
.
.
w(αℓ) = βℓ

 .
Claim. (A) If there exist a1, . . . , aℓ ∈ F(n) such that w(α) =∑ℓi=1 aiw(αi) for all w ∈ Cn (Condition A), then p = 1 if
β =
∑ℓ
i=1 aiβi and p = 0 otherwise. (B) If no such a1, . . . , aℓ exist, then p = 1|F(n)| .
Proof of claim. If Condition A holds, then, for any w ∈ Cn such that w(α1) = β1, . . . , w(αℓ) = βℓ, it holds that w(α) =∑ℓ
i=1 aiw(αi) =
∑ℓ
i=1 aiβi, which proves the first part of the claim.
Next, let d := dim(Cn) and let w1, . . . , wd be a basis of Cn. Define φα := (w1(α), . . . , wd(α)). We argue that
Condition A holds if and only if φα ∈ span(φα1 , . . . , φαℓ):
• Suppose that Condition A holds. Then wj(α) =
∑ℓ
i=1 aiwj(αi) for every j ∈ {1, . . . , d}. Since wj(α) is the j-th
coordinate of φα, it also holds that φα =
∑ℓ
i=1 aiφαi , so that φα ∈ span(φα1 , . . . , φαℓ).
• Suppose that φα ∈ span(φα1 , . . . , φαℓ). Then there exist a1, . . . , aℓ such that φα =
∑ℓ
i=1 aiφαi . For any w ∈ Cn,
we can write w =
∑d
j=1 bjwj (for some bj ’s), so that w(α) =
∑d
j=1 bjwj(α) = 〈w, φα〉 =
∑ℓ
i=1 ai〈w, φαi〉 =∑ℓ
i=1 aiw(αi).
Thus, the negation of Condition A is equivalent to φα /∈ span(φα1 , . . . , φαℓ), which we now assume to prove the second
part of the claim, as follows.
Let Φ ∈ F(n)ℓ×d be the matrix whose rows are φα1 , . . . , φαℓ , and let w
′
1, . . . , w
′
k be a basis for Φ’s nullspace. Let Φ′
be the matrix Φ augmented with the row φα. Note that rank(Φ′) = rank(Φ) + 1, so the nullspace of Φ′ has dimension
k − 1, which implies that there exists j ∈ {1, . . . , k} such that 〈w′j , φα〉 6= 0. Also note that, for every w ∈ Cn such that
w(α1) = β1, . . . , w(αℓ) = βℓ and r ∈ F(n), the codeword w+rw′j satisfies the same equations asw does. Therefore, ifw is
drawn uniformly randomly from Cn such that w(α1) = β1, . . . , w(αℓ) = βℓ, then w+ rw′j for r uniformly random in F(n)
is identically distributed to w. We conclude that Pr[w(α) = β] = Pr[(w + rw′j)(α) = β] = Pr[r = β−〈w,φα〉〈w′
j
,φα〉
] = 1
|F(n)|
,
since 〈w′j , φα〉 6= 0.
By the definition of constraint detection, a1, . . . , aℓ as above exist if and only if there exists z in the space output by
the constraint detector such that z(α) = 1. If the constraint detector outputs z1, . . . , zd such that zi(α) = 0 for all i,
then clearly the space contains no such vector. Otherwise, let j be such that zj(α) 6= 0; then ai = −zj(αi)/zj(α)
for i = 1, . . . , ℓ is a solution. Hence this distribution equals that of A’s output, and moreover fully describes the
probability distribution of w(α). The lemma follows.
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C Proof of Lemma 4.6
By Claim 4.5, it suffices to show an algorithm that computes a basis of (C⊥
n
)⊆I in poly(|n|+ |I|) time. So consider the
algorithm that, on input an index n and subset I ⊆ D(n), works as follows. First, invoke the hypothesis to compute
the set W ; since vectors are represented sparsely we conclude that |W |, |supp(W )| ≤ poly(|n| + |I|). (Recall that
supp(W ) := ∪z∈W supp(z).) We may assume W is linearly independent; otherwise, make it thus via Gaussian
elimination which runs in time poly(|W | + |supp(W )|). Similarly, the bound on |W | and |supp(W )| implies that a
basis W ′ for the subspace W⊆I can be found in time poly(|n| + |I|), and we let W ′ be the output of our algorithm.
To argue correctness it suffices to show that span(W ′) = (C⊥
n
)⊆I . We first argue span(W ′) ⊆ (C⊥
n
)⊆I , so let
z′ ∈ span(W ′), which can be represented as z′ = ∑λ∈Λ aλ∑z∈W λ(z) · z; note that z′ ∈ span(W ) ⊆ C⊥n and
supp(z′) ⊆ supp(W ) = I ∪ I . Hence, it suffices to show that supp(z′) ∩ I = ∅; but this is true by the choice of
Λ, because M · λ = 0 for every λ ∈ Λ, so that ∑z∈W λ(w) · z(α) = 0 for every α ∈ I (by M ’s definition), so that
z′(α) =
∑
λ∈Λ aλ
∑
z∈W λ(z) · z(α) = 0 for every α ∈ I , as required.
We next argue that span(W ′) ⊇ (C⊥
n
)⊆I , and for this it suffices to show that any w ∈ span(W ) having represen-
tation w =
∑
z∈W az · z such that ~a := (az)z∈W /∈ span(Λ) can not be in (C⊥n )⊆I . This follows by the definition of
Λ, because for any ~a /∈ span(Λ) there exists α ∈ I such that w(α) =∑z∈W az · z(α) 6= 0, so that w /∈ (C⊥n )⊆I .
48
D Proof of Lemma 4.11
For completeness, we give an elementary proof of Lemma 4.11, by simplifying the proof of [Kay10, Thm. 10] for
polynomials of the form we require; note that [RS05] and [BW04] also use similar techniques. We first introduce
some notation. We consider a polynomial Q ∈ F<d[X1, . . . , Xm] equivalently as a univariate polynomial of degree
less than d in X1 with coefficients in F<d[X2, . . . , Xm], and let ∂j1Q be the coefficient of X
j
1 in this representation.
Define ∂j1 ~Q := (∂
j
1Q1, . . . , ∂
j
1Qℓ). In general, given an arbitrary arithmetic circuit representing a polynomial Q, it is
not clear how to efficiently compute a circuit representing ∂j1Q, because Q may have exponentially many monomials.
Nevertheless, for circuits of the required form, this computation is trivial.
Claim. Let ~Q := (Q1, . . . , Qℓ) be a vector of polynomials in F<d[X1, . . . , Xm]. If d ≤ |F| then ~Q⊥ = ⋂d−1j=0 (∂j1 ~Q)⊥.
Proof. When d ≤ |F|, Q ∈ F<d[X1, . . . , Xm] ≡ 0 if and only if all of its coefficients are zero when written as a formal
sum. Then one direction of the set equality follows straightforwardly from the linearity of ∂j1, namely, ~Q⊥ ⊆
⋂d−1
j=0(∂
j
1
~Q)⊥.
For the other direction, we argue as follows. Fix some (a1, . . . , aℓ) ∈
⋂d−1
j=0(∂
j
1
~Q)⊥ and let T :=
∑ℓ
k=1 akQk; we have
that ∂j1T ≡ 0 for all j ∈ {0, . . . , d − 1}, by linearity. But T =
∑d−1
j=0 (∂
j
1T )X
j
1 by definition, so T ≡ 0, and thus
(a1, . . . , aℓ) ∈ ~Q
⊥
.
Thus to compute a basis of ~Q⊥ it suffices to compute the intersection of the bases of (∂j1 ~Q)⊥ for all j ∈ {0, . . . , d−1}.
The naive approach yields an exponential-time algorithm since we reduce the problem to d subproblems of roughly
the same size. Observe, however, that for Qk of the specified form,
∂j1Qk = ck,jTk where Tk :=
(
m∏
i=2
Qk,i(Xi)
)
,
for constants ck,j computable in time poly(s). Let ~T := (T1, . . . , Tℓ) and let T⊥ ∈ Fℓ×b be a basis for ~T⊥; note that
b ≤ ℓ. Let ~a := (a1, . . . , aℓ) ∈ Fℓ, and observe that for each j,
∑ℓ
k=1 ak∂
j
1Qk ≡ 0 if and only if
∑ℓ
k=1 akck,jTk ≡ 0,
or equivalently, (a1c1,j, . . . , aℓcℓ,j) ∈ ~T⊥. Hence (a1, . . . , aℓ) ∈
⋂d
j=0(∂
j
1
~Q)⊥ if and only if for each j there exists
~vj ∈ Fb such that T⊥ ~vj = (a1c1,j , . . . , aℓcℓ,j). This is a system of linear equations in ~a, ~v0, . . . , ~vd−1 of size
poly(ℓ+ d+ b), and hence we can compute a basis for its solution space in time poly(log |F|+ d+ ℓ+ b). Restricting
this basis to ~a yields a basis for ~Q⊥.
If Q1, . . . , Qn are univariate then we can easily determine a basis for ~Q⊥ in deterministic polynomial time (by
Gaussian elimination). Otherwise, if the Qi are m-variate, we use the procedure above to reduce computing ~Q⊥
to computing ~T⊥ for some ~T = (T1, . . . , Tℓ) where the Ti are (m − 1)-variate. This algorithm terminates in time
poly(log |F|+m+ d+ s+ ℓ).
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E Proof of Claim 4.23
First we show that span(∪j∈J C˜⊥j ) ⊆ (C⊥)⊆(∪j∈J D˜j). For every j ∈ J and z ∈ C˜⊥j , it holds that supp(z) ⊆ D˜j ;
therefore, for every z ∈ span(∪j∈J C˜⊥j ), it holds that supp(z) ⊆ ∪j∈JD˜j ; thus it is suffices to show that, for every
z ∈ ∪j∈J C˜⊥j and w ∈ C, it holds that 〈w, z〉 = 0. But this holds because for every z ∈ ∪j∈J C˜⊥j there exists j ∈ J
such that z ∈ C˜⊥j and C|D˜j = C˜j so that 〈w, z〉 = 〈w|D˜j , z〉 = 0, as required.
Next we show that span(∪j∈J C˜⊥j ) ⊇ (C⊥)⊆(∪j∈J D˜j), which is equivalent to span(∪j∈J C˜⊥j ) ⊇ (C|∪j∈J D˜j )⊥ by
Claim 4.5. Recall that for any two linear spaces U, V it holds that U ⊆ V if and only if U⊥ ⊇ V ⊥, thus it is sufficient
to show that span(∪j∈J C˜⊥j )⊥ ⊆ C|∪j∈J D˜j , i.e., that every w ∈ span(∪j∈J C˜⊥j )⊥ can be extended to w′ ∈ C. This
latter statement holds because span(∪j∈J C˜⊥j )⊥|D˜j ⊆ (C˜⊥j )⊥ = C˜j for every j ∈ J , and thus w|D˜j ∈ C˜j . Recalling
|J | ≤ κ implies, by Definition 4.15, that w can be extended to a codeword w′ ∈ C, as claimed.
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F Definition of the linear code family BS-RS
In this section we define the linear code family BS-RS, which consists of evaluations of univariate polynomials con-
catenated with corresponding BS proximity proofs [BS08]. The definition is quite technical, and we refer the interested
reader to [BS08] for a discussion of why it enables proximity testing. We begin with notation used later.
Definition F.1. Given a field F, a subfield K ⊆ F, a K-linear space L ⊆ F with a basis (b1, b2, . . . , bℓ), a positive
integer µ, and a positive integer k > 2µ, we make the following definitions.
• Four subspaces of L and a subset of L:
L0[K,F, L, µ] := spanK(b1, b2, . . . , b⌊ℓ/2⌋)
L′0[K,F, L, µ] := spanK(b1, b2, . . . , b⌊ℓ/2⌋+µ−1)
L1[K,F, L, µ] := spanK(b⌊ℓ/2⌋+1, . . . , bℓ)
∀β ∈ L1[K,F, L, µ] , Lβ[K,F, L, µ] := spanK(b1, b2, . . . , b⌊ℓ/2⌋+µ−1, β′)
∀β ∈ L1[K,F, L, µ] , Rβ [K,F, L, µ] :=Lβ \ (L0 + β)
where β′ := b⌊ℓ/2⌋+µ if β ∈ L′0 and β′ := β otherwise.
• The vanishing polynomial of L0: ZL0 [K,F, L, µ](X) :=
∏
α∈L0
(X − α).
• The following domains:
Dbi[K,F, L, µ] :={(α,ZL0(β)) : β ∈ L1, α ∈ Lβ}
Dpf [K,F, L, µ] :={(α,ZL0(β)) : β ∈ L1, α ∈ Rβ}
D[K,F, L, µ] := ({rs} × L) ⊔ ({px} ×Dpf)
where we use the symbols ‘rs’ and ‘px’ to distinguish different parts of the disjoint union.
• The bijection φ[K,F, L, µ] : Dbi → D is defined by φ(α, β) :=
{
(px, (α, β)) (α, β) ∈ Dpf
(rs, α) otherwise
.
• Given w ∈ FD[K,F,L,µ], the bivariate function fw : Dbi[K,F, L, µ]→ F is defined by fw(α, β) := w(φ(α, β)).
• The fractional degree ρ[K,F, µ] := |K|−µ.
• The domain DBS-RSpx [K,F, L, µ, k] implied by the recursion below:
– if dim(L) ≤ k then DBS-RSpx [K,F, L, µ, k] := Dpf [K,F, L, µ];
– if dim(L) > k then
DBS-RSpx [K,F, L, µ, k] := Dpf [K,F, L, µ]
⊔ (
⊔α∈L′0 {(col, α)} ×DBS-RSpx [K,F, ZL0(L1), µ, k]
)
⊔ (
⊔β∈L1 {(row, β)} ×DBS-RSpx [K,F, Lβ, µ, k]
)
.
where we use the symbols ‘col’ and ‘row’ to distinguish different parts of the disjoint union.
• The domain DBS-RS[K,F, L, µ, k] := ({rs} × L) ⊔ ({px} ×DBS-RSpx [K,F, L, µ, k]).
• Given α ∈ L′0, the embedding φcol,α : DBS-RS[K,F, ZL0(L1), µ, k] →֒ DBS-RS[K,F, L, µ, k] is defined by
φcol,α(x) :=
{
(px, ((col, α), x)) x ∈ {px} ×DBS-RSpx [K,F, ZL0(L1), µ, k]
φ(α, β) x = ({rs}, ZL0(β))
We denote by Dcol,α the image of φcol,α.
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• Given β ∈ L1, the embedding φrow,β : DBS-RS[K,F, Lβ, µ, k] →֒ DBS-RS[K,F, L, µ, k] is defined by
φrow,β(x) :=
{
(px, ((row, β), x)) x ∈ {px} ×DBS-RSpx [K,F, Lβ, µ, k]
φ(α, β) x = ({rs}, α)
We denote by Drow,β the image of φrow,β .
• Given α ∈ L′0, ψcol,α : FD
BS-RS[K,F,L,µ,k] → FDBS-RS[K,F,ZL0(L1),µ,k] is the projection of DBS-RS[K,F, L, µ, k] on
Dcol,α with indices renamed to elements of DBS-RS[K,F, ZL0(L1), µ, k]. Formally, ψcol,α(w) = w′ if and only if
w′(φcol,α(x)) = w(x) for all x ∈ DBS-RS[K,F, ZL0(L1), µ, k].
• Given β ∈ L1, ψrow,β : FDBS-RS[K,F,L,µ,k] → FDBS-RS[K,F,Lβ,µ,k] is the projection of DBS-RS[K,F, L, µ, k] on
Drow,β with indices renamed to elements of DBS-RS[K,F, Lβ, µ, k]. Formally, ψrow,β(w) = w′ if and only if
w′(φrow,β(x)) = w(x) for all x ∈ DBS-RS[K,F, Lβ, µ, k].
The following definition considers a code that extends the evaluation of a univariate polynomial with a bivariate
function that represents the polynomial over a specially-chosen set.
Definition F.2 (RS). Given a field F, a subfield K ⊆ F, a K-linear space L ⊆ F, and a positive integer µ, the code
RS[K,F, L, µ] consists of all w ∈ FD[K,F,L,µ] such that fw : Dbi → F is an evaluation of a low degree polynomial:
there exists a polynomial g ∈ F[X,Y ] such that: (i) degX(g) < |L0|, (ii) degY (g) < |L1| ·ρ[K,F, µ], (iii) g|Dbi = fw.
Ben-Sasson and Sudhan [BS08] show that:
• v ∈ RS[F, L, |L| · ρ] if and only if there exists w ∈ RS[K,F, L, µ] such that w|{rs}×L = v;
• w ∈ RS[K,F, L, µ] if and only if
– for every α ∈ L′0, fw|{α}×ZL0 (L1) ∈ RS[F, ZL0(L1), |L1| ·ρ] (with the standard mapping between domains) and
– for every β ∈ L1, fw|Lβ×{ZL0(β)} ∈ RS[F, Lβ, |L0|] (with the standard mapping between domains).
The above equivalences illustrate the ‘quadratic reduction’ from testing that w ∈ FL is a codeword of RS[F, L, |L| · ρ]
to a set of Θ(
√|L|) problems of testing membership in codes of the form RS[F, L′, d′] with |L′|, d′ = Θ(√|L|).
The code from Definition F.2 corresponds to one step of the recursive construction of [BS08]. We now build on
that definition, and recursively define the linear code family BS-RS.
Definition F.3 (BS-RS). Given a field F, a subfield K ⊆ F, a K-linear space L ⊆ F, a positive integer µ, and a
positive integer k > 2µ, the code BS-RS[K,F, L, µ, k] consists of all words w ∈ FDBS-RS[K,F,L,µ,k] satisfying the
following. If dim(L) ≤ k then w ∈ RS[K,F, L, µ]. If dim(L) > k the following holds: (1) for every α ∈ L′0 there
exists wα ∈ BS-RS[K,F, ZL0(L1), µ, k] such that wα(φcol,α(x)) = w(x) for every x ∈ D[K,F, ZL0(L1), µ, k];
(2) for every β ∈ L1 there exists wβ ∈ BS-RS[K,F, Lβ, µ, k] such that wβ(φrow,β(x)) = w(x) for every x ∈
D[K,F, Lβ, µ, k].
We conclude this section with two claims about BS-RS that we use in later sections. We omit the proof of the first
claim (and refer the interested reader to [BS08]), and prove the second claim based on the first one.
Claim F.4. For every codeword w ∈ RS[F, L, |L| · ρ], positive integer µ, and positive integer k > 2µ, there exists a
unique πw such that w ◦ πw ∈ BS-RS[K,F, L, µ, k].
Claim F.5. The following two statements hold for the code BS-RS[K,F, L, µ, k]:
• for everyα ∈ L′0 andw′ ∈ BS-RS[K,F, ZL0(L1), µ, k] there existsw ∈ BS-RS[K,F, L, µ, k] such thatψcol,α(w) = w′;
• for every β ∈ L1 and w′ ∈ BS-RS[K,F, Lβ, µ, k] there exists w ∈ BS-RS[K,F, L, µ, k] such that ψrow,β(w) = w′.
Proof. The proofs for the two statements are similar, so we only give the proof for the first statement. Let w′ ∈
BS-RS[K,F, ZL0(L1), µ, k], and define wrs := w′|{rs}×ZL0(L1); observe that wrs in RS[F, ZL0(L1), |L1| · ρ]. By
Claim F.4, w′ is uniquely determined by wrs, thus it suffices to show that there exists w ∈ RS[K,F, L, µ] such that
fw |{α}×ZL0 (L1) = wrs. By definition of RS, it suffices to show that there exists a bivariate polynomial g ∈ F[X,Y ]
such that: (i) degX(g) < |L0|, (ii) degY (g) < |L1| · ρ, (iii) g|{α}×ZL0(L1) = wrs ∈ RS[F, ZL0(L1), |L1| · ρ]. The
existence of such g follows by considering a suitable interpolating set (see, e.g., Appendix H).
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G Proof of Lemma 4.27
In this section we prove Lemma 4.27. In Appendix G.1 we define the recursive cover and prove its combinatorial prop-
erties; in Appendix G.2 we prove that a spanning set for the duals of codes in this cover can be computed efficiently;
in Appendix G.3, we put these together to conclude the proof.
G.1 The recursive cover and its combinatorial properties
We define a recursive cover for BS-RS and then prove certain combinatorial properties for it. The definition relies on
the definition of another cover, which we now introduce.
Definition G.1. The native cover S[K,F, L, µ, k] of BS-RS[K,F, L, µ, k] is defined as follows:
• if dim(L) ≤ k then the cover contains only the trivial view (DBS-RS[K,F, L, µ, k],BS-RS[K,F, L, µ, k]);
• if dim(L) > k then the cover contains
– the view (BS-RS[K,F, ZL0(L1), µ, k], Dcol,α) for every α ∈ L′0, and
– the view (BS-RS[K,F, Lβ, µ, k], Drow,β) for every β ∈ L1.
We now prove that the native cover is indeed a cover.
Claim G.2. The native cover of BS-RS[K,F, L, µ, k] is a code cover (see Definition 4.13).
Proof. From Claim F.5 we know that:
• for every α ∈ L′0, the restriction of BS-RS[K,F, L, µ, k] to Dcol,α equals BS-RS[K,F, ZL0(L1), µ, k];
• for every β ∈ L1, the restriction of BS-RS[K,F, L, µ, k] to Drow,β equals BS-RS[K,F, Lβ, µ, k].
Therefore, it suffices to show that D ⊆ (∪α∈L′0Dcol,α) ∪ (∪β∈L1Drow,β). So let x be an index in D.
• If there exists α ∈ L′0 such that x ∈ {px} × {(col, α)} ×DBS-RSpf [K,F, ZL0(L1), µ, k], then x ∈ Dcol,α.
• If there exists β ∈ L1 such that x ∈ {px} × {(row, β)} ×DBS-RSpf [K,F, Lβ, µ, k], then x ∈ Drow,β .
• If x ∈ {px}×Dpf [K,F, L, µ], then there exist β ∈ L1 and α ∈ Rβ such that x = (px, (α,ZL0(β))), so x ∈ Drow,β .
• If x ∈ {rs} × L, then there exist β ∈ L1 and α ∈ Lβ such that φ[K,F, L, µ](α,ZL0(β)) = x, so x ∈ Drow,β .
The recursive cover of BS-RS is recursively defined based on the native cover of BS-RS.
Definition G.3. The recursive cover T [K,F, L, µ, k] ofBS-RS[K,F, L, µ, k] is the tree of depth ⌊log dim(L)− log(k)⌋
where, for every non-leaf vertex v labeled by (D˜,BS-RS[K,F, L˜, µ, k]), the vertex v has |S[K,F, L˜, µ, k]| successors,
all labeled by elements of S[K,F, L˜, µ, k] with the natural embedding of their domains into D˜.
Claim G.4. The recursive cover of BS-RS[K,F, L, µ, k] is 1-intersecting (see Definition 4.18).
Proof. We must show that for every two disconnected vertices u, v it holds that |D˜u ∩ D˜v| ≤ 1. It suffices to do so
for every two distinct siblings u, v, because if a is an ancestor of b then D˜a contains D˜b. Hence, we only need to show
that for every two distinct views (D˜, C˜), (D˜′, C˜′) in the native cover S[K,F, L, µ, k], it holds that |D˜ ∩ D˜′| ≤ 1. First
we observe that for every α1 6= α2 ∈ L′0 and β1 6= β2 ∈ L1, the following sets are disjoint by definition:
• {px} × {(col, α1)} ×DBS-RSpf [K,F, ZL0(L1), µ, k],
• {px} × {(col, α2)} ×DBS-RSpf [K,F, ZL0(L1), µ, k],
• {px} × {(row, β1)} ×DBS-RSpf [K,F, Lβ1, µ, k],
• {px} × {(row, β2)} ×DBS-RSpf [K,F, Lβ2, µ, k].
Thus it is enough to show that:
• Any two columns are distinct: φ(α1, β1) 6= φ(α2, β2) for every α1 6= α2 ∈ L′0 and β1, β2 ∈ ZL0(L1).
• Any two rows are distinct: φ(α1, β1) 6= φ(α2, β2) for every β1 6= β2 ∈ ZL0(L1), α1 ∈ Lβ1 , and α2 ∈ Lβ2 .
• The intersection of any row and column has at most one element: φ(α, β′) 6= φ(α′, β) for every α, α′ ∈ L′0 and
β, β′ ∈ ZL0(L1) with (α′, β′) 6= (α, β).
But all the above follow from the fact that φ[K,F, L, µ] is a bijection and, thus, an injection.
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The next claim establishes a connection between the depth of a vertex v in the recursive cover and the independence
of the cover Tv of the code C˜v .
Claim G.5. For every vertex v in layer(T, d), the cover Tv is (|K|dim(L)·2−d−1−µ−2)-independent. In particular, by
assignment, it holds that, for every positive integer m and every non-leaf vertex v in T [K,F, L, µ, k] with depth less
than log2 dim(L)− log2(log|K|m+ µ+ 2)− 1, the cover Tv is m-independent.
The proof of the above claim directly follows from Claim G.7 and Claim G.6, stated and proved below. The first of
these two claims connects the depth of a vertex v and the dimension of a spaceLv such that C˜v = BS-RS[F,K, Lv, µ, k]
(this claim is used separately also for establishing computational properties in in Appendix G.2).
Claim G.6. If v ∈ layer(T [K,F, L, µ, k], d) then C˜v = BS-RS[K,F, L˜, µ, k] for some L˜ such that
dim(L) · 2−d ≤ dim(L˜) ≤ dim(L) · 2−d + 2µ .
Proof. The proof is by induction on d. The base case d = 0 follows directly from the definition; so we now assume
the claim for d − 1 and prove it for d. Let v ∈ layer(T, d) be a vertex of depth d, and let u ∈ layer(T, d− 1) be v’s
predecessor. By the inductive assumption, C˜u = BS-RS[K,F, Lu, µ, k] for some Lu such that dim(L) · 2−(d−1) ≤
dim(Lu) ≤ dim(L) · 2−(d−1) + 2µ.
First we argue that Tu is not the trivial (singleton) cover. For this, it suffices to show that dim(Lu) > k. But this
follows from the inductive assumption, since depth(T, u) < ⌊log dim(L)− log(k)⌋, so that dim(Lu) ≥ dim(L) ·
2−(⌊log dim(L)−log(k)⌋−1) ≥ 2k.
Recall C˜v = BS-RS[K,F, Lv, µ, k] for some space Lv; we are thus left to show that dim(Lu) ·2−1 ≤ dim(Lv) ≤
dim(Lu)·2−1+µ. We do so by giving two cases, based on the form ofLv: (a) ifLv = ZL0[K,F,Lu,µ,k](L1[K,F, Lu, µ, k])
then dim(Lv) = dim(L1[K,F, Lu, µ, k]) = ⌈dim(Lu)2 ⌉; (b) if there exists β ∈ L1[K,F, Lu, µ, k] such that Lv =
Lβ[K,F, Lu, µ, k] then dim(Lv) = dim(L0[K,F, Lu, µ, k]) + µ = ⌊dim(Lu)2 ⌋ + µ. In either case dim(Lu) · 2−1 ≤
dim(Lv) ≤ dim(Lu) · 2−1 + µ, and the claim follows.
Claim G.7. The native cover S[K,F, L, µ, k] is |K| dim(L)2 −µ−2-independent.
Proof. Recalling Definition 4.16, fix arbitrary subsets D′ ⊆ ({col} × L′0) ⊔ ({row} × L1) and D′′ ⊆ D[K,F, L, µ]
both of size at most |K| dim(L)2 −µ−2, and define D˜ := D′′ ∪ (∪(col,α)∈D′Dcol,α) ∪ (∪(row,β)∈D′Drow,β). Let w′ ∈
F
DBS-RS be such that: (i) for every (col, α) ∈ D′ it holds that ψcol,α(w′) ∈ BS-RS[K,F, ZL0(L1), µ, k]; and (ii) for
every (row, β) ∈ D′ it holds that ψrow,β(w′) ∈ BS-RS[K,F, Lβ, µ, k]. We need to show that there exists w ∈
BS-RS[K,F, L, µ, k] such that w|D˜ = w′|D˜.
In fact, it suffices to show that there exists w ∈ RS[K,F, L, µ] such that w|D˜∩D = w′|D˜∩D , because
Claim F.4 implies there exists a unique codeword w ∈ BS-RS[K,F, L, µ, k] such that w|D = w and w|D˜ = w′|D˜ .
Thus, we now argue that there exists w ∈ RS[K,F, L, µ] such that the following holds.
• For every (col, α) ∈ D′ and β ∈ ZL0(L1), it holds that fw(α, β) = w′(φ(α, β)) = (ψcol,α(w′)) (rs, β). In
particular, fw |{α}×ZL0 (L1) ∈ RS[F, ZL0(L1), |L1| · ρ], and let pcol,α be its univariate low degree extension to F.
• For every (row, β) ∈ D′ and α ∈ Lβ , it holds that fw(α,ZL0(β)) = w′(φ(α,ZL0 (β))) = (ψrow,β(w′)) (rs, α).
In particular, fw |Lβ×{ZL0(L1)} ∈ RS[F, Lβ, |L0|], and let prow,β be its univariate low degree extension to F.
• For every (α, β) ∈ D′′, it holds that fw(α,ZL0(β)) = w′(φ(α,ZL0 (β))).
By Definition F.2 it suffices to show that there exists a bivariate polynomial g ∈ F[X,Y ] such that: (i) degX(g) < |L0|;
(ii) degY (g) < |L1| · ρ; (iii) g|X=α = pcol,α for every (col, α) ∈ D′; (iv) g|Y=ZL0 (β) = prow,β for every (row, β) ∈
D′; (v) g(α, β) = w′(φ(α,ZL0(β))) for every (α, β) ∈ D′′. But notice that |D′| + |D′′| ≤ 2 · |K|
dim(L)
2 −µ−2 =
|K| dim(L)2 −µ−1 < min{|L0|, |L1| · ρ}, because (a) log|K|(|L0|) = dim(L0) ≥ dim(L)2 − 1, and (b) log|K|(|L1| · ρ) =
dim(L1)− µ ≥ dim(L)2 − µ. The claim follows by considering a suitable interpolating set (see Section H).
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G.2 Computing spanning sets of dual codes in the recursive cover
We prove that spanning sets for duals of codes in the recursive cover can be computed efficiently; this is the key fact
that we later use to argue that the algorithm required by Lemma 4.27 satisfies the stated time complexity.
Claim G.8. For every positive integerm and vertex v in T [K,F, L, µ, k] of depth at least log2 dim(L)− log2 log|K|m,
a spanning set of C˜⊥v can be computed in time poly(log2 |F|+ |K|µ +m).
The above claim directly follows from Claim G.9 and Claim G.10, stated and proved below.
Claim G.9. For every positive integerm and vertex v in T [K,F, L, µ, k] of depth at least log2 dim(L)− log2 log|K|m,
|D˜v| ≤ poly(m+ |K|µ).
Proof. Ben-Sasson and Sudan [BS08] show that the block length of BS-RS[K,F, L, µ, k] is O˜K,µ,k(|L|) for any fixed
K, µ, k. One can verify that, if we do not fix these parameters, the block length is O˜(|L| · |K|µ). Next, observe
that C˜v = BS-RS[K,F, Lv, µ, k] for some Lv such that dim(Lv) ≤ log|K|m + 2µ (Claim G.6); in this case, the
aforementioned bound becomes poly(m+ |K|µ).
Claim G.10. A spanning set forBS-RS[K,F, L, µ, k]⊥ can be found in time poly (log2 |F|+ |DBS-RS[K,F, L, µ, k]|).
Proof. We show an algorithm that constructs the desired spanning set in the stated time complexity. First, a spanning
set for RS[F, S, d]⊥ can be found in time poly(log2 |F|+ |S|), for any finite field F, subset S ⊆ F, and degree bound
d < |S|. Hence, a spanning set for RS[K,F, L, µ]⊥ can be found in time (log2 |F| · |L| · |K|µ)c for some c > 0.
We argue by induction on dim(L) that a spanning set for BS-RS[K,F, L, µ, k]⊥ can be found in time (log2 |F| ·
|L| · |K|µ)c. We rely the property that the code BS-RS[K,F, L, µ, k] is covered by
{(BS-RS[K,F, ZL0(L1), µ, k], Dcol,α)}α∈L′0 ∪ {(BS-RS[K,F, Lβ, µ, k], Drow,β)}β∈L1
and the property that w ∈ BS-RS[K,F, L, µ, k] if an only if:
• ψcol,α(w) ∈ BS-RS[K,F, ZL0(L1), µ, k] for every α ∈ L′0 and
• ψrow,β(w) ∈ BS-RS[K,F, Lβ, µ, k] for every β ∈ L1.
ThusBS-RS[K,F, L, µ, k]⊥ is spanned by the duals of codes in its cover and, in particular, is spanned by their spanning
sets; in sum, it suffices to construct a spanning set for its cover.
In light of the above, we can bound the construction time of a spanning set for BS-RS[K,F, L, µ, k]⊥ as follows:
• If dim(L) ≤ k, the claim follows as the code in this case simply equals RS[K,F, L, µ].
• If dim(L) > k, the time to construct a spanning set is at most the time to construct spanning sets for the cover:
|L′0| · (log2 |F| · |L1| · |K|µ)c + |L1| · (log2 |F| · |L′0| · |K|µ+1)c (1)
= |L0| · |K|µ−1 · (log2 |F| · |L1| · |K|µ)c + |L1| · (log2 |F| · |L0| · |K|2µ)c (2)
= |L| · (log2 |F| · |K|µ)c ·
(|K|µ−1 · |L1|c−1 + |K|cµ · |L0|c−1) (3)
≤ |L| · (log2 |F| · |K|µ)c ·
(
|K|µ+c−2 · |L| c−12 + |K|cµ · |L| c−12
)
(4)
= |L| c+12 · (log2 |F| · |K|µ)c ·
(|K|µ+c−2 + |K|cµ) (5)
≤ (log2 |F| · |L| · |K|µ)c . (6)
Above, (1) is by the inductive assumption, (2) is by definition of L′0, (3) is by the fact that |L0| · |L1| = |L|, and (4)
is by definition of L0, L1. We are left to show (6), and this follows from the fact that: (i) dim(L) > k, (ii) k > 2µ
by definition, and (iii) we can choose c to be large enough (namely, so that |K|µ+c−2 + |K|cµ ≤ |L| c−12 holds).
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G.3 Putting things together
Proof of Lemma 4.27. Define the depth function d(K, L, µ, a) := log2 dim(L) − log2(log|K| a + µ + 2) − 1. We
argue the two conditions in the lemma. First, for every index n = (K,F, L, µ, k), T [K,F, L, µ, k] is a 1-intersecting
recursive cover of BS-RS[K,F, L, µ, k] (by Claim G.4). Moreover, for every positive integer m and non-leaf vertex v
in T with depth(T, v) < d(K, L, µ,m), the cover Tv is m-independent (by Claim G.5).
Second, consider the algorithm that, given an index n = (K,F, L, µ, k) and subset I ⊆ DBS-RS[K,F, L, µ, k],
works as follows: (1) for every α ∈ I choose an arbitrary vertex vα in layer(T, d(K, L, µ, |I|)) such that α ∈ D˜vα ,
and then set U := {vα}α∈I ; (2) compute a spanning set Wv set for C˜⊥v ; (3) return W := ∪u∈UWu. This algorithm
satisfies the required properties. First, it runs in time poly(log2 |F|+dim(L)+|K|µ+|I|) because a spanning set set for
C˜⊥u can be computed in time poly(log2 |F|+ |K|µ + |I|) (by Claim G.8). Next, its output W meets the requirements:
• U ⊆ layer(T [K,F, L, µ, k], d(K, L, µ, |I|));
• |U | ≤ |I|, by definition of U ;
• I ⊆ (∪u∈U D˜u), by definition of U ;
• span(W ) = span(∪u∈UWu) = span(∪u∈U C˜⊥u ), by definition of W and Wu.
This completes the proof of Lemma 4.27.
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H Folklore claim on interpolating sets
Claim H.1. Let F be a field, let dcols, drows ∈ N, and consider three sets Scols, Srows ⊆ F and Spnts ⊆ F× F such that
|Scols|+ |Srows|+ |Spnts| ≤ min{dcols, drows}. Let f : F× F→ F be a function such that:
• for every α ∈ Scols there exists gcol,α ∈ F<drows [x] such that f(α, β) = gcol,α(β) for every β ∈ F;
• for every β ∈ Srows there exists grow,β ∈ F<dcols [x] such that f(α, β) = grow,β(α) for every α ∈ F.
Then there exists g ∈ F[X,Y ] such that: (i) degX(g) < drows; (ii) degY (g) < dcols; (iii) g|X=α = gcol,α for every
α ∈ Scols; (iv) g|Y=β = grow,β for every β ∈ Srows; (v) g(α, β) = f(α, β) for every (α, β) ∈ Spnts.
Proof. Any rectangle DX ×DY ⊆ F× F with |DX | = drows and |DY | = dcols is an interpolating set: for every w ∈
F
DX×DY there exists a unique g ∈ F[X,Y ] such that: (i) degX(g) < drows; (ii) degY (g) < dcols; (iii) g|DX×DY = w.
Define
DX := Scols ∪ {α : ∃β s.t. (α, β) ∈ Spnts} and DY := Srows ∪ {β : ∃α s.t. (α, β) ∈ Spnts} .
Note that |DX | ≤ drows and |DY | ≤ dcols; if either is strictly smaller, extend it arbitrarily to match the upper bound.
Choose w ∈ FDX×DY to be a word that satisfies: (i) w(α, β) = f(α, β) for every α ∈ Scols and β ∈ DY ;
(ii) w(α, β) = f(α, β) for every β ∈ Srows and α ∈ DX ; (iii) w(α, β) = f(α, β) for every (α, β) ∈ Spnts. Denote by
gw ∈ F[X,Y ] the unique “low degree extension” of w; we show that gw satisfies the requirements of the claim.
The degree bounds and the equivalence on Spnts follows by definition of gw; thus it suffices to show equivalence
of gw with f when restricted to the required rows and columns.
• For every α ∈ Scols: it holds by definition of gw that gw|{α}×DY = f |{α}×DY ; moreover, gw|{α}×F and f |{α}×F
are evaluations of polynomials of degree less than |DY |, which implies that gw|{α}×F = f |{α}×F.
• For every β ∈ Srows: it holds by definition of gw that gw|DX×{β} = f |DX×{β}; moreover, gw|F×{β} and f |F×{β}
are evaluations of polynomials of degree less than |DX |, which implies that gw|F×{β} = f |F×{β}.
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